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SUDAN NOTES AND RECORDS

incorporating
Proceedings of the
Philosophical Society
of the Sudan

19 R
Khartoum

السودان في رسائل ومدونات

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1959

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SUDAN NOTES AND RECORDS

Incorporating Proceedings of the
Philosophical Society of the Sudan

FOUNDED 1918

Patron :
HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL IBRAHIM ABBOUD
President, Supreme Council for the Armed Forces

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Editor : G. N. Sanderson

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Mekki Shibeika

VOLUME XL DOUBLE NUMBER
KHARTOUM, 1959

Transliteration of the Arabic Alphabet

adopted by the Editors of *Sudan Notes and Records*

ا	at beginning of word omit, hamza (')	ذ	dh (coll. d)	غ	gh
	elsewhere	ر	r	ف	f
		ز	z	ق	q (coll. g)
ب	b	س	s	ك	k
ت	t	ش	sh	ل	l
ث	th (coll. t or s)	ص	ṣ	م	m
ج	j or g	ض	ḍ	ن	n
ح	ḥ	ط	ṭ	ه	h
خ	kh	ظ	ẓ	و	w
د	d	ع	‘	ي	y

VOWELS

fatha	a,	lengthened	ā
kasra	i,	,,	ī
damma	u,	,,	ū

DIPHTHONGS

ى —ai (as in aisle).

و —au (as in mauser).

The ل of the article always remains *l*.

The silent *t* (ة) is omitted.

NOTES

1. The system is not applied to well-known names, such as Khartoum, Omdurman, etc.

2. The vowel sounds of *e* in ‘ get ’ and *o* in ‘ hot ’ with the corresponding long vowels (*a* in ‘ gate ’ and *o* in ‘ home ’), which occur only in the colloquial, are expressed by e, o, ē, ō.

e.g. beled, Mohammed, bēt (or beit), hōsh.

Ei may be used as alternative to show the long ē.

3. In geographical names the conventional spelling used by the Sudan Government Survey Department is followed, although not always agreeing with the above transliteration.

4. At present phonetic type is not available for proper reproduction of non-Arabic African languages.

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PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTORS

Particulars of those Contributors who participated in the Philosophical Society Conference on *The Sudan in History* will be found in the Conference Programme, printed on p. 3 below.

Other Contributors

MUSTAFA M. MUSAD, Reader in History, University of Cairo, Khartoum Branch.

FR. S. SANTANDREA, of the Verona Fathers' Mission. Resided for many years in the Bahr al-Ghazal.

G. NAWAR, Lecturer in Zoology, University of Khartoum.

ABDEL WAHAB MUSA, formerly on the staff of the Commissioner of Labour, Sudan Government.



Sudan Survey Dept, Khartoum.
(Topo No S.454 May, 1930)
(Corrected Feb, 1955)

SUDAN NOTES AND RECORDS

INCORPORATING

PROCEEDINGS OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY OF THE SUDAN

VOL. XL DOUBLE NUMBER 1959

EDITORIAL

This volume has a very strong historical bias, which we hope most of our readers will find acceptable. The bulk of it is made up of the Proceedings of the Seventh Philosophical Society Conference, on the theme of "The Sudan in History". In this Conference the Society attempted to present in non-technical language the latest findings of scholars on the whole range of Sudan History. These findings *Sudan Notes and Records* now offers to a wider public, in the belief that many readers will welcome a brief but authoritative statement of this kind.

Plans are now in hand for a complete reproduction, by xerographic methods, of the back numbers of this journal. For many years complete sets of *Sudan Notes and Records* have been well-nigh unobtainable, and in recent years the very few sets which have appeared on the market have changed hands at very high prices—recently at more than £150. The selling price of the xerographic reproduction has not yet been finally fixed; but it is hoped to offer complete sets, strongly and tastefully bound, at a price not exceeding £50 per set. It is believed that many Universities and other learned institutions, and some private subscribers, will be glad to take advantage of this offer. The work of reproduction is being sponsored and financed by the Sudan Publications Bureau, under the general supervision of the Minister of the Interior, to whose enlightened enterprise in this matter the Editor is happy to pay tribute on behalf of all who have a scholarly interest in the Sudan.

Arrangements are also being made for the appointment of a salaried full-time editorial assistant, which should enable the journal rapidly to overcome its arrears of publication, and in particular to bring the Sudan Bibliography up-to-date.

The Editor wishes to draw the attention of contributors to the standard system of transliteration adopted by *Sudan Notes and Records*. In this issue considerable editorial labour has been necessary to eliminate the more extreme variations; even so, complete consistency from article to article has not been achieved. Special attention is directed to the following points:—

ق is always "q" (except in Sudanese colloquial)

ج is *always* "j" or "g" (preferably "j"); and not "dj".

The vowels "e" and "o" should not appear except in the transliteration of Sudanese colloquial words.

The subscript ligature is *not* used. "Dotted" letters and the macron sign (ā, etc.) are not necessary in the well-known proper names for which a conventional "English" transliteration exists.

The Editorial Committee laments the untimely death, in May 1959, of one of its most distinguished members, Professor Saad ed Din Fawzi. Professor Fawzi was educated at Gordon Memorial College, at the University of St. Andrew's, and at Balliol College, Oxford, where he achieved the rare distinction of election to an Honorary Scholarship. At the time of his death he was Head of the Department of Economics, Dean of the Faculty of Economic and Social Studies, and Deputy Vice-Chancellor of the University of Khartoum. *Sudan Notes and Records* and the Philosophical Society of the Sudan were only two of his many interests outside the University; within the University, in spite of the burden involved in the organisation of a new Faculty, he was always willing to give his energetic assistance to colleagues who requested his co-operation. Meanwhile, although by predilection a philosopher, Saad Fawzi believed it his duty to devote himself to the study of the social and economic problems of the contemporary Sudan—especially the urban Sudan. In spite of his tragically short working career, and his extremely heavy administrative responsibilities, he published an astonishing range of articles and monographs in this field. His principal monument is his book *The Labour Movement in the Sudan*, which is reviewed in this issue of *Sudan Notes and Records*.

In the death of Saad Fawzi, the University and the Sudan as a whole mourn the irreparable loss of a brilliant scholar and academic administrator whose qualities of mind and character fitted him to play an increasingly important part in the intellectual development of the Sudan.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY OF THE SUDAN

THE SEVENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE SOCIETY

held in

THE UNIVERSITY OF KHARTOUM

on

15 and 16 January, 1959

Theme of the Conference :

THE SUDAN IN HISTORY

FIRST SESSION — Thursday, 15th January at 6 p.m.

J. VERCOUTTER, Commissioner for Archaeology :
Ancient Egyptian Influence in the Sudan.

Chairman : Dr. El Tigani Mohammed El Mahi.

Written Contribution :

T. H. THABIT, Department of Antiquities :
International Relations of the Sudan in Napatan Times.

SECOND SESSION — Friday, 16th January at 10 a.m.

L. P. KIRWAN, Director and Secretary, British Royal Geographical Society :
The International Position of Sudan in Roman and Medieval Times.

Chairman: Sayed Nasr El Hag 'Ali, Vice-Chancellor, University of Khartoum.

Written Contributions :

F. F. GADALLAH, Lecturer in History, University of Khartoum.
The Egyptian Contribution to Nubian Christianity.

A. J. ARKELL, Reader in Egyptology, University College, London :
The Medieval History of Darfur in its relation to other cultures and to the Nilotic Sudan.

THIRD SESSION — Friday, 16th January at 11.45 a.m.

ABD AL-MAGID ABDIN, Reader in Arabic, University of Khartoum :
Some general aspects of the Arabisation of the Sudan.

Chairman : G. N. Sanderson.

(Dr. 'Abd al-Magid's paper was delivered in Arabic: an English translation was distributed to all taking part in the Conference).

Written Contribution :

A. PAUL, formerly Governor, Kassala Province :
The Hadāreb. A study in Arab-Beja Relationships.

FOURTH SESSION — Friday, 16th January, at 6 p.m.

G. N. SANDERSON, Head of the Department of History, University of Khartoum.
The European Powers and the Sudan in the later nineteenth century.

Chairman : A. B. Theobald, Reader in History, University of Khartoum.

Written Contributions :

R. L. HILL, Lecturer in Near Eastern History, School of Oriental Studies, University of Durham :
The Period of Egyptian Occupation, 1820–1881.

P. M. HOLT, Lecturer in History, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London :
The Place in History of the Sudanese Mahdia.

A. B. THEOBALD, Reader in History, University of Khartoum :
Dārfūr and its Neighbours under Sultan Alī Dinār, 1898–1916.

A. W. M. DISNEY, formerly in Sudan Government Service :
English Law in the Sudan, 1899–1958.

THE SUDAN IN HISTORY: INAUGURAL ADDRESS

by

His Excellency Sayed Ziada Osman Arbab
Minister of Education and Justice

سيداني سادني

بالنيابة عن صاحب المعال الفريق ابراهيم عبود رئيس المجلس الاعلى للقوات المسلحة ورئيس الوزراء يسعدني ان افتتع هذا المؤتمر السنوى السابع للجمعية الفلسفية .

أن هذه الجمعية مؤسسة تسمو بمستوى البحث في الدراسات المختلفة حتى تنصهر فتصبح وحدة علمية متماسكة . هذه الجمعية كانت ولا زالت تعطى المكان الاول لبحث المواضيع الادبية والتاريخية زيادة على اهتمامها بالجانب الفلسفي كما تقوم من وقت لاخر بالدراسات الفنية الهامة للسودان .

ومن المهم حقا والبلاد في مطلع مرحلة التقدم والانشاء ان نجعل من العلم غاية في ذاته . ويسعدني إذأرى أن هذه الجمعية الفلسفية قد وضعت تقليدا يأخذ بأيدينا نحو هذا الهدف فهانحن بفضل هذا المبدأ استطعنا ان ندعو المحاضرين من غير اعضاء الجمعية نفسها من السودان ومن الخارج ويسرني أن يكون من بين المتكلمين المستر كراون مدير وسكرتير الجمعية الجغرافية الملكية كما يسرني ان ارىمن ضمن المشتركين في المحاضرات المكتوبة المستر اركل والمستر هولت الموظفين السابقين نجمهورية السودان .

فى عالم اليوم دول تأثرت علاقاتها الوديةلا لشيء في الغالب سوى جهل شعوب تلك الدول بحياة الشعوب الاخرى والناس في كل مكان مهما اختلفت عقائدهم او الوانهم هم في الواقع سواء لهم طموحهم المتشابهة كما لهممسراتهم واحزانهم . فمتى تحقق الناس من كل ذلكاصبح من المرجح ان يتخلوا عن شعورهم غير الودى نحو الاخرين وبذلك يعملون تلقائيا لغرس الصداقة والمحبة بينهم . وهذابلاشك هو المجال الذى تستطيع الجمعية الفلسفية ان تقوم بدور هام فيه .

لقد اختار هذا المؤتمر للبحث موضوعا هاما طريفا هو « السودان فى التاريخ » ويتضح من برنامج المؤتمر انه قد عالج هذا الموضوع على نطاق واسع شامل ، ذلك لأن الأبحاث فيه سواء منها ما سيلقي اويقدم مكتوبا تعالج تاريخ السود ان منذ اقدم عصوره حتى العصر الحاضر مع مزيد من الاهتمام بالعلاقة بين السود ان والبلاد المجاورة واني لارجو ان يكون هذا العرض التاريخي الشامل مفيدا في التعرفالي اهميةما أداه السودان لتاريخ وادى النيل

والشرق الادنى . وانا علي يقين من ان هذا العرض التارتخي سيدلنا كيف كان السود ان عاملا هاما في تاريخ هذه المناطق .

ومن الاهمية بمكان ان يتعرف السودانيون ويتأملوا في تاريخ بلادهم ويطيب لي ان الاحظ بأن الاهتمام قد ازداد في السنوات الاخيرة بتاريخ السودان في داخل القطر وفي خارجه . وهاهم الباحثون الاكفاء من سودانيين واجانب يتوفرون علي دراسة الحقب التاريخية المختلفة من تاريخ هذا البلد وقد بدأت بحوثهم تؤتى ثمارها واستطاع القائمون علي هذا المؤيمر ان ينجحوا في تجنيد اقلام حفنة من الباحثين الممتازين وعلى ذلك فأن هذا المؤتمر سيقدم للجمهور اخر نتائج هذه الجهود في هذا الميد ان في اسلوب غير اسلوب الاصطلاحات العلمية .

وانه لواجب وطني ان نتأكد بأن تاريخ بلادنا قد كتب من غير ما تحيز او غرض وبأن معالمه الصحيحة خلال الاحقاب والقرون قد اصبحت جزءا من ثقافة كل مواطن سوداني .

وفي الختام أرجو للمؤتمر والجمعية نيابلة عن صاحب المعالي الرئيس نجاحا وتوفيقا في هذا الجهد الطيب املا ان تجد اغراض الجمعية واهد افها ماتستحقه من الانتشار والتقدير والسلام عليكم .

[ENGLISH TRANSLATION]

Ladies and Gentlemen,

On behalf of His Excellency General Abboud, The President of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and Prime Minister of the Sudan, I am most happy to open this Seventh Annual Conference of the Philosophical Society.

It exists for the promotion and diffusion of learning at a high level. In the past it has concerned itself with literary and historical matters as well as philosophical ones and indeed, at times, with technical matters of great importance to the Sudan.

At the present stage of the development of this new independent country, it is vitally important to pursue learning for its own sake and I am glad to observe that your Society is building up this tradition. Through it we are able to invite speakers from outside this Society and from outside the Sudan as well. I am pleased to notice that Mr. L. P. Kirwan, Director and Secretary, British Royal Geographical Society, is one of the speakers and that Mr. Arkell and Dr. Holt, former Sudan Government Officials, have contributed to the written papers.

In the world today some countries are unfriendly with others; very often the hostility arises out of the fact that the nations concerned are completely ignorant of the ways of life of each other. People everywhere, whatever their creed or colour, are basically the same, they have the same sort of ambitions, the same sort of pleasures and the same sort of worries. When people grow to realise this, they are more likely to lose their hostility and cultivate friendship towards each other. This is surely a matter in which the Philosophical Society of the Sudan can play a major part.

This Conference has as its subject the very important and interesting theme of *The Sudan in History*, and it is clear from the programme of the Conference that this theme has been interpreted in a wide and comprehensive sense. The Conference, by means both of spoken addresses and written contributions, will survey the history of the Sudan from its beginnings down almost to contemporary times ; and particular emphasis is laid throughout upon the contacts of the Sudan with its neighbours. I hope this will illustrate the importance of the specifically Sudanese contribution to the history of the Nile valley and of the Near East ; I am sure it will show that throughout its long history, the Sudan has been an important factor in these regions.

At the present time it is obviously of the greatest importance that citizens of the Sudan should become familiar with, and reflect upon, the long and distinguished history of their country. In recent years there has been a very marked increase of interest in Sudanese history, both here in the Sudan and elsewhere ; and a number of able scholars, both Sudanese and foreigners, are now at work upon various periods of the country's history. Their researches are now beginning to bear fruit ; and the organisers of the Conference have been able to secure contributions from some of the leading scholars in this field. The Conference will thus present to the public, in a non-technical form, the latest results of scientific historical research. I hope that this will not only propagate a fuller appreciation of the part played by the Sudan in History, but that it will also stimulate further research, especially by Sudanese scholars. It is, I believe, an essential national duty to ensure that the history of our country should be accurately ascertained, and that a knowledge of its salient features throughout the ages should become part of the culture of Sudanese citizens.

In conclusion, on behalf of His Excellency The President, I should like to wish the Society and Conference every success in its praiseworthy undertaking, hoping that its aims will be more widely understood and appreciated as time goes on.

ANCIENT EGYPTIAN INFLUENCE IN THE SUDAN

by

J. VERCOUTTER

One of the problems which faces the Historian when dealing with the earliest history of the Sudan is that of Historical Criticism. There are dual sources for this period: Egyptian texts and paintings on the one side; archaeological remains found in the Sudan on the other. But the former, which are not yet all gathered together, are biased, and the latter are little known or incomplete. As long as the archaeology of this country is not systematically explored, our knowledge of its early history will be more or less influenced by the personal views of Ancient Egyptians about the Sudan, views which are unfavourably coloured by the fact that the first relations between the Lower and the Upper parts of the Nile valley were warlike. Notwithstanding these difficulties, which we must keep in mind, if only to remind us that our reconstruction of the History of the Sudan is still conjectural, it is possible to give a general idea of the interrelations which from the dawn of history linked Egypt with its southern neighbours.

Since Herodotus it has been a commonplace among historians to begin with a short introduction on the physical geography of the country, even if this geography had but little to do with what they had to say. Not to break so general and commendable a practice, we will see how and why physical geography played a part in the early influence of Egypt in the Sudan, but before doing so I should like to stress the fact that for the History of the interrelations between Egypt and the Sudan we must take into consideration not only the geography, but also the ethnology of the country. Unfortunately, if the Nile Valley is still— even taking into consideration the minor changes in flora and fauna—basically the same as it was five thousand years ago, the same cannot be said of the peoples who inhabited the country. The Nile Valley has always been a temptation to the nomads dwelling in the adjacent deserts—if only to get water for their cattle during the droughts in the desert, and as early as 1900 B.C. the Ancient Egyptian texts stressing the then unhappy condition of Egypt remarked :

"lo, the nomads now come with their cattle to drink the Nile waters".

But the Sudanese part of the Nile Valley is at a disadvantage compared to Egypt— indeed the wider the valley, the denser the population. During periods of political stability the Egyptian population has always been sufficient in numbers to keep the nomad invaders away from the rich agricultural soil of their country. This was all the easier since the Eastern Desert, the only one which was really inhabited, is narrower in Egypt than further south. On the other hand, the very narrow strip of cultivated land in Nubia could not feed so large a population as in Egypt, with the result that the sedentary peoples, being few in number, have always been an easy prey for the far more numerous tribes living in the extensive eastern and southern deserts. This explains why we can assume from earliest times in the Northern Sudan, successive waves of nomadic invaders—first maybe the B-Group peoples, then the C-Group peoples, the X-Group, the Nobatae of Latin sources. With one exception, however: the Dongola reach of the Valley, where the richer banks seem to have always fed a greater number of men who more easily resisted invasion, and formed, therefore, for many centuries, the real heart of the Sudan.

* * *

To illustrate the difficulties the Egyptians faced when they started their advance southwards, we will join one of the troops which King Djer (about 3250 B.C.) sent to Ta-Seti—"The Land of the Bow"—as the Northern Sudan was then known to

the Egyptians. The gathering of the army was done not at Aswan, as one would imagine, but further north at Gebel Silsile near Kom-Ombo, about 50 km. north of Aswan, which was then called "The Head of the South". The First Cataract Area was entirely in the hands of Sudanese tribes, with the result that from the very start the Egyptian crews of the small ships which formed the expedition had to fight their way through the rapids of the Cataract where bowmen could shoot safely at them from the rocks towering over the rapids, when the full force of the crew had to be put ashore to tow the ships southward. Anyone who has seen the rapids beneath the Aswan Dam will realize the difficulty of such an enterprise, and will wonder why the Egyptians of the First Dynasty started it at all. The answer is first the insecurity of the Southern Province. Egypt unified at last, some fifty years before under King Menes, had begun to expand its agriculture considerably, devising the system of the "hods", or irrigation basins and canals, to make the best possible use of the water provided by the annual Flood. The benefit of this invention was an increase in the cultivated land. Warlike tribes coming from the South were an everyday danger for the peasants of the Southern Province, and futhermore they stopped the advance of agriculture. Hence the King's desire to stop the aggressors by making his own incursion into the Nubian country. Secondly, from this early period we can suspect the desire of the Egyptians to get from the Sudan valuable raw materials such as ebony and ivory, which were found in the graves in Egypt from Predynastic times onwards.

A. J. Arkell has shown that King Djer went as far south as the Second Cataract near Wadi Halfa, entering the present Sudan and conquering the whole of what was to be known later as Lower Nubia, that is the part of the country between the First and Second Cataracts. I will take this opportunity to remind you that historically, geographically, and ethnologically, the Border between Egypt and the Sudan is not, as now, at the 22nd parallel, but much farther north at the *First Cataract*.

The chances are that at this time (around 3250 B.C.) the Egyptian Army did not conquer the country permanently. From time to time they sent armed forces which plundered the country and, by keeping the tribes on the alert, prevented them from coming and raiding Egypt. This is shown by the very place chosen by King Djer's general to engrave his Victory Inscription : an isolated hill not too far from the River, but easy to defend and with a clear view of the whole country, so that any advancing force could be easily detected and there was no longer any danger of surprise attack.

But if the Egyptian penetration to the Second Cataract during the Old Kingdom was not a permanent one, it led none the less to important results : the peoples of the country became accustomed to the Egyptian Civilization which was now flourishing in the lower valley, and imported objects and copper. This explains how we came to find, only three years ago, a magnificent alabaster vase of the First Dynasty, in a Sudanese settlement at Faras near Wadi Halfa. The people living in this part of the Sudan at this time are known as the A-Group. They belonged to the Hamitic race and were, therefore, closely related to the predynastic Egyptians, from whom it is impossible to distinguish them physically. Unfortunately, we have not enough archaeological data on the A-Group people in the Sudan to form a clear idea of their civilization. We do not even know how far south they extended. The discovery by A. J. Arkell, at Omdurman, of red polished pottery clearly related to the Egyptian predynastic pottery seems to point to the fact that the A-Group tribes might have occupied the whole Northern Sudan, at least as far south as Khartoum. But until this Omdurman Bridge culture has yielded human remains, we will not know if the people who created it belonged to the Hamitic race, or if they came from another stock but had trade relations with the true A-Group people, and had more or less adopted their culture.

The Archaeological Survey of Nubia conducted in Egyptian territory from 1900 onwards, has shown that the A-Group culture disappeared progressively from the beginning of the Egyptian Old Kingdom (2770–2420). This may be the result of Egyptian raids, which were pursued during this period as we know from an Egyptian Inscription, which records that during the reign of King Snefru (about 2700 B.C.) 7,000 prisoners and 200,000 head of cattle were captured in Sudanese Nubia. Taking the text at its face value, if we compare the number of prisoners with the number of cattle, we can infer that the Nubian tribes were then chiefly cattle breeders, and hence largely nomads. So there might be other explanations for the impoverished state of Lower Nubia at this time recorded by the Archaeological Survey; the explanation being either that the A-Group tribes moved southwards out of the reach of the Egyptian army, or were themselves replaced or overwhelmed by newcomers from the South, as we could deduce from the fact that the skulls found in the B-Group graves show definite traces of negroid blood.

As is often the case with the Egyptian Old Kingdom, so rich in monuments, we have but little data on the historical events of the Fourth Dynasty, the Dynasty of the famous Cheops, Chephren, and Mykerinus. It is probable that the policy of military raids on the Southern territories was continued by them, since they quarried Diorite in the Western Desert no more than 70 km. from the Nile Valley in its Sudanese reach, but we have no real evidence, and we have to wait till the end of the Old Kingdom—after the Fifth Dynasty—to get more historical information on the Sudan.

By the end of the Fifth Dynasty, the Egyptians, it seems, had firmly settled their boundary at Aswan, since an inscription there records that in the fifth year of his reign King Merenre, of the Sixth Dynasty, came in person, and the princes of Medja, Irtet, and Wawat, that is the whole of Lower Nubia, paid homage to him; and from a small text found nearby it seems that Unis, the last king of the Fifth Dynasty, did the same—so that while Nubia south of Aswan was still free, it had nevertheless strong links with the Egyptian monarchy.

From this time Aswan and its local princes will play an important part in the history of Egyptian relations with the South, and Elephantine is the stronghold from which all southward expeditions will start. To make these expeditions easier, Merenre, fourth king of the Sixth Dynasty (about 2300 B.C.) the last dynasty of the so-called Old Kingdom, asked Weny, the Governor of the South, to dig canals through the First Cataract. Weny boasts of having done the work in one year.

Whether or not it was the result of the work of Weny, it is a fact that expeditions to the South were far more frequent during the Sixth Dynasty than ever before. Most of these expeditions were peaceful: their obvious aim was to explore the southern countries, and to try and get the valued products of the south: incense, ebony, ivory, leopard skins, and so on. How far south these expeditions went is still open to doubt. Reisner, the American Egyptologist, was of the opinion that they might have reached Sennar on the Blue Nile; Arkell suggests that they went at least as far as Darfur. But the fact is that the only geographical names mentioned in the Egyptian texts refer to small countries between the First and Second Cataracts: Wawat, Irtet, Sethu, and Iam—and one wonders why, if the Egyptians went so far south as the Blue Nile, they did not give any names to their discoveries. We know that the Ancient Egyptians could be boastful, and from time to time they say in their inscriptions: "*This is the real truth, there is no lie in it*", which, instead of reassuring us, leaves us somewhat doubtful about the veracity of all the texts.

However, we must keep an open mind and not be hypercritical, as a few facts seem to show that they really went quite far south. For one thing it is obvious from the texts that they explored the desert roads, since they used asses for the transport

of water, and they would not have had to do so if they had limited themselves to the countries between the first and second Cataracts, where transport by river is much easier than by land, as is shown even today, when all the traffic between Wadi Halfa and Shellal is still by steamer. Furthermore, when excavating Kerma, a little south of the Third Cataract, Reisner found, under the Middle Kingdom level, fragments of vases of the Sixth Dynasty. Maybe this discovery is not as conclusive as it seems, but we have to bear it in mind, and we can presume that by the end of the Old Kingdom the Egyptians had probably reached the Third Cataract area, where they were in a position to get, by barter, most of the materials they were looking for.

We have now surveyed more than one thousand years, and I will summarize the position so far reached by Egypt in the Sudan. While the border between Egypt and the Southern countries is now firmly established at the First Cataract, it does not seem that between 3250 and 2200 B.C. the Egyptians ever tried to establish themselves permanently in the country. They contented themselves by trading with the tribes, sending them faience and alabaster objects, ointment, honey, woven cloth, and maybe copper, and getting in exchange, as I have mentioned above, resins, woods, ivory, oils, certain special kinds of grain, incense, myrrh, and leopard skins used as ceremonial dress for religious purposes. Furthermore from time to time armed expeditions brought back slaves and cattle. But this exchange was not the only benefit Egypt drew from the Sudan at this period. It seems that as early as 2400 B.C. Sudanese were employed in the Egyptian army as mercenaries, and it is certain that Egyptians of the Old Kingdom married Sudanese women, even in the royal family, as can be seen from pictures in the tombs. So that the people from the two countries knew each other well. If we except the few military expeditions sent by Pharaoh from time to time, to release the pressure on the walls of Elephantine, this period, on the whole, was one of peaceful penetration when the Egyptians tried to make the best of the trading road between Egypt and Central Africa which passed through the Northern Sudan. Of course, this part of the History of the Sudan is chiefly known from Egyptian sources, so that it is difficult to appreciate what the Sudanese really got in return from Egypt. Future archaeological research in the Sudan should give the answer to this question.

The period of some two centuries (from 2240 to about 2150 B.C.) between the end of the Old Kingdom and the rise of the Middle Kingdom, is known to Egyptologists as the First Intermediate Period. It is a period of social troubles, disorder and anarchy in Egypt, so that we have but few records of what was going on in the country, which had divided itself into small feudal princedoms. It seems that trading with the south had stopped, if we take at their face value the laments of an Egyptian sage of this time, who complained that a special kind of oil, which came from the Sudan, did not reach Egypt any more. Incidentally, the text shows that we must not value ancient trading according to our own view of the economic importance of raw materials. A product of little economic use could be of immense value because it had religious significance to the importer. What is true of a special oil is also true of the leopard skin, which was part of the dress used by the funeral priest during the burial ceremonies even of ordinary people.

But if the Egyptians did not go south any more, it seems that the Sudanese seized the opportunity to go north themselves, and Egyptian texts mention the happiness of the Medja—possible the Beja of today—wandering in the Nile Valley. It is probable that the invasion of Egypt by the tribes dwelling between the First and Second Cataracts would have been even more far-reaching, had they not themselves been subject to attack, probably from the south-west.

We have no information as to the precise date of the arrival in Lower Nubia of the new invaders, who belonged, it seems, to another branch of the red-brown Hamitic race, but with a slight admixture of negroid blood. It is possible, as A. J. Arkell suggests, that they were but the descendants of the people who lived further south during the preceding period and developed the Omdurman Bridge culture. Anyway they settled in the valley between the First and Second Cataracts, and introduced into this part of the country a completely different culture. They were chiefly cattle breeders, and it has been suggested that their move to the Nile Valley was due to the "increasing dessication of their old homelands".

While the C-Group people were installing themselves in Lower Nubia, politics in Egypt had undergone an important change. Central power was no longer at Memphis, near modern Cairo, but at Thebes, the present Luxor. One can see in the displacement of the chief city of Egypt, the reason why, from the beginning, the new power took a still more active interest in the south than its forerunner, the Sixth Dynasty. It is true that after a while, the Pharaohs of the Twelfth Dynasty came back to Middle Egypt, but all of them came originally from the southern part of Egypt and therefore pursued the policy of expansion southwards initiated by their predecessors, the kings of the Eleventh Dynasty.

With the rise of the Middle Kingdom, Egyptian policy towards the Sudan underwent a profound change. Pharaoh did not content himself now with sending trading caravans, and from time to time a military expedition. Henceforth he pursued the military conquest of the country, thus sowing the seeds of the future policy of the New Kingdom. What were the reasons for this change ? One can but guess. However, two facts thrust themselves upon us : first, the establishment near the Border of Egypt of the newcomers, the C-Group people ; secondly the search for gold mines.

It has been suggested, it is true, that the C-Group were a peace-loving people, but one cannot but be impressed by the strength of the fortresses which the Egyptians built in the area inhabited by them. Professor Emery is now excavating one of these fortresses in the Sudan at Buhen, and anyone passing through Wadi Halfa can see for himself that the fortification system devised by the Middle Kingdom engineers was as good, if not better than, and quite as complicated as, any medieval one. Surely the Egyptians would not have taken such pains had they not felt insecure among the inhabitants of the country. This gives a first motive for the new Egyptian policy—a desire for security on their southern border.

The second incentive for the conquest of the Sudan is new too. While, during the Old Kingdom, the Egyptians were asking for wood, ivory, ostrich feathers, incense, leopard skins, and so on, from the South, they are now prospecting for gold, and the Sudan is going to be for all the centuries to come, one of the Eldorados of the Ancient World.

When did the search for gold start ? The Old Kingdom lists of products from the south do not mention it—but one suspects that during their stay in the south the caravan leaders of the Sixth Dynasty got information about it, or saw gold dust in the possession of the Sudanese. Alternatively, during the military campaigns of the Eleventh Dynasty some Egyptians may have witnessed the same phenomenon that struck Linant de Bellefonds in 1820 when, during a flood of the Wadi Allaqi, he saw gold dust in the silt washed away by the waters. This would explain why prospecting seems to have started in the Wadi Allaqi and extended afterwards to all the mountainous districts near the First and Second Cataracts.

The conquest initiated by the kings of the Eleventh Dynasty as early as 2060 B.C. was pursued and achieved by the pharaohs of the Twelfth Dynasty. Sesostris I, second king of the Dynasty, most probably reached the Third Cataract area and by the time of Sesostris III, about 1880 B.C., at least fourteen strongholds had been built between Semna, at the Head of the Second Cataract, and Elephantine ; and Egyptian settlers from the Theban region had installed themselves in fortified towns in the shadow of the strongholds. But one remarkable fact is that all the Egyptian fortresses built in the Sudan—with two exceptions—are either on the West Bank of the river or on small islands, one of the exceptions being the stronghold of Kuban, obviously built to protect the road following the Wadi Allaqi towards the gold mines, while the other, the fort at Serrah, could have been erected for the same purpose. This fact shows clearly that the Egyptians did not feel secure on the East Bank of the Nile because of the ever important nomadic tribes of the Sudanese Eastern Desert, mentioned above.

By the end of the Twelfth Dynasty, all the Western Bank of the Nile between Aswan and Semna was considered as part of Egypt, and Sesostris III erected at Semna three boundary stelae giving definite instructions to the commanders of forts not to let anyone pass the border, except for trading purposes. By chance an archaeological find in Egypt gave us proof that the king's orders were strictly obeyed. About sixty years ago, in the ruins of the Ramasseum, was found a bunch of hieratic papyri, some of them dating back to the Middle Kingdom, among which were some loose leaves, known now as the "Semna despatches". They are some of the daily reports sent to Egypt by the Commanders of the Egyptian strongholds in the Sudan. In one of them the Commander informs headquarters that on such and such a day he received news about some nomads wandering in the desert, and that, accordingly, he had immediately sent a patrol which was able to find them and bring them into the Fort. The despatch ends by giving the number of people (thirty-two men) seized by the patrol, and, as a good official should, he reports to his superior that the people were sent back where they had come from after having been fed. This tiny incident in the border life, gives vivid colour to the stereotyped sentences of the royal stelae, which otherwise might have been thought meaningless boastings.

Their border firmly established at Semna, the Egyptians did not stop at that. While they were achieving the conquest of the northern part of Nubia, they pursued in the South the efforts of the trading caravans of the Old Kingdom. They reached the very heart of the Sudanese kingdom of this time, the Dongola reach of the Nile, and started doing business with the Sudanese kings. The capital of the kingdom was then at Kerma (not very far from New Dongola). The Egyptians introduced there their building methods, and erected, on behalf of the Sudanese king, a huge brick chapel, known now as the Eastern Defufa ; but at the same time, they seized the opportunity to build themselves a fort to protect their trading centre.

It has been suggested, and some scholars still believe, that an Egyptian governor took the place of the local king and ruled the country on behalf of Pharaoh. This governor, named Hepidjefa, might have died at Kerma and been buried there according to the local customs, since statues of himself and his wife were found in one of the Kerma graves ; but other scholars prefer to assume that the statues of Hepidjefa found at Kerma were either given to the Sudanese king by Hepidjefa himself, or brought back later from Egypt by a Sudanese king. Personally, I prefer the latter explanation, for the simple reason that the real grave of Hepidjefa is known . . . and is in Egypt !

If we agree, and I think we must, that during the Middle Kingdom the Egyptian settlement at Kerma was only a trading centre—then, from the material recovered by

excavations on the site, we can see how important was the Egyptian influence on the Sudanese kingdom. Faience objects, statues, alabaster vessels, beads, scarabs, jewels—Egyptian objects are indeed numerous and of excellent workmanship. But they should not blind us to the fact that the purely Sudanese objects found beside them are of as good workmanship as the Egyptian ones—the pottery, particularly, is wonderful and Egyptian potters of the same period would have been unable to produce it. It is obvious that a mixed culture, basically Sudanese but superficially Egyptianized, developed at Kerma. This civilization, which we will call the Kerma Culture, survived after the fall of the Middle Kingdom in Egypt and the subsequent surrender of the forts south of Aswan.

Recently important information on the history of the Sudan during the dark period which followed the Middle Kingdom has been discovered. The most important is the text of the Kamose stela discovered at Karnak three years ago. Kamose, king of Egypt about 1600 B.C., was fighting against the Hyksos who still occupied the Lower part of Egypt. In the Karnak stela, Kamose mentions that an Egyptian patrol in the desert intercepted a message from the Hyksos King to the King of Kush. From the text of the message, which is given in full in the Egyptian, it appears that the Hyksos King was then trying to arrange a combined attack on Egypt, from the South by the troops of Kush, and from the North by his own army, the reward being, as he puts it vaguely, "Then we shall divide the towns of Egypt between us". We do not know if the Hyksos king, his first message having been intercepted, sent another one, but the text shows definitely that the Sudanese kingdom was strong enough to be an important factor in the politics of the Seventeenth Century B.C. As a result, it explains a number of facts so far misunderstood, the main one being that after the retreat of the Egyptian army from Nubia, some time around 1780 B.C., a unified Sudanese power took over from the Egyptians.

This power was not systematically hostile towards Egypt. Not only did it send mercenaries to the Theban kings, but it also had Egyptians in its employment. An Egyptian text of this period throws a delightful light on what was then happening in the Sudan. A certain Haankhef, a military officer, writes on his funerary stela, found at Edfu, that he was for six years in the service of the King of Kush, and that at his retirement he brought back with him twenty-six *deben* of gold—a weight of nearly five pounds—so it seems that the Sudanese Government of the time not only had short term contracts for expatriates, but used the bonus system too.

Haankhef was not the only Egyptian official we know of, who was employed by the King of Kush—so we may assume another powerful factor in the Egyptian influence in the Sudan, namely Egyptians in Sudanese service. The result of this influence was obviously the greater strength of the kingdom of Kerma or Kush, as it appears in the Kamose stela. But the sad part of the story is that this new power was now a danger to Egypt, and that is why the pharaohs of the New Kingdom could have no rest until it was destroyed. So the achievements of the Sudanese Kingdom of the Seventeenth Century led, in the long run, to the Egyptian conquest of the Sixteenth. But the seeds of independence were not lost, and personally, I have no doubt that the Sudanese kings of Napata, who, nine centuries later, came to power in the Dongola region, were but the descendants of the Kerma rulers.

After Dr. Vercoutter had read his paper the following discussion took place:—

Mr. Kirwan asked whether the lecturer could throw any light on the connection between the C-group people and the Kerma culture. The C-group had lived in the area between the first and second cataracts ; and the fact that no signs of wounds had

been found on their bodies seemed to indicate that the relations between the C-group and the Egyptians had been peaceful.

Dr. Vercoutter replied that it was true that no signs of wounds had been found, nor were there any weapons in the graves of the C-group people. This might of course be explained by the possibility that weapons were thought to be too valuable to be deposited in graves. It was hoped that further excavations would increase our knowledge of the Kerma culture.

Sayed Nasr el Hag Ali asked why the peoples of Ancient Nubia had no names other than Group A, B ,C, etc. ; and *Sayed Justice M. I. El Nur* further enquired why this system of nomenclature embodied so large a gap between the C-group and the X-group.

Dr. Vercoutter replied that this literal nomenclature was an indication of our ignorance of the real identity of these peoples ; with the possible exception of the X-group, their proper names were unknown. The wide gap between C and X was intended to indicate that a long period of time had elapsed between the appearances of these two groups.

Dr. Fawzi Gadallah said that he believed that the claims made in Ancient Egyptian inscriptions, that very large numbers of A-group people had been killed or captured, must have been exaggerated. Expeditions which were in effect no more than raids could hardly have inflicted casualties on the scale claimed.

Dr. Vercoutter replied that in his opinion Dr. Gadallah's scepticism was justified ; but as the inscriptions themselves were our sole evidence there was no means of checking the accuracy of the statements they contained.

Mr. Sanderson said that the Old Kingdom inscriptions seemed to record the interchange of material objects and of personnel only. Was there any other evidence, which might throw light on a possible exchange in religion or culture ?

Dr. Vercoutter replied that for this period no evidence other than that of the inscriptions was available.

Professor Sandon asked whether the commodities in which Nubia traded with the Old Kingdom were the indigenous products of Nubia, or whether the Nubians themselves traded with more remote regions and brought the products of these regions to points where they could be exchanged for Egyptian goods.

Dr. Vercoutter replied that he himself would very much like to know the answer to this question. It was his own belief that the Nubians did send out trading caravans into the remoter interior, but of this there was no definite proof.

Sayed Mustafa Mohammed Khojali asked whether the Ancient Egyptian religion had influenced the Nubians in any way.

Dr. Vercoutter said in reply that there was some evidence of a possible interchange in religious ideas in the Kerma area. In one of the Kerma graves, a funerary boat had been found. It was therefore possible that the Egyptian religion had been introduced ; but the mere presence of the boat was not of course proof of this.

Sayed Nassif Ishag asked what kinds of pottery had been found in the Kerma region.

Dr. Vercoutter said that the typical Kerma pottery was of two kinds, one black-and-red and the other coloured. Both kinds were very thin and hard.

Sayed Nasr El Hag Ali said that he was particularly interested in the continuing influence of historical traditions. Were there any present-day survivals of Ancient Egyptian influence in Nubia, where that culture must at one time have been so strong ?

Dr. Vercoutter replied that such survivals undoubtedly did exist, although their point of origin could not be precisely dated. For example, in Northern Province, boats were still being built to the same design as those of the Ancient Egyptians; and the thin plaits of hair worn by little girls in the Halfa region were clearly descended from the style which was fashionable in Ancient Egypt and is frequently depicted in funerary paintings.

Professor Murray said that he had noticed that the lecturer had only once referred to a resemblance between ancient and modern names, although other writers on this period made much use of such resemblances.

Dr. Vercoutter said that he believed that such apparent resemblances should be used only with the greatest caution. *Mr. Kirwan* added that in his opinion one of the greatest shortcomings in the study of the Ancient Sudan was that superficial resemblances between ancient and modern local and tribal names had often been made the basis for sweeping historical generalisations for which there was no other evidence.

Sayed Mustafa Mohammed Khojali asked whether the speaker could give any further information about the influence of Ancient Egypt upon Ancient Nubia in such spheres as architecture and religion.

Dr. Vercoutter said in reply that our knowledge of the history of Ancient Nubia was as yet of necessity very limited. There were over four hundred known sites of archaeological interest in the Northern Sudan; of these only twenty-six had been partially explored and none had been completely explored. An answer to Sayed Mustafa's question must therefore await further knowledge derived from much more extensive excavation.

Dr. Collinson asked whether there was any evidence that the Red Sea route between Egypt and the Sudan had been used during the Middle and New Kingdoms, or whether communications had been limited to the Nile Valley route.

Dr. Vercoutter replied that during the periods with which he had been dealing there was no such evidence. The earliest record of the Red Sea route dates from Ptolemaic times, when Egyptian travellers are mentioned who must have touched at ports on the Red Sea coast of the Sudan.

Sayed Mohammed Ahmed Ali asked whether there was any truth in a local tradition that a tunnel existed between Buhen and the near-by pyramids.

Dr. Vercoutter said that as yet nothing had been found which could substantiate such a belief.

Sayed Justice M.I. El Nur remarked that today the resources of cultivable land between the second and third cataracts was very limited, yet this region appeared to have been prosperous in ancient times. Was there any evidence of greater rainfall in the ancient period? Could the speaker give any estimate of the former prosperity of this region?

Dr. Vercoutter answered that an archaeological air survey of the region had revealed that there had certainly been more cultivation in ancient times than at present; but he did not think that its agricultural resources had ever been very great.

Dr. Taha Baashar asked about the historical significance of the excavated site at Omdurman. What had been the shape and attitude of the bodies found there? Could any information concerning cultural or religious ideas be deduced from the finds?

Dr. Vercoutter replied that the excavations had been conducted by Mr. Arkell, and that he had found no bodies, but only artifacts. The pottery found showed techniques similar to those employed in the pottery of pre-dynastic Egypt. The conclusion was that the Omdurman people were of the same culture as those of the northern provinces of the Sudan. But there could be no certainty until human remains had been found.

Sayed Doleib Mohammed El Mahdi remarked that the lecturer had referred to trade in such substances as incense and resins. These commodities were not now produced in Sudanese Nubia. Was the climate in those times more suitable for their production, or were they imported from elsewhere?

Dr. Vercoutter said that these commodities might either have been produced in the Dongola reach, or have been brought from a region further to the south-east. He thought the latter was the more probable explanation.

Sayed Mohammed Allam disagreed with the speaker's view that the Kerma civilisation was basically Sudanese and only superficially Egyptian. He believed the reverse to be the case.

Dr. Vercoutter answered that no one could be certain until there had been very much more excavation. One difficulty was that all the sites so far excavated had been in the extreme North of the cultural area, within the present Egyptian boundaries. Until sites further to the south had been fully investigated, it was impossible to generalise with any great confidence.

Sayed Mustafa Mohammed Khojali remarked that the lecturer had made it clear that the main factors in the influence of Ancient Egypt upon the Sudan had been commerce, conquest and migration. Which did he think had been the most important?

Dr. Vercoutter replied that at first the main interest of the Egyptians had been the acquisition of raw materials from the Sudan. Later, as the Sudanese kingdoms became stronger, they began to present a potential military threat to Egypt, and fears for their southern frontier led the Egyptians to invade and conquer parts of the Northern Sudan.

Sayed Mirza Hamza asked whether any precise definition could be given to the region known as 'Kush'. Some writers seemed to include Ethiopia within its borders, and some even used the name to indicate a region extending as far as India.

Dr. Vercoutter replied that up to the time of the Middle Kingdom, the name 'Kush' was applied only to a restricted region between Sai and Semna. From the time of the New Kingdom, the word was used to denote the region as far as Kurgus, but not further south. Later still, the name 'Kush' was used by Semitic writers to denote the whole of the Meroitic kingdom. *Mr. Kirwan* added that he thought that it was only in the earliest period that the name had been used with any great precision.

Professor Butler asked whether there was any evidence from Egyptian paintings of the physical appearance of the Sudanese in ancient times.

Dr. Vercoutter said that paintings had been found in a tomb near Wadi Halfa which seemed to indicate that at the time of the early New Kingdom, the Sudan was inhabited by three races, respectively black, red-bronze and nearly yellow in colour.

Dr. Hadi El Nagar said that he had recently seen in the museum at Damascus some remarkable surgical instruments which had been used by the Ancient Egyptians. Had the lecturer any information about the surgical instruments used in the Sudan in ancient times?

Dr. Vercoutter replied that he had no such information, as no surgeon's grave had yet been found in the Sudan.

The Chairman (*Dr. Tijani El Mahi*) intervened to say that we now knew a great deal about Ancient Egyptian medicine and surgery from papyri which had been translated, although many of the drugs and diseases described in them could not now be identified. There were descriptions of the use of animal extracts for treatment, and of both surgical and magical treatments. The influence of Ancient Egyptian medicine upon other peoples, particularly the Arabs and the Greeks, had been very great. The Ancient Egyptians knew both the symptoms of and the treatment for hysteria; they knew of sedative drugs for inducing sleep. Of course many of the diseases in the Sudan in ancient times may have been local phenomena for which local treatments would doubtless have been used; but these local treatments may well have had a basis in Ancient Egyptian medicine. It was quite possible that investigation in Northern Province would reveal the use of Ancient Egyptian medical methods in local traditional treatment.

The Chairman, in thanking Dr. Vercoutter for his interesting and learned paper, said that it had been an admirable illustration of a remark by Sir Winston Churchill: "The longer you can look backward, the further you can look forward".

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE SUDAN IN NAPATAN TIMES

By
T. H. Thabit

In the surviving annals and traditions of the older European and Asiatic nations, few foreign lands and peoples are more often and favourably mentioned than are ancient Ethiopia and the ancient Ethiopians. In the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, the earliest of all known Greek literature, Homer speaks of no non-Hellenic people in more exalted terms than he does of the "blameless Ethiopians"; and Herodotus, the "father of history", calls the ancient Sudanese the "most handsome" and the "most just of men". Diodorus Siculus, Pliny the Elder, Stephanus of Byzantium and many other Greek and Roman authors, name the Ethiopians among the oldest, wealthiest and most powerful of early civilized nations and the annals of the ancient Hebrews, Assyrians and Egyptians contain innumerable references of the same general meaning.

In addition to surviving documents, during the past century and a half, the work of archaeologists has added immensely to modern knowledge of the history and civilization of the ancient Sudan.

On the strength of these various and sundry historical materials, it is known that our Sudan was indeed not only the centre of one of the earliest and most advanced civilizations of historical antiquity, but was likewise the seat of two of the wealthiest and most powerful kingdoms of the ancient world. These were the kingdoms of Napata and Meroe. In fact, both kingdoms could be considered as one, as it was the same family which at first ruled at Napata and subsequently at Meroe for over 1070 years, between 725 B.C. and 350 A.D.

The origin of the Napatan kings is a point of argument among archaeologists. Dr. Reisner, the excavator of their tombs and the first reconstructor of their chronology, maintained that they were of Libyan origin, but his evidence is insufficient and hence not conclusive. Some have advanced the idea that they had Egyptian blood and originated in Thebes, presumably springing from the Egyptian priests of Amon at Barkal. It has also been argued that they were natives of the Sudan who had been influenced to a great extent by their close contact with the priests of Amon at Barkal. The latter opinion is now gaining more support.

How they came, in the first place, to seize power is also not yet known. All we know is that the founder of the Dynasty, Kashta, came to power before 751 B.C. From this time up to the year 350 A.D., when Meroe was destroyed, Kashta's family ruled the Sudan.

International relations with our country during the earlier part of that period, i.e. the Napatan, is the subject of this paper.

Our contact with our northern neighbour Egypt goes back perhaps to the earliest inhabitants of that country in Predynastic times and Arkell has suggested that the predynastic civilizations of Egypt originated in the Neolithic civilization of the Sudan. There has always been some sort of relation between the two countries from the earliest times until the present day.

It is understood that in Napatan times, Kashta, the first of the Kushite kings, about whom we know very little, somehow gained power over Upper Egypt and assumed the title of King, but not the full status of a pharaoh.

His son, Piankhy (751–716 B.C.), at the head of a large army and a fleet of war boats, went down the Nile to Egypt and in a few months made himself the indisputable master of the whole of Egypt and became King of Kush and Egypt. Piankhy, after completing the conquest of Egypt, left the princes of the Delta to pay tribute to him and did not place Lower Egypt under a central administration based on Thebes. One of these princes, Tefnakht, set himself up as king of Lower Egypt soon after Piankhy's departure.

Piankhy's brother, Shabako (707–696 B.C.) subdued Tefnakht and placed the whole of Egypt firmly under his control. He moved his capital from Napata to Thebes and arranged for his daughter to be adopted as the "divine wife of Amen-Re". He had now become universally known as the king of Kush and Egypt.

At the time of the Napatan occupation of Egypt, the latter's fortunes, waning for well over 300 years, had come to a very low ebb. The centralized and efficient government which gave Egypt security and order in the olden days had degenerated into anarchy and continuous bloodshed. Egypt's creative arts had become decadent, and her industry and commerce had practically disappeared. Scores of her royal tombs were plundered.

Under her Sudanese occupiers, this state of affairs was quickly and completely changed. In less than a generation, the arts flourished once more and ordered government and national security were again re-established. Her tombs were protected, her temples restored and added to, and the faded renown of her ancient name recovered its lustre in all the ancient civilized world. In short, Egypt, decadent though she had become, when grafted upon the virile and vigorous stock of the Napatan state was infused with new life, and as an integral part of what was then Africa's greatest commonwealth, soon found herself sharing with her protector the prerogatives and prestige which came to the Kushite Empire as a world power.

An impartial analysis of the national and international results of the Sudanese occupation of Egypt would seem to justify the conclusion that this entire undertaking was one of the most blameless and beneficent ventures in imperialism ever attempted in the ancient world. Compared with it in method and spirit, Assyrian and Babylonian warfare and dominion were adventures in cruelty and exploitation of the lowest kind ; and by the same criteria, the history of Greek and Roman imperialism are stories of brutality and greed.

Again, the annals of early warfare appear to mention no other great military campaign where the use of force was so swiftly and effectually, yet so cautiously and humanely employed as was the case in Piankhy's remarkable conquest of Egypt. Or, yet again, the period of Sudanese domination in Egypt seems to have been one of the very few instances in the history of ancient imperialism where the native institutions and the spiritual well-being of a conquered people are known to have prospered and progressed rather than withered and declined under the rule of foreign masters.

At the same time as Piankhy and his successors were infusing new life into Egypt, the Kushite Empire was also engaged in performing other services which were scarcely less significant in the history of mankind. This refers to the aid rendered by the ancient Sudan to the little nations of western Asia during the last quarter of the

Eighth and the first half of the Seventh Century before Christ. With the exception of the ancient Greeks, no peoples of early antiquity contributed so much to the rise and development of western civilization as did the ancient inhabitants of Palestine, Syria and Phoenicia. But had it not been for the moral and military support extended to these principalities by Kush, they might not have had the chance to contribute to man's civilization. At the time when Piankhy was taking over control in Egypt, Assyria, the most predatory and militarily powerful Empire of Antiquity, was engaged in a programme of conquest which for nearly a hundred years threatened to annihilate not only Palestine, Syria and Phoenicia, but to uproot the foundations of most of the civilized nations of the age. Under the leadership of their notorious kings, Sargon II, Sennacherib, Esarhaddon, and Ashurbanipal, Assyrian armies composed of soldiers whose love of brutality has never been surpassed were ever marching and plundering lands far and near, or in the words of an Assyrian text "smashing up kingdoms like pots and bespattering the whole earth with the venom of death".

The princes of Phoenicia, Israel and Judea are known to have made appeals for aid to the kings of Kush in order to escape the widening range of Assyrian destruction. The Kushite kings hastened to their aid, but they could not stem the Assyrian tide. In 732 B.C. the Syrian kingdom fell to the Assyrians, and in 721, shortly after Piankhy had invaded Lower Egypt, Sargon took Samaria and moved the people of Israel into Iraq. Only the little kingdom of Judah lay betwwen Assyria and Egypt, and her king was described in the Bible as wavering between co-operation with the Kushites and submission to Assyria. A clash between the two powers, Kush and Assyria, was becoming more and more inevitable, though outwardly they maintained friendly relations. A fragment of a clay tablet bearing impressions of the seals of both Shabako and Sennacherib, son of Sargon, was found in the royal archives of Nineveh.

Sennacherib, after subduing Samaria, invaded Judah. The Kushite king Shabako sent an army, which the Book of Kings tells us was commanded by Taharqa. But before the two armies met, an outbreak of plague among the Assyrian army forced them to evacuate Palestine in 701 B.C.

Shabako died in 696 B.C. and was succeeded by Piankhy's son, Shebitku, who was subsequently succeeded by a strong man, Taharqa, who came to the throne in 683, though he was associated with his brother's rule five years earlier.

Taharqa resided most of the time in the Delta in order to be near to events in Asia, and though we have no record of the preparations he made for the inevitable conflict with Assyria, we know he was in touch with the Assyrian colonies, particularly Tyre and Sidon. As a result the king of Sidon rebelled and was put to death in 677 B.C.

In 671 B.C. Esarhaddon, the Assyrian king, crossed the Sinai Desert using camels and invaded Egypt, defeating Taharqa's army on the frontier, and received the submission of the Delta princes. Taharqa himself retreated to Thebes.

As soon as Esarhaddon left Egypt, after being proclaimed king of Upper and Lower Egypt, Taharqa returned with a fresh army, occupied the Delta and started his contacts with Tyre once more. Assurbanipal, who succeeded his father Esarhaddon, defeated Taharqa the following year (666) and occupied Egypt as far as Thebes. He reinstated the princes of the Delta and returned to Asia.

Taharqa died in 664 B.C. and was succeeded by his nephew Tanwetaman who, as soon as he was crowned at Napata, led an army into Egypt and marched as far as the Delta and subdued most of the Delta princes. Ashurbanipal's troops descended

into Egypt once more and Tanwetaman fled to the south, first taking refuge in Thebes, and finally retreated to Napata at the approach of the Assyrians, who this time ransacked Thebes and destroyed it.

It is now obvious that in spite of all that the ancient Sudanese kings could do, parts of Palestine, Phoenicia, Syria and Egypt were inundated and devastated by the Assyrian surge ; but it is also quite conceivable that had it not been for the repeated efforts of the Kushite kings, these lands would have been totally ruined by Assyria and hence the history of the world would have been different.

After Tanwetaman, his family continued to rule an independent Sudan with their capital first at Napata and then at Meroe for about 1,000 years.

THE INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF SUDAN IN ROMAN AND MEDIEVAL TIMES

by

L. P. Kirwan

The theme of this paper deals in broad outline with the history of the Northern Sudan over a period of more than seven hundred years. It is a period of history which begins in 30 B.C. with the southward advance of Roman power to the First Cataract following Octavian's defeat of Antony and Cleopatra. It ends with the first known settlement of Arabs in the Sudan in the ninth century of the present era. But first of all, the term "Northern Sudan". Although the term "Nubia", imprecise as it is, is convenient in so far as it transcends the modern political boundaries dividing Egypt from Sudan, in speaking of history I prefer to adhere to the name Sudan and to apply this—irrespective of today's political situation—to the whole region south of the First Cataract. In several ways the First Cataract is the natural dividing line between the two countries. It is there that the Nile first enters the large and continuing region of Nubian sandstone. It is there that the flow of the Nile is first obstructed by those intrusive crystalline rocks, granite and syenite, which create the Cataracts, always a dominating feature of the geographical history of the northern Sudan. It is there too that one first meets the modern descendants of an ancient physical type and the spoken dialect of a very ancient and once written language, both predominantly Sudanic in origin and distinctively different from anything in Egypt.

It was perhaps for such reasons, geographical, racial, linguistic, that it seemed natural to the new Augustus—not that he was in favour of an expansionist policy—to establish the Roman frontier at the First Cataract in 29 B.C.

What was the situation south of the First Cataract when Cornelius Gallus, Virgil's friend and the first prefect of Egypt, confronted the situation on the frontier? Immediately to the south, extending as far as the modern Maharraqah, was the territory known as the Dodekaschoinos, the land of the twelve schoinoi. It had probably been regarded as Egyptian territory under the Ptolemies and had from time immemorial been a domain and adjunct of the great temple of Isis at Philae. South of Maharraqah, an important boundary in Sudanese history, lay the kingdom of Meroe, well known to the world of Greece and Rome, a kingdom which flourished from the end of the sixth century B.C. until its decline and fall in the late third and early fourth century A.D. For most of this long life the capital city, first discovered by Bruce in the eighteenth century, lay at Meroe, near Bagrawiyah. But by tradition the royal burials were for nearly three centuries at Napata and Barkal, cemeteries and sanctuaries accessible from the capital by the short route across the western desert which cuts out the Abu Hamed bend of the Nile. From time to time there was also a rival northern capital at Napata, notably from the beginning of the fourth to the middle of the third century B.C. For the most part however Meroe was the centre of this ancient Kingdom.

In the earliest centuries, the Meroitic kingdom, in outward aspect at any rate, had been little more than a continued reflection of ancient Egypt, an extension in language, art, religion, and social life of the days when the Pharaohs of Egypt had ruled as far as the Fourth Cataract. But from about the third century B.C. perhaps, the beginning of a period of isolation from which we may date the birth of Sudan as a nation, the basic African elements in the Meroitic civilization had a chance to show themselves, although Egyptian influence continued to be strong. Gradually a native language developed, hieroglyphic at first, then with a cursive script implying some general use, a language more likely to be of African than of Hamitic or Semitic origin.

Later still distinctive forms of Meroitic art began to flourish, not only hieratic but secular. In the secular field, in the realm of ceramics, I always think that the painted egg-shell pottery, made during early Roman times, is a most remarkable example not only of indigenous but of any African ceramic art.

The Meroitic kingdom appears to have been divided when the Romans arrived into a northern and southern province. The northern province, known in Ptolemaic times as the Triaconteschoinos, extended from Maharraqah to beyond the Second Cataract as far perhaps as Akasha-Firka and was ruled over by a hereditary chieftain or prince. The southern province extended from this point well to the south of Meroe itself. But these were lands along the Nile. What was happening in the deserts to the east and west? To the east, between the kingdom of Axum, the Red Sea, Egypt and the Nile, there was a conglomeration of nomadic desert tribes known as *Blhmw* in late Egyptian, as Blemmyes in classical, and as Bega in Arab times. To the west the situation is a good deal more obscure, the desert areas there, extending northwards to the Roman African province, being allocated rather vaguely by arm-chair geographers and historians of classical times to a tangled and obscure variety of tribes known generally as Nubians.

It was not long before the demands of strategy compelled the Romans to advance the frontier from the ancient line of the First Cataract and to enter for the first time the Sudan. This happened during the prefecture of Gaius Petronius (25 to 21 B.C.) when the Sudanese twice launched powerful raids against the Roman frontier garrisons. The Sudanese maintained that they had been affronted and wronged by the Egyptian nomarchs. But this was the merest excuse. The real reason was that the frontier forces had been greatly depleted by the needs of Aelius Gallus' campaign in Arabia and they shrewdly judged the moment to be ripe. According to Strabo thirty thousand Sudanese fell upon the three Roman cohorts (fifteen hundred men) guarding the stations at Philae, Elephantine and Syene; captured a great number of prisoners; and carried off as trophies statues of Caesar. The magnificent bronze head of Augustus, found under the stairway of one of the temples at Meroe in 1910–11—and now in the British Museum—is probably part of one of these.[1]

The Roman reaction to these events was swift, and as far as relations between Rome and Meroe were concerned, decisive for almost three hundred years. With one legion and auxiliaries, a force of almost 11,000 men, Petronius drove the Sudanese back to Pselchis (Dakka) which evidently they had occupied. Then negotiations began. The Sudanese, when Petronius demanded the return of prisoners and booty, complained once again about the nomarch ; an interesting reference for it suggests that the Dodekaschoinos had had the status not only of an appendage to the Temple at Philae but of an Egyptian nome.[2]

As the Sudanese procrastinated and negotiations broke down, Petronius attacked again. Moving by land and by river he captured Pselchis (Dakka), then Primis (Kasr Ibrim) a naturally strong fortress, probably Ptolemaic, on a rocky eminence overlooking the Nile and desert routes. He then marched on Napata, sacked the city and returned with prisoners and plunder to Alexandria. On his way back, as evidence of Rome's determination to tolerate no further Sudanese adventures, Petronius left a garrison of four hundred men with supplies for two years in the rock fortress at Ibrim. But as these two years drew to a close, calculating no doubt that the garrison could not hold out for long, the Meroites attacked once more. Petronius however came to the rescue and this time delegates of the Queen of Meroe were compelled to travel all the way to distant Samos, off the coast of Turkey, to sue for peace in the august and awe-inspiring surroundings of the Imperial Court. On the condition that the Sudanese kept the

peace, tribute was remitted. But the Romans were far from confident about the security of southern Egypt. The Roman frontier was therefore extended to Hiera Sykaminos (Maharraqah), an extension strategically sound for it not only gave defence in depth to Egypt but gave the Romans access to the gold mines in the Wadi Allaqi and gave them also control of the strategically important desert routes leading from the Wadi into the realm of the Blemmyes, the Eastern Desert.

All this of course is related from the Roman point of view. But there are two sides to every battle. And it is all the more provoking therefore that we cannot read what seems likely (if Monneret de Villard was correct[3]) to be the Sudanese version of these campaigns ; inscribed, and accompanied by portrayals of Roman prisoners on a wall of one of the temples of Meroe. Indeed, our failure to progress in the decipherment of Meroitic is a great obstacle confronting the historian of the Sudan at this time. We know a great deal about Meroitic archaeology, about pottery and tomb types, about religion, about architecture and ways of life. We have an approximate and recently revised chronology of Meroitic kings and queens revolving round three known fixed dates and laboriously built up out of archaeological analysis.[4] We know their names too in the majority of cases, even perhaps the name of the Queen who opposed Petronius, Queen Amānishakhetē. But the longer and more elaborate texts, containing the clues, however slender, to Meroitic history remain unread.

I turn now to the developments in the northern Sudan during the first and second centuries A.D. when south of the First Cataract Roman stations and roads could be seen, flanking the Nile as far as Maharraqah or Hiera Sykaminos. These, as is apparent from the Antonine Itinerary, were disposed along the west bank of the Nile, with only a few bridgeheads across the river, because in this way they were better protected against the swift descents of the Blemmyes-Bega from the Eastern Desert. The fear which these marauding nomad tribes instilled—it gave rise to many legends about their grotesque and terrifying appearance in classical and medieval times—was not without its effect on imperial policy and it caused the Emperor Augustus to dedicate to Mandulis, their principal god, the temple of Kalabsha in the frontier zone and to dedicate also to him the only Roman temple on the east bank of the river, the small temple of Ajuala.[5]

During these first two centuries under the *pax Romana* the people of Meroe had frequent contacts with the outer world ; to the east with the rising power of Axum and possibly also with India along the desert routes from Meroe to the Red Sea. To the north they were in close touch with Roman (as they had been with Ptolemaic) Egypt through trade and through their annual pilgrimage to the shrine of Isis at Philae. There and in Elephantine and Syene the people of Sudan met and mingled with the Roman garrisons, with traders, and probably also with men originating from more distant countries, from Palestine and Syria, descendants of colonies first founded at Elephantine before the Persian conquest. It is possible too that there was some contact with North Africa then or at a later date, for a third century amphora from northern Algeria, near Bougie, has been found in a tomb at Meroe.[6] In the first and second century moreover there were the Roman expeditions led by Septimius Flaccus and Julius Maternus which may have reached Darfur from Leptis Magna, travelling across the desert towards the land of the "Aethiopians".[7]

Meroe was well known to the Hellenistic world through the description of Greek writers and one, indeed, Simonides the Younger, lived for five years in the city. So it was with Roman Egypt and through Egypt, especially Alexandria, contact was maintained with the Mediterranean. There is ample evidence of this contact not only at Meroe itself but also, and even more so, in numerous Meroitic sites north of the

Second Cataract, a region which through the Egyptian Government's surveys must archaeologically be one of the best known in the world. Trade was of course the principal common interest—trade by barter because so few coins have been found—trade in which Roman luxury goods, corn and oil, were exchanged for the ivory and skins, spices and gum, slaves and gold, iron perhaps—and no doubt also beasts for gladiatorial shows—from the Sudan and Central Africa.

But towards the end of the first century A.D. other eyes then those of Rome began to be cast on the fertile island of Meroe and on the city which was the guardian of this Roman trade route into Central Africa. The new threat came from the expanding kingdom of Axum and it was probably this and the desire to attach Meroe more closely to Rome—and not, as Seneca asserts, the advancement of geography—which persuaded Nero in the autumn of 61 A.D. to send deep into Sudan one of the most remarkable of exploring expeditions. This party, soldiers of the Praetorian Guard led by a civilian with official and diplomatic powers and two centurions, penetrated far beyond Meroe. Armed with testimonials from the capital to allied or subject tribes further south they reached the swamps and floating grass islands of the Sudd.[8]

Through the ensuing centuries peace reigned between Rome and Meroe and trade, if it did not flourish as in earlier times, at least continued. Indeed, Philostratus[9] talks of a common open frontier market at Maharraqah early in the third century for trade in gold and other products. The rulers of Meroe meanwhile continued to maintain a religious and diplomatic representative at Philae and envoys and missions were exchanged between Meroe and Rome. One of these left at Massawarat the southernmost Latin inscription known. On the frontier however, life for the Roman troops who were reinforced by both camel corps and river police was not always as quiet as this picture might suggest and a skirmish between Roman cavalry, possibly from Talmis (Kalabsha), and desert tribes which is described in Papyrus 40 of Milan[10] was probably a fairly frequent experience and a reminder of the ever-present threat of the Blemmyes-Bega tribes.

The third and fourth centuries witnessed very great changes in the Northern Sudan, changes which in so far as they affected Roman policy must be seen in the context of the Empire as a whole. The later years of the third century brought about a seemingly disastrous disintegration in the Roman world, both internally and along the frontiers. The years 250–270 A.D. in particular were years of crisis. In Gaul, on the Rhine, on the Danube, on the frontiers with the Sassanids of Persia, everywhere the frontier provinces of the Empire were threatening to break under the onslaught of hostile tribes. The same was true of the southern frontier of Egypt. In the time of Decius, the middle of the third century, the Blemmyes directly attacked the Roman frontier garrisons. A few years later we find them allied with the Egyptian usurper Aemilianus, and later still, about 273 A.D., with the usurper Firmus against the Emperor. Their raids which forced the Roman garrisons, already depleted by other calls, to march against them carried them deep into upper Egypt, to Ptolemais and Coptos. Within the southern Roman frontier zone too they gained a foothold in the region of Kalabsha.[11] This, a step towards the eventual establishment of the Blemmyes in the Nile Valley south of the First Cataract, is a clear indication of the weakening of the Roman hold.

In some of these onslaughts not only Blemmyes but also Axumites were involved, for prisoners from both participated in the triumph of Aurelian (c. 273 A.D.) under whom a re-organization and a great revival of the Empire began. The principal architect however of this was the Emporer Diocletian, and we have not only literary but inscriptional and archaeological evidence of his military reforms on the Egypto-

Sudanese frontier. The former is provided by the remarkably accurate sixth century historian Procopius, an official well-placed for access to the Imperial archives, who records that Diocletian withdrew the Roman garrisons (c. 297 A.D.) back to the First Cataract, consolidated the defences there, and introduced in the place of the Roman troops a people called the Nobades. They had it seems been accustomed to plunder round the Roman settlements in the Oasis of Kharga and Diocletian had hopes that the gift of land along the Nile and the rewards they received as allies (foederati) would not only induce them to keep the peace but would induce them also to act as a defensive buffer against the marauding eastern desert tribes. This was a widely used device employed not only on Rome's southernmost frontier with the Sudan but also on her northernmost frontier in Roman Britain at a slightly earlier date.

The Roman withdrawal to the First Cataract, according to Procopius, was made without much regret and he says nothing about adverse effects on trade. This by then perhaps had become negligible with Meroe under attack by advancing Axum. The cultivable land, he only records, was narrow and unproductive because of lack of rain while the yield in tax was remarkably poor. Certainly the Roman Sudan must have been the poorest of all her territories despite the introduction of the *saqya* and the winepress, the principal Roman contributions to the economy of Sudan. And certainly also the new defensive positions at Philae, of which there is evidence in an inscription of the consuls Valerius Diocletianus and Constantius Chlorus of 296 A.D. were a good deal easier to defend.[12]

With the withdrawal of the Roman garrisons to the First Cataract at the end of the third century A.D. we approach a new and bewildering period in history, a period which still retains the name given to it half a century ago, the mysterious name "X-group". But first we must turn to the southern province of the Meroitic kingdom. There about the middle of the third century we see the first clear evidence of movements, ominous and avaricious, by the kings of Axum towards the upper reaches of the Nile in an inscription copied at Adulis in Ethiopia by the sixth century topographer Cosmas Indicopleustes. There can be little doubt that Axumite ambitions were encouraged by the weakening of ties between Meroe and Rome, though these ties were certainly maintained until at least the year 253 A.D. for in that year the Meroitic king Teqerideamani, who was buried in tomb N.28 at Meroe, sent workers to Philae. Another Meroitic inscription at Philae dated about 265–266 A.D. may also be that of the same king.

There is evidence in a Greek inscription found at Meroe of an Axumite attack on the capital in the late third or early fourth century A.D., encouraged no doubt by the Roman withdrawals from the Dodekaschoinos. These were attacks on Meroe from the south-east. There was also about this time some movement of tribes from the south-west, from Kordofan, the forerunner of an infiltration and penetration of the Noba peoples who are found in occupation of the Island of Meroe towards the middle of the fourth century A.D.

The northward movement of African tribes towards the fertile valley of the Nile is no new thing in Sudanese history. Indeed, the anthropological evidence from the Surveys of Nubia shows a continuing and increasing admixture of this kind from the New Kingdom onwards, reaching a climax in Meroitic and X-group times.[13]

The principal evidence for these movements of the Noba however and of the ultimate fate of the kingdom of Meroe in the middle of the fourth century A.D. is contained in the great inscription of Ezana, the first Christian king of Abyssinia, found at Axum and most recently translated by the late Professor Enno Littmann.[14]

This describes how Ezana, having campaigned against the Blemmyes-Beja, advanced across the Atbara against a people called Noba with whom he had already waged earlier campaigns. Ezana found the Noba occupying all the Island of Meroe, their grass huts mingled with the brick temples and houses of the Meroitic people, the people whom he calls Kasu. The striking feature of the inscription however—apart from its first mention of cotton trees in Sudan—is that nowhere in it is there any recognizable mention of the word for "Meroe".

The geographical information given in the Ezana inscription is of the greatest importance in assisting us to solve some of the many complicated problems of this "dark age" in the history of the Northern Sudan. Moving south along the Nile Ezana captured two brick towns, Daro and Alwa. The name Alwa, which appears also in Graeco-Egyptian papyri of the sixth century, is of course the antecedent of the Arabic name for the southernmost Christian kingdom of the Sudan, the Kingdom of Alodia or Alwah. But Ezana's account of the movement northward of his armies is even more informative, for after the capture, sacking and burning of several Meroitic and Noba settlements, Ezana advanced downstream of the confluence of the Atbara and the Nile, as far as the frontier of people whom he calls the Red Noba. These were an earlier wave of Noba immigrants perhaps who had assimilated or been assimilated by the Meroitic culture. The furthest point of the Axumite advance may be indicated by the old Abyssinian graffito on the walls of a temple at Kawa, opposite New Dongola.[15]

By the middle of the fourth century therefore it looks as if the capital at Meroe, after repeated Axumite attacks, had fallen and had for some time been at least partly occupied by the Black Noba. But before considering how this can be related to the archaeology of the Meroe region, we must turn back to the northern Meroitic province. This, or the greater part of it, during the fourth or early in the fifth century had suffered a similar fate but at the hands of the Blemmyes or Bega. When the Egyptian historian Olympiodorus visited the First Cataract in c. 421 A.D., he found the country to the south as far as Primis (Ibrim) in the hands of the Blemmyes-Bega who included among the towns they held Tafis (Taifa) and Talmis (Kalabsha) where the Roman temple built by Augustus had been dedicated to their god Mandulis. In addition to these cities, formerly occupied by Romans and Nobades, he also visited by permission of the Blemmye king the emerald mines at Gebel Zebara in the Eastern Desert. At that time at all events the Blemmyes must have been on good terms with the Roman Government in Egypt. Indeed Blemmyan documents of about this date found in Egypt indicate that they not only had commercial agents there but had, like the Nobades, adopted for their officials titles borrowed from the Byzantine hierarchy.

But if the Blemmyes, in control of the gold and emerald mines in their traditional habitat, the Eastern Desert, occupied also the Nile Valley as far south as Ibrim, where are the Nobades to be found who had been introduced into the Dodekaschoinos by Diocletian? The answer must surely be south of Ibrim and here another very important inscription is relevant.

This inscription, written in Greek by an Egyptian Christian scribe, describes how Silko, King of the Nobades and "of all the Ethiopians", after a number of campaigns had driven the Blemmyes northwards from Ibrim to Shellal and had thereupon occupied the whole country. It also relates how Silko had also conquered other Nobades to the south of him, to the south presumably of the Second Cataract. Beneath the Silko inscription on a column in the temple of Kalabsha is a representation of Silko himself, clad in the fashion of the late Roman emperors, with paludamentum and

short tunic of mail. He carries a short sword of Roman type and wears a crown incorporating the horns of the ram-god Khnum, the feathers of the goddess Maat, and the royal uraei ; all indications of the extent to which this Sudanese king was influenced by the Meroitic inheritance from ancient Egypt.[16]

The date of the Silko inscription and the relation between its contents and a number of other broadly contemporary documents mentioning both Nobades and Blemmyes is very perplexing. As to date this must be later than 421 A.D. when Olympiodorus found the Blemmyes firmly occupying the country north of Ibrim but before 543 A.D. (the probable date of the advent of the first missionaries) when the Blemmyes were no longer in the Nile Valley. But it is difficult to get a closer date for Silko's three campaigns. In the fifth century the great Coptic writer Shenoute describes raids against the monasteries in Upper Egypt in which both Nobades and Blemmyes were allied. A papyrus dateable on internal evidence to 425–450 A.D. contains an appeal by Appion, Bishop of Syene, Contra-Syene, and Elephantine to the Emperors Theodosius and Valentinian seeking protection for his diocese and for the churches at Philae against the combined attacks of both tribes. Finally in 452 we find both peoples suffering a heavy defeat at the hands of the Procurator Firmus who imposed on them a peace of a hundred years. It may be that these alliances between Blemmyes and Nobades occurred during the intervals between Silko's three campaigns. In any event, by the middle of the sixth century, as we shall see, the Nobades controlled the whole country from the First Cataract, south as far perhaps as the Sai region.

The time has now come to consider how the events related to these two important inscriptions, the inscription of Ezana and the inscription of Silko, can be related to the archaeology of the Northern Sudan covering the fourth to the sixth century.

The post-Meroitic and pre-Christian culture in the northern part of this region, at least as far south as Sai and north to the Egyptian frontier, is the so-called X-group. The special point to notice however is that the chief centre of the X-group, the site of its royal cemeteries, the site too of its capital city if only it could be found, is to the south of the Blemmye frontier at Ibrim. This centre is represented by the great burial mounds at Ballana and Qostol, the northernmost of their kind in the Sudan. These tombs, rich in silver and bronze objects imported from Byzantine Egypt, including also many hundreds of amphorae inscribed in cursive Greek, can be closely dated to the period from the fourth to the middle of the sixth century A.D. This is the period within which the Nobades over whom Silko and others ruled occupied first the Nile Valley south of Ibrim, then the whole stretch up to the First Cataract. There is I think no need to labour the point that the X-group probably equals the Nobades and their subjects, nor to stress that the X-group burials north of Ibrim must be those of their pre- and post-Blemmye occupation.

But this, and there is I think no longer any doubt about the matter, only answers part of the problem. If it be asked where are the Blemmye cemeteries arising out of their occupation of the Ibrim-Shellal sector, then I think that Monneret de Villard was right in identifying these with the large cemeteries of simple rock-mound tombs found by Firth and Weigall at Kalabsha, the traditional Blemmye centre and capital. Other Blemmye tombs may be those, the graves of ancient nomads, found by Schweinfurth in the eastern desert. A much more difficult question however is, what was the origin of the Nobades ? I do not think that we can avoid identifying them as the descendants of the Nobades introduced into the Dodekaschoinos by Diocletian. In fact, Procopius as much as says so when having related their earlier history in the time of Diocletian, he says that in his own day—the middle of the sixth century—they occupied the

country immediately south of the First Cataract. But where did these earlier Nobades originate? In North Africa, as Monneret de Villard suggested? In Kordofan, travelling north by the Darb al-Arbain, as Zylharz on linguistic grounds has proposed? For reasons connected with Roman policy in North Africa at this date towards the desert tribes, there are strong arguments against Monneret de Villard's theory. But the whole matter is a very open question.

There is however one thing which is certain, namely that there is in the Ballana-Qostol culture an element which is foreign, an element which is different from the basic Meroitic culture which they largely assimilated, and different also from the civilization of Byzantine Egypt with which the Nobades evidently had close contacts. One object alone, the unique horse bits found only in the X-group mound tombs, is sufficient indication of this. If something analogous to these, the most characteristic of all objects in the X-group tombs could be found, then the problem might be solved. It might be thought that anthropology could help. But unfortunately none of the royal burials at Ballana were well enough preserved for this purpose. The only statistical information came from the secondary burials, the sacrificed slaves, courtiers and the like. These were found to be, as indeed one might expect, very close to the Meroitic peoples.

It is quite evident from the size, the number and the wealth of the tombs of the Nobades at Ballana and Qostol that this was the chief centre of power and civilization in the Northern Sudan in the immediately post-Meroitic period. They were a warlike people, riding horses and camels. From the Meroitic iconography which is everywhere displayed it is evident that they worshipped the Egyptian or Egypto-African gods worshipped by the people of Meroe. It is evident also from the use of Byzantine weights and measures and from the multitude of objects imported or copied from the north that they were in very close touch with the civilization of Byzantine Egypt. Nowhere is this blend of influences from north and south better illustrated than in the great jewel-encrusted crowns their rulers wore, decorated with Egyptian emblems. These, based on the typical Byzantine crown seen in its full glory in the mosaics of Justinian and Theodora in the church of St. Vitale in Ravenna are, with their surmounting emblems of Maat and Khnum, strikingly similar to the crown worn by Silko at Kalabsha. Even with so much archaeological material for study, however, we know next to nothing of the history of the Nobades, for no documents or inscriptions (apart from those on amphorae) were found except a love charm in illiterate Greek addressed to Isis and Osiris. There was a trace or two of Meroitic in the earliest tombs at Qostol. But it looks on the whole as if the Meroitic language and script had by then fallen into disuse.

Some useful conclusions however may be drawn from the distribution of the X-group-Nobades settlements. There is no sign of any X-group material in the New Dongola district or south. Indeed, to date no X-group pottery (apart from some doubtful sherds at Gebel Barkel) has been found south of the mound cemetery at Sai which the Department of Antiquities has recently investigated.[17] That being the case, we are confronted by the question, what remains represent the X-group period at Meroe and in the southern Meroitic province? In this region, instead of X-group pottery we find, covering much the same period, the coarse, characteristically African pottery known as Aloa ware. This was found in the latest pre-Christian levels at Meroe. It has been found as far south as Sennar, and near Khartoum. Most important it has proved to be the characteristic pottery in the mound tombs at Tangassi. This pottery was identified by Crowfoot, and I am sure quite rightly, with the Noba tribes whom Ezana found in occupation of the island of Meroe and of the Nile Valley to the north.

In the immediately pre-Christian period therefore we find the Northern Sudan divided into two broad and mutually exclusive cultural groups ; the one, the X-group Nobades covering the Nile Valley from the First Cataract as far south as Sai and perhaps beyond ; the other, the Noba culture stretching southwards from Tangassi certainly as far as Sennar.

How does this situation compare with what we know of the Northern Sudan at the time of the introduction of Christianity in the middle of the sixth century A.D.? Here we have two reliable contemporary authorities both of them in close contact with influential persons in the inner circles of the Byzantine court. One is Procopius, already cited, the other is the historian of the Church, John of Ephesus, who was born in Iraq in 516 A.D. and was a close adherent of the Empress Theodora.

The way was prepared for the arrival of the first missionaries by the closing of the temple of Isis at Philae and the removal of pagan statues to Constantinople between 536 and 543 A.D. The Sudanese do not seem to have shown the resentment one might expect at either of these measures (which Procopius describes) and one can only suppose that their rulers had already come to terms with the Christian communities on the frontier. Procopius' account can now be supplemented by the long and very detailed and very amusing description written in Syriac by John of Ephesus describing the conversion of the Sudanese. Like Procopius, John of Ephesus also describes the Nobades as being immediately south of the First Cataract, with the Blemmyes in the desert, but adds that beyond the Nobades, Nābādōs he calls them, there was the kingdom of Makuria, and south of that, a third Sudanese kingdom, the Kingdom of Alodia, the Alwah of the Arabic geographers. From this, we see that the Northern Sudan was now divided into three, and not two principal kingdoms as in the X-group period. It is important to note also that Christianity did not enter the Sudan from Ethiopia (the enemy of Meroe), converted in the fourth century, nor from Egypt (which by the fourth century could be called a Christian country). The missionaries whose adventures John of Ephesus describes came direct from the Byzantine capital, Constantinople; and the doctrine they taught was in its earliest form—contrary to the biased assertions of John of Ephesus—in accordance with the Melkite or Chalcedonian rite.[18] The earliest missionaries, Julian and Longinus, evidently had an arduous time. Julian found the heat so oppressive that from nine in the morning to four in the afternoon he used to sit, clad only in a shirt, in a cavern by the Nile. And Longinus, on a desert journey from Korosko to Abu Hamed to convert the king of Alwah, suffered greatly from drinking water from the wells along the route, and lost no less than seventeen camels. Even so, by 580 A.D. all three kingdoms had been ostensibly converted, even the kingdom of Makuria which according to John of Ephesus was at loggerheads with its neighbours both north and south in the middle of the sixth century.

A considerable amount of information, though often obscure, is given by the Arab geographers about the territorial divisions of the northern Sudan in their day. Nobadia, the territory over which the Nobades ruled, appears to have been equated with the Arabic Al-Maris ; its southern frontier, on the evidence of the hot springs mentioned by Abu Salih, being at or near Akasha in the Batn-al-Hagar region. South lay Makuria, the Arabic Mukurrah, the stretch of the Nile Valley about which perhaps least is known during this earliest Christian period. The name and origins of Makuria are very obscure and the few like-sounding names appearing in classical geographers give no clue to its apparently sudden emergence as an independent kingdom in the fifth or sixth century. Farther south still lay the kingdom of Alodia or Alwah, with its capital at Soba. This appears to have been originally a Meroitic settlement, the one

captured perhaps by Ezana. The northern frontier of Alwah appears to have lain, like the northern frontier of the Noba tribes in the pre-Christian period, somewhere north of the junction of the Nile with the Atbara.

Owing to the remarkable work of the Italian scholar, the late Professor Monneret de Villard, there is a firm basis for the history of the mediaeval Sudan. The Christian kings there, priest kings with both secular and ecclesiastical functions, were supported by a hierarchy modelled in miniature on that of the Byzantine Court. Indeed, Byzantine influence (in keeping with the original source of Sudanese Christianity) is often marked, especially in religious painting, a fruitful and important field of study for historians of Sudanese art.

The Arabs arrived at the northern frontier of the Sudan in 616 A.D. but their long struggle for conquest and dominion over the country did not begin until 641, when they launched the first of a series of raids culminating in 651–652 with an attack on Dongola. The text of the treaty which resulted from this battle, a commercial treaty and not an imposed peace as some Arab historians have asserted, is illuminating for the history of the Sudan in the seventh century. It shows that between 580, the date of the conversion, and 651—no doubt under threat from the north—the kingdoms of Nobadia and Mukurrah had united and had withdrawn to a joint capital at Dongola, well protected by the Cataract region. It shows also that the toughness of Sudanese opposition had had its effect, for the Arabs readily agreed that the Sudan frontier should be established on the ancient line of the First Cataract.

The history of Egypto-Sudanese relations from the seventh to the fourteenth century is largely one of the ebb and flow of Sudanese and Arab attacks ; with the Arabs, at first discouraged by their heavy casualties and by the territorial poverty of Sudan, gradually increasing pressure under the attraction of the gold mines in the east. More than once during these early years the Kingdoms of Nobadia and Makuria fell out, but as before the threat from the north had a salutary effect and by the eighth century both kingdoms were again united, with Mukurrah in the lead and the capital once again at Dongola.

The eighth century saw the Sudanese in the ascendant and their king Ciriacus, c.745 A.D., drove deep into Egypt, with a large army of horse and camel-borne troops, as far as the gates of Cairo. Half a century later perhaps we see the complete unification of all the Sudan, in the alliance of the kingdoms of Mukurrah and Alwah, under the Sudanese King John. Between 822 and 836 there was a fresh Sudanese invasion of Egypt, reaching as far as Edfu and resulting in some settlement there. Of this the traveller Burckhardt saw traces, in people of Sudanese speech and race, early in the nineteenth century. A few years later, and it is striking evidence of the respect paid to Sudan by Arab Egypt, we hear of the foundation of a Christian Church in Aswan, well within Arab territory, dedicated to the Virgin Mary.

Nevertheless, Arab pressure was steadily increasing. Arab settlers, attracted by the gold mines, appear in the eastern Sudan, in the neighbourhood of Sinkat, in the middle of the ninth century and probably earlier still the Arab occupation of the Nile Valley south of the First Cataract had already begun. In the third quarter of the twelfth century the Sudanese once again launched a powerful attack on Egypt. But the independence of the Sudan was now rapidly drawing to a close. In 1275 an Arab invasion of Dongola resulted in the enthronement of a puppet king. In 1323 yet another puppet king, Kanz-ed-Dawla, was placed on the throne at Dongola. This was the end not only of Christianity in Sudan, though the Portuguese missionary Alvarez heard of a few hardy survivors as late as the sixteenth century ; it was, for the time being, the end of Sudanese independence.

NOTES

[1] For this early period, see Ugo Monneret de Villard, Storia della Nubia cristiana. Rome 1938. Also by the same author, La Nubia romana. Rome 1941. Of neither is there an English translation. For the bronze head, see Liverpool Annals of Archaeology and Anthropology, IV, plates XII-XIV, 66–71.

[2] La Nubia romana, 3.

[3] Storia della Nubia cristiana, 12–15.

[4] Dows Dunham, Royal Tombs at Meroë and Barkal, introduction. Boston 1957.

[5] L. P. Kirwan, Oxford University Excavations at Firka, Appendix I, "The early history of the Blemmyes". O.U.P. 1939.

[6] Dunham, op. cit., 186 and fig. 122; Tubusuptus, the modern Tiklat.

[7] L. P. Kirwan, Rome beyond the southern Egyptian frontier, *in* Geographical Journal, CXXIII (March 1957), 14–19.

[8] Kirwan, op. cit., 16 and references.

[9] Vita Apoll., 6, 2.

[10] E. G. Turner, Papyrus 40 'Della Raccolta Milanese'. *In* Journal of Roman Studies XL (1950), 57–59.

[11] Procopius, De bello persico, I, 19. Storia della Nubia cristiana, 25.

[12] La Nubia romana, 6.

[13] Ahmed el Batrawi, The Racial History of Egypt and Nubia, *in* Journal of the Anthropological Institute 76 (1946), 131–154; but especially Section XI.

[14] Die Äthiopische Inschriften *in* Miscellanea Academica Berolinensia II/2, 97–127. Berlin 1950.

[15] L. P. Kirwan, Tanqasi and the Noba, *in* Kush V (1957), 37–41.

[16] L. P. Kirwan, The Ballana Civilization, *in* Bull. de la Société royale de Geographie d'Egypte XXV (1953), 103–110.

[17] J. Vercoutter, Excavations at Sai 1955–7. *In* Kush VI (1958), 158.

[18] H. Junker, Die Christlichen Grabsteine Nubiens *in* Zeitschr. f. ägypt. Spr., LX (1925). The best translated text (into Latin) of John of Ephesus is that of E. W. Brooks, CSCO, Ss. Syri III, vol. III. Louvain 1936. The version I have used (Payne-Smith) *in* Sudan Notes and Records XX (1937) is less satisfactory.

After Mr. Kirwan had read his paper, the following discussion took place:—

Dr. Fawzi Faheem Gadallah. Dr. Gadallah had two comments to make: 1. Mr. Kirwan had suggested that the Nobadae were the most serious danger in the Northern Sudan; he did not agree. The Blemmyes had been more serious. The Nobadae had been easily enticed to live in the Nile Valley and had maintained easy relations with the Christian Nubians. They had been early converted to Christianity. King Silko had driven out the Blemmyes and founded the first Christian Nubian kingdom.

Mr. Kirwan. What he had meant was that the Nobadae presented the most serious historical problem. It was certain that the Blemmyes were to be identified with the Bega; there was firm evidence for this derived from the writings of Shenoute, Cosmas and the Arab geographers. In the case of the Nobadae, we do not know their origin. Professor Zylharz thought that they were a wave of nomad immigrants who had moved northwards to the oasis of Kharga and from there had been called in by

Diocletian as *foederati*. On the other hand, Professor Monneret de Villard thought that they came to Kharga from north-west Africa. But this theory was hard to reconcile with what we know of Roman policy in Algeria after the time of Septimus Severus, which was defensive. Evidence of the identity of the Nobadae was to be found in the royal tombs at Ballana and included some remarkable horse-bits which were unlike anything else in the world. He had been looking for similar objects for years but had not found them. It could be seen that this was a very savage bit; it was not Roman, and specimens could be found in every single tomb. It was something which was completely foreign.



FIG. 1

Sayed Nasr El Hag Ali. Sayed Nasr El Hag thought that similar bits existed in the modern Sudan and had perhaps descended from those of the Nobadae.

Mr. Kirwan expressed surprise that such bits were found in modern Sudan.

Sayed Justice M.I. El Nur. Such bits were to be seen in Darfur among the Hawawir tribe who were thought to have come from North Africa.

Dr. Fawzi Faheem Gadallah's second comment. Mr. Kirwan had suggested that John of Ephesus had been biased, but he was under the impression that Mr. Kirwan had expressed a different view in an article in Volume 20 of *Sudan Notes and Records*. Dr. Gadallah thought that John of Ephesus was not biased. If he did not mention the kingdom of Makuria, it was probable that he had no reason to do so. John of Biclarum did not disagree with John of Ephesus.

Mr. Kirwan. He thought that Dr. Gadallah was quite right as far as his own previous views were concerned. He confessed that when he had first read John of Ephesus he had swallowed him hook, line and sinker (laughter). But Professor Monneret de Villard had been sceptical and had pointed out that Professor Junker had shown that Christian tombstones in Nubia contained extracts from the Byzantine liturgy. In any case, the controversy concerned only a short period. In due course all three kingdoms became Monophysite; possibly a minority adhered to the Melkite faith in later years. He could not agree with Dr. Gadallah's suggestion made in his written contribution that Christianity had been introduced into the Sudan at a date earlier than the sixth century. Refugees from Roman persecution remained a possibility, but there was no *evidence* of Christianity dateable before the seventh to ninth centuries, and Christian tombstones were often of later date.

Professor Mekki Shibeika. As the time was limited and restricted by the Chairman, he wished only to comment on certain problems raised by the ancient pre-Islamic history of the Sudan. The first problem was that of the difficulty which many modern Sudanese found in accepting the pre-Islamic history of the Sudan as part of their own history. He would illustrate this with some examples. The first concerned his own family Shibeika. He had a feeling that it had a connection with the Kushite kings (laughter and applause), who were not only kings of the Sudan but of Kush and Misr as well, and had an international reputation in the near East (much laughter). Close approximations to the name Shibeika appeared in inscriptions in parts of lower Nubia and Upper Egypt—Shabaka and Shibitku. Yet if members of his family were told of this conjectural descent, they would hear nothing of it. They would not accept that their ancestry was anything but the purest Abbasid blood. Secondly,

he would refer to his friends of the Shaiqiya. They have certain characteristics of their own, especially that of being good soldiers, which suggest that they might be the successors of the people of Kush, but even educated Shaiqiya had treated the matter very lightly. Similarly, the Ja'alin, living in the neighbourhood of Meroe were sceptical if told that they might be the descendants of the Meroitic people. Lastly, when the newspaper *Al Ayyam* had suggested that the statue of King Taharqa, at present in Meroe museum should be placed on the pedestal of Kitchener's statue, just as that of Rameses was moved and put in the Bab el Hadeed Square in Cairo, a Sudanese correspondent had said that the suggestion was nonsensical, since there was no connection between the modern Sudan and Taharqa. This reaction was not unique. The problem was how to educate people into accepting the pre-Islamic history of the Sudan as the history of their own country and of their own ancestors. His next comment—

Nasr El Hag Ali said the Mr. Kirwan might like to reply to Dr. Mekki's first comment before he called on someone to confirm his claim to the Throne of the Sudan (much laughter).

Mr. Kirwan. Dr. Shibeika had made a very interesting point. The problem was how was this to be done. We needed a short history in Arabic of the pre-Islamic period, based on facts and not on speculation. The story must be told as it could be ascertained from archaeological finds and inscriptions, classical and Arabic authors. He had hopes that this might be done. Secondly, it might be achieved by teaching in the University the archaeology and history of this period concurrently. He believed archaeology to be the handmaid of history and not an end in itself. University students were at a receptive age and would in this way become familiar with their origins.

He thought it would be useful if all Sudanese legends which contained historical evidence could be gathered into one central collection. Dr. Arkell's paper made use of many Darfurian legends and collections of Sudanese legends were scattered in *Sudan Notes and Records* and the anthropological journals but this material needed to be collated.

Dr. Mekki Shibeika. He would like to add one point to Mr. Kirwan's suggestions. Young Sudanese would be very interested in their pre-Islamic history if they could be shown how the ancient inhabitants of the country had influenced the present day customs and way of life of the Sudan. If evidence of this influence could be selected and shown to be both indigenous to the Sudan and pre-Islamic they would be very interested. For example, it was perhaps not generally known among some members of the present audience that the sign of the cross was put on every new-born child in the modern Sudan. The way of life in boats and with *saqiyas* provided further evidence, for many of the names used in these contexts were not Arabic. If people read of these things, they would realise how far they were influenced by the past in their present way of life.

His second comment on Mr. Kirwan's paper was to say that students of modern history were fortunate in the copious documentary material at their disposal and had no doubts about the facts of their narratives. But he was worried about the ancient and medieval history of the Sudan, since one could never be sure what were facts based on authentic evidence and what was hypothesis.

Mr. Kirwan. The answer was to restrict the history of these periods to what was *known*. In his paper he had tried to restrict himself to facts which were firmly based on the findings of archaeology and the evidence of texts and inscriptions. Dr. Shibeika had made a good point. It should be made quite clear in any history of the early Sudan what the basis of evidence was.

Mr. A. B. Theobald. Mr. Kirwan had stated that the key to much of the history of this period lay in the deciphering of the Meroitic script. He would like to ask how many Meroitic inscriptions survived, whether any progress had been made in their deciphering, and whether there was any prospect of the script being deciphered.

Mr. Kirwan. There had been relatively little fundamental progress in the deciphering of the Meroitic script since the great pioneer work of Francis Llewellyn Griffith. We could read the script but we could not understand it (laughter). We could read certain titles and adjectives and some place-names, but the difficulties lay in the understanding of a long text such as the inscription which we suspect to be a Sudanese description of the battle with the Romans which Strabo described. What was needed was a corporate effort by all scholars concerned. Some Meroitic inscriptions were still unpublished. What was wanted was a complete *corpus* of inscriptions such as we had of classical inscriptions, so that we could see all the material together. The trouble was that only three or four people in the whole world were working in this field. Here was a great opportunity for Sudanese students.

Mr. George Lengas. With specific reference to the first and second centuries A.D. he would like to ask Mr. Kirwan to tell them something about the character of what Mr. Kirwan called terrifying legends concerning the Bega tribes, so as to compare and contrast them with the legends of other contemporary nations and so throw light on the intellectual exchange of ideas, customs, etc., on an international basis.

Secondly, he wondered whether some more appropriate names could be found for the subdivisions of the ancient Sudanese in place of the alphabetical classification as A group, B group, C group, etc., as if they were commodities. The fact that they were subdivided into these groups showed that they must have differed in one way or another. Would it not be possible to give them names reflecting some of their characteristics ? It had been noticed in the course of Dr. Vercoutter's lecture of the previous day that members of the audience, both graduate and undergraduate, had been embarrassed by the use of the alphabetical system.

Mr. Kirwan. He was afraid that he did not know enough about Sudanese legends to answer Mr. Lengas's first point. There were many people in the audience, such as Mr. Theobald, who knew much more than he. The use of an alphabetical classification was necessary when we knew very little about the people, in order to supply some kind of chronology. The term X group should now be abandoned since the X-group were most probably the Nobadae. As for A, B and C, what names would Mr. Lengas propose ?

Mr. Lengas. He had no proposals to make, but he suggested that they be given a name reflecting some distinguishing characteristic, in the same way as the name Stoic was given to those philosophers in Ancient Greece who delivered their lectures under *stoas*. Did these people have no characteristics which might give them a name, or was this alphabetical classification designed to increase the difficulties of the students?

Mr. Kirwan. It was true that archaeologists had sometimes been guilty of obscuring history. It might be possible to call the C group people "Middle Kingdom Nubians", but this would obscure the important difference between C group and the Kerma culture. If someone could work out those geographical lists in Egyptian inscriptions which refer to the south lands, it might be possible to relate these names to the ancient remains of the same period.

Sayed Nasr El Hag Ali said that there was only room for one more question and he would give it to Sayed Ibrahim Ahmed.

Sayed Ibrahim Ahmed. Could Mr. Kirwan inform us on the origins of the name Nubia? In the Nubian language *Nub* signified gold and *Nob* slaves. Did the Nubians (and he was one of them) derive their name from slaves, and were the slaves brought in to dig for gold ?

Mr. Kirwan. He had always understood from the Egyptologists that the root *Nub* signified gold and that the etymology of "Nubia" had been so identified. The name Nubia first appeared in medieval Latin manuscripts of the thirteenth century and came from the name given to tribes on the west side of the Nile by Pliny and other classical geographers. The name Nubae or Nubii had a vague connotation in some of these writers and was often applied to people extending far to the north and west. On the whole the name had been related to peoples west of the Nile, but the whole question was very vague. In the fifth century papyrus of Appion, we read of Anoubades, of Anouba in the Coptic life of Shenute, of Noba in the Axumite inscription, and of Nuba today.

Sayed Hamad Ghallab. Any student of Sudanese history was faced by three problems: the first was that of the relation of the Meroitic to the Nubian language and of the Nubian to the ancient Egyptian language. There was an unexplained linguistic gap.

The second concerned the peaceful penetration of the Arabs into the Northern Sudan. Historians were concerned with armies and generals. Sudanese might conclude that the conquest had been violent and that the Arabs had come with swords in their hands to kill all the people. He thought that the history of the Arab conquest of Egypt as well as of the Sudan showed that the technique had been first one of peaceful infiltration, settlement and intermarriage, followed by the army of conquest.

Mr. Kirwan. He thought that the Nubian invasions of Egypt had been no more peaceful than Arab incursions into Nubia. There had possibly been some peaceful trading penetration in the North and Arabs had entered the Eastern Sudan from the Red Sea searching for gold and had intermarried with the Bega. But on the whole the invasion of 650 had not been peaceful. The Arabs had burnt the church at Dongola.

Sayed Nasr El Hag Ali brought the discussion to an end by saying that Mr. Kirwan had inspired both students and teachers to find much in history that was interesting and illuminating and he would even say inspiring. He stood as a teacher who had in the past taught history in a way which Dr. Mekki would not have approved of, and it would certainly be illuminating for teachers to link the past more directly with the present. He was sorry that in the words of the hieroglyphic inscription presented to Mr. Kirwan by Dr. El Tigani Mohammed El Mahi he could not seize Mr. Kirwan and reward him with five bags of gold. We must content ourselves with the hope of being able to secure him from time to time.

THE EGYPTIAN CONTRIBUTION TO NUBIAN CHRISTIANITY

by

F. F. Gadallah

Christianity entered the Sudan from Egypt as the civilization of the ancient Egyptians had done in earlier times[1]; later in history the Arabisation of the Sudan was achieved by way of the same route.[2]

Although the official missions for preaching Christianity in Nubia began in the sixth century A.D., when the Coptic (Monophysite) missionary achieved the greatest success, as is clear from the graphic chronicle of the contemporary historian John of Ephesus,[3] yet one should not disregard the previous activities of the Egyptians in spreading the new religion in the Sudan.

The various waves of adversity and the ruthlessness of the persecution of the Egyptian Christians by the Romans in the second and third centuries[4] must have urged many of the Copts who refused to renounce Christianity to look for some refuge south of Aswan, in lower Nubia, where the Romans had failed to subdue the Blemmyes and the Nubians.[5] In time they must have found the Nile Valley between the Second and Fourth Cataracts more suitable to live in than the barren lower Nubia.[6] We can obtain an idea of this situation from the statements of such writers as Eusebius, Bar Hebraeus and Cosmas Indicopleustes[7]; besides, some the Christian remains in Nubia as far as Marawi are believed to be earlier than the official missions of the sixth century.[8]

We also know that in the first half of the fifth century, the combatant monk Shenoute (in the White Monastery near Akhmim), was frequently brought into collision with the pagan Blemmyes and that he did his best to convert them and had some of them in his monastery.[9] In this connection I also refer to the tales partly published by Crum, which deal with the life of certain monks and the incidents that happened to them in their monastery in the south of the country. Although these are supposed by Crum to have been written in the seventh century and to be the works of imaginative fantasy, yet the incidents narrated may well record a tradition surviving in the monastery, which in earlier periods must have been liable to inroads from the pagan tribes of the Blemmyes and the Nubians whom they did their best to win to Christianity.[10] Shenoute tells us about a visit of one of these pagan tribes to the White Monastery and the charitable treatment of the tribe by his monks.[11]

On the other hand we should not gather that Christianity became widespread in these rather early centuries before its official promulgation in the sixth century. And it appears that when the Emperor Theodosius I (378–395 A.D.) decreed that Christianity should be obligatory everywhere in the Empire, he did not succeed in abolishing idolatry in Nubia.[12] The Greek historian Olympiodorus who visited Nubia between 407–425 A.D. considers the Blemmyes as idolators. Further, a papyrus dated to the latter part of the reign of Theodosius II (c. 425–450 A.D.) preserves an appeal from Appion Bishop of Aswan to the Emperor pleading for military troops to be put at his disposal for the protection of his churches at Philae against the Blemmyes and the Nubians. The churches on the island of Philae were not far from the famous temple of Isis, the last public shrine of paganism and the cult-centre of the Blemmyes.[13] In 451 A.D. the general Maximinus, in the service of Marcianus, defeated an alliance of the Blemmyes and the Nubians and compelled them to agree to a treaty by which he

ensured their homage. It is interesting to mention that one clause of the treaty stipulated that they should be granted permission for the annual pilgrimage to the Temple of Isis at Philae, from which they could take the statute of Isis to their own country to perform their religious rites.[14]

Finally in the reign of Justinian I (527–65 A.D.), Narses, the commander of the Roman troops in Philae, overthrew the idol worship there by closing the temple.[15] At about the same time Silko, the king of Nubia and a recent ally of the Empire, tells us in his famous inscription in the Temple of Kalabsha that he warred with the Blemmyes and drove them out of Lower Nubia.[16] There is no clear-cut evidence that Silko was a Christian although he is supposed to be so since he attributes his triumph to God, apparently the God of the Christians, and refers to the Gods of the Blemmyes as idols.[17]

The title of the patriarch as Patriarch of Alexandria, Ethiopia, Nubia and Pentapolis,[18] as early as the second century of Christianity in Egypt, doubtless referred to the individual Christianities with which he was concerned outside Egypt.

Migration to the south must have increased with the "nationalization" of the Coptic Church as a result of the Council of Chalcedon (451 A.D.). Disputes regarding the nature of Christ led to the great schism between the Church of Rome and that of Egypt. In the Council of Chalcedon the Monophysite doctrine was tenaciously held by the Egyptians against the Duophysite dogma held by Byzantium. Native Egypt was united behind the Patriarch of Alexandria. National feelings were involved and, as Edith Butcher says, "it became a point of honour for an Egyptian patriot to reject the decrees of the Council of Chalcedon".[19] A Melkite (Duophysite) Patriarch was officially appointed in Alexandria, but he was not recognized by the Copts who chose their own Jacobite (Monophysite) Patriarch. Drastic measures were carried out by the Melkite patriarchs against the Copts who, instigated by their religious belief as well as national aspirations, again fled, as during the persecutions by the pagan Emperors, to the Oases in the Desert and to the south of the country. By the sixth century relations with the Nubians changed for the better. The power of the Blemmyes who had ravaged the country from Philae to the Second Cataract in the previous centuries, was on the wane until they were driven away by Silko as we have seen above. The friendlier Nubians were already under the influence of a missionary Bishop, Theodore, established at Philae.[20] Thus the connections became so close and important that the Jacobite leaders were the first to interest themselves in sending missionary expeditions to Nubia. And again I quote Mrs. Butcher, "Religious strife in the north became religious zeal in the south".[21]

The story of the mission, as already hinted above, has been told by the contemporary historian John of Ephesus. When the official Christian missions first arrived in the Sudan in the sixth century A.D. there were three independent Nubian kingdoms.[22] In the north was the kingdom of Nobatia with its capital at Faras; south of it was the kingdom of Makuria (Ar., Maqurrah) with its capital at Old Dongola; and beyond Makuria was the kingdom of Alodia (Ar., 'Alwah) with its capital at Soba.[23]

Julian, an able priest (who had been a companion of Theodosius, the Coptic Patriarch of Alexandria, while in exile in Constantinople),[24] was full of an intense desire to convert the Nobadae, the inhabitants of Nobatia. He transmitted his desire to the Empress Theodora, the greatest champion of the Monophysite sect in the reign of Justinian. Theodora received the proposal with ardent zeal and asked Justinian to send Julian as a missionary to Nobatia; but the Emperor, who maintained the decrees of Chalcedon, would not countenance a Monophysite as the agent of conversion;

and so a rival (Melkite) mission was sent off in Justinian's name. Nevertheless, Theodora frustrated this mission's work by insisting with threats that the Byzantine governor of Thebaid (Upper Egypt) should detain the Melkite mission until Julian had reached his destination. Julian arrived in Nubia c. 543 A.D. and was enthusiastically welcomed by the Nobadae who confessed the God of the Christians, saying, "that He is the one true God and there is no other beside Him"[25]. The statement shows that there was a ready response ; and its wording may well reflect the grudge between the Monophysites and the Chalcedonians (Duophysites) concerning the nature of Christ. Julian taught them Christianity and warned them against the Chalcedonians so that when the imperial countermission arrived in Nobatia it did not achieve any success.

Julian returned to Constantinople after two years of earnest work[26] and was succeeded by Theodore, Bishop of Philae[27] who maintained and consolidated Julian's work. Theodore returned to Philae c. 551 and the work was carried on by Longinus, another able man who was made Bishop of Nubia.[28]

Due to the opposition of the Melkites Longinus had considerable difficulties in getting away from Constantinople and it was only by disguising himself that he was able to slip out and reach his field c. 569. Longinus did fine missionary work in Nobatia—he indoctrinated the Nubians afresh in the faith and practices of the Coptic Church, ordained clergy and built them a church.[29] After six years with the Nobadae, and to their deep distress and tribulation, Longinus left for Egypt to share in the election of the Monophysite patriarch.

But Longinus returned to Nobatia in 578 A.D. at the request of the king of 'Alwah, who aspired to have his country evangelized as had been Nobatia with which 'Alwah was in friendly relations. But when the Melkite Patriarch heard that Longinus was about to preach Monophysitism in this new sphere he deposed him and sent two Melkite bishops to the king of 'Alwah to inform him about Longinus' deposition and to warn the king that unlike the Melkite bishops, Longinus was unable to baptize or ordain. But as before in Nobatia, the Melkites were frustrated in their attempt through the insistence of the king of 'Alwah that Longinus only, who had baptized the Nobadae, should baptize the people of 'Alwah.[30] In 580 A.D. Longinus set out for 'Alwah, and because Maqurrah was unfriendly he had to take a roundabout route through the land of the Blemmyes in which he suffered many hardships. In an interesting letter from the king of Nobatia to the king of 'Alwah we read : "But because of the wicked devices of him who dwells between us, I sent my saintly father to the king of the Blemmyes, that he might conduct him thither by routes further inland ; but the Makoritae heard also of this, and set people on the look-out in all the passes of his kingdom, both in the mountains and in the plain, and as far as the Sea of Weeds (the Red Sea)".[31]

Longinus was accorded a great welcome in 'Alwah "and after a few days' instruction, both the king himself was baptized and all his nobles ; and subsequently in process of time, his people also.[32] There, he also met certain Abyssinians following the heresy of Halicarnassus (which claims that Christ's body was incorruptible) and corrected their belief".[33]

From the passage quoted above (concerning Longinus' trip to 'Alwah) it may be right to infer the following :

(a) Both Nobatia and 'Alwah were gained to Monophysitism.

(b) Inasmuch the Blemmyes helped Longinus, the Monophysite missionary, this might reflect some Monophysite influence which might have been begun in Nubia before their expulsion by Silko. In Nubia they were involved in the Christian activities of the Copts.[34]

(c) Maqurrah was not Monophysite. They might have been pagan[35] but there is also a strong possibility that they were Melkites. John of Ephesus is silent respecting their religion; but John of Biclarum, a contemporary Melkite chronicler says that Maqurrah was converted to Melkite Christianity in 569–70.[36] It would seem more reasonable if we assume that Justinian's mission, after its failure in Nobatia, had gone to Maqurrah and succeeded there in converting the Makorites to Melkite Christianity. This may explain how the two Melkite bishops could reach 'Alwah easily and sooner than Longinus. It may also explain the readiness of the Makorites to go to any length to intercept Longinus as if they were playing their part in the conflicts between the two sects.

Monophysitism appears to have profited much after the Arab conquest of Egypt in 639–640 A.D. The Arabs favoured the Copts,[37] whereas they considered the Melkites as partisans of Byzantium. A Melkite church in Nubia must have found the Arabs in Egypt a serious obstacle to any contact with Byzantium. No doubt the whole of Nubia became in time Jacobite. All the medieval Arab writers who wrote about Nubia agree that from about the beginning of the eighth century, the whole of Nubia was Jacobite, that she followed the church of Egypt, and that her bishops were appointed by the patriarch of Alexandria.[38] The three Christian kingdoms were reduced to two after the Arab conquest of Egypt, as the two kingdoms of Nobatia and Maqurrah became united at some time between 650–710 A.D. Although Maqurrah had been always against Monophysitism she was converted to it since no fresh supply of Melkite clergy was available.[39]

On the other hand Eutycheus in the tenth century, followed by Maqrizi in the fourteenth century, tells a rather different story from that of John of Ephesus. They maintain that Nubia was Melkite until the Arab conquest of Egypt. There was no Melkite patriarch in Egypt for about one century from the caliphate of 'Umar ibn al-Khattāb to that of Hishām ibn 'Abd al-Malik. The Monophysites took advantage of this and when the people of Nubia sent to them asking for bishops they sent them Jacobite bishops, so Nubia became from that time Monophysite.[40]

But it is to be noted that neither Eutycheus nor Maqrizi was a contemporary historian, unlike John of Ephesus who lived at the time of his account of the conversion of Nobatia and 'Alwah. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that the account of John of Ephesus should be accepted with reserve since he was himself a strong supporter of the Monophysite Church and accordingly he would tend to suppress any account of a Melkite success.[41] But I cannot see how this account can be set aside. On the contrary it may be regarded rightly enough as authentic. John of Ephesus was a contemporary historian, and his description of incidents in convincing detail excludes the idea that his account included fictitious events. Further, he lived in Constantinople and claimed personal knowledge of the reports received there.[42] Again, his account finds support in that of John Biclarum, another contemporary authority, and of different dogma, as mentioned above.

Again some authorities argue in favour of a Melkite church in Nubia on archaeological grounds. Junker in a study of Nubian gravestones has shown that the text on the majority of them, especially the Greek ones, is based on a prayer occuring in the Euchologia of the Byzantine Church.[43] But Kirwan has pointed out cogently that this

formula is found on gravestones belonging to the earliest period of Nubian Christianity and is also found on others of a much later date when, without a doubt, Nubia was wholly Monophysite.[44]

The Byzantine influences in Christian Nubia, such as the Greek language used in the epitaphs, the Byzantine Names, the contents of the Nubian religious books as stated by the medieval Arab historians, the Byzantine titles in Nubia such as "Eparch" and "Domestikos", and the Byzantine influence in architecture, are not conclusive evidence against a Monophysite Nubia. It is to be remembered that the Greek language was the official language in Nubia as well as in Egypt. Nubia had been for a long period under Hellenistic influence,[45] many chiefs imitated the Byzantine state and used Greek as the written language of court and commerce.[46] Greek was the only language available for religious use in the early days of Christianity in Nubia; the Nubian language was still not reduced to writing, and the Egyptian liturgy was still not translated into Coptic.[47] The Greek language was the general medium of Christianity everywhere. The canonical Christian writings were all in Greek, as were all the writings of the Apostolic age,[48] and thus the Byzantine influence was inherited from the beginning in Nubia, when they adopted certain Byzantine forms in the euchologia which became stereotyped and conventional as is clear from the gravestones.[49] This inheritance also explains the perseverance in the use of the Greek language in the Church in very much later periods, as stated by the Arab historians, when Nubia was certainly Monophysite. Further, a Melkite Maqurrah may be another reason for such Byzantine influence.[50] But we have to remember that the Coptic also existed[51] and that Coptic books were circulated due to the presence of a big number of the Coptic clergy; and it appears that by the end of the tenth century Nubian displaced Greek as the language of the church.[52] One may speculate whether the victory of the Nubian language was inspired by the same forces which had led to the adoption of Coptic in Egypt; namely to strengthen the local Christianity as a nationalistic cult over against Islam.[53]

In Nubia the Egyptians had found a home when they were persecuted by the pagan emperors, the Melkites and the Persians. Monophysite Christianity was destined to prevail there. The Nubian kingdoms remained faithful to the Monophysite Church of Egypt and were to render it valuable services, and the kings of Nubia considered themselves as the protectors of the patriarch of Alexandria.[54]

NOTES

[1] Christianity did not enter the Sudan from Abyssinia as some have claimed. See, however, Budge, E. A. Wallis, *A History of Ethiopia*, I, pp. III ff., Kirwan, L. P., *The Oxford university excavations at Firka*, pp. 49 ff., Hardy, E. R., *Christian Egypt: Church and People*, pp. 142 f.; Trimingham, J. S., *Islam in the Sudan*, p. 49 n.

[2] Cf. MacMichael, H. A., in '*The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan from within*', ed. Hamilton, pp. 46 f.; Trimingham, op. cit., p. 50; Groves, C. P., *The Planting of Christianity in Africa*, p. 106.

[3] See below.

[4] The persecutions began with the reign of Septimus Severus (193–211), were continued in the reign of Decius (244–251), Valerian (253–260), and reached their zenith in the reign of Diocletian (284–305) whose measures against the Christians were so hard and severe that the Coptic church still dates by the Era of Diocletian or the Era of the Martyrs.

[5] Woolley and MacIver, *Karanog*, III, pp. 90 ff.

[6] Budge, *The Egyptian Sudan*, p. 287. On the Blemmyes and the Roman frontier see *Karanog*, pp. 85 ff.

[7] See Trimingham, p. 49 n.; Budge, op. cit., quoting Bar Hebraeus, *Ecclesiastical History; The Christian Topography*, ed. McCrindal, Hakluyt Society, 1897, p. 120.

[8] Budge, *Ethiopia* I, p. 113.

[9] Woolley & MacIver, op. cit., p. 95; Kirwan, *LAAA*, XXIV, p. 92.

[10] Crum, W. E., *A Nubian Prince in an Egyptian Monastery*, in '*Studies presented to F. Ll. Griffith*', pp. 138 ff.

[11] Ibid., p. 140 n. and references there.
[12] Budge, *Egyptian Sudan*, II, p. 291.
[13] See Woolley and MacIver, op. cit., p. 95; Kirwan, *SNR*, XX, p. 53.
[14] Woolley and MacIver, op. cit., p. 96.
[15] This event seems best dated in 540–541—after Theodosius' exile and Julian's mission, and before Narses' departure for the Persian wars where he died in the campaign of 543. See Hardy, op. cit., p. 142 and references there; see also Griffith *LAAA*, XIII, p. 51.
[16] Budge, *Egyptian Sudan*, II, pp. 292 ff.
[17] Trimingham, op. cit., p. 47 n.
[18] For this title see Maspero, J., *Histoire des Patriarches d'Alexandrie*, p. 382.
[19] Butcher, E. L., *The Story of the Church of Egypt*, p. 301.
[20] Monneret de Villard, *Storia della Nubia Christiana*, p. 56; Hardy, op. cit., p. 112.
[21] *The Church in Egypt*, I., pp. 330. See also Trimingham, op. cit., p. 50.
[22] John of Ephesus, *Ecclesiastical History*, III, transl. R. Rayne Smith (1860). See also Kirwan 'A Contemporary Account of the Conversion of the Sudan to Christianity', *SNR* XX, pp. 289 ff.; Trimingham, op. cit., pp. 48 ff.
[23] For the topography of these kingdoms see de Villard, op. cit., chaps. XIV–XVI; Kirwan, Topography of the Christian Nubian kingdoms, *JEA*, pp. 57 ff. See also Crawford, O.G.S. *Antiquity* XXI, pp. 13 ff.; *The Fung kingdom of Sennar*, pp. 23 ff.
[24] John of Ephesus, op. cit., p. 251.
[25] Ibid., p. 254.
[26] Julian used to relate how he sat down every day in caves full of water (due to the severe heat) baptizing the people who came in big numbers (Ibid., pp. 255 f.).
[27] See Maspero, J., 'Theodore de Philai', *Rev. de l'hist. des relig*, LIX, pp. 303 ff.
[28] John of Ephesus, op. cit., 256.
[29] Ibid., p. 257.
[30] Ibid., p. 318.
[31] Ibid., p. 324.
[32] Ibid., p. 226.
[33] Ibid., p. 323.
[34] See above. See also Trimingham, op. cit., p. 58 fn. 3.
[35] Cf. Trimingham, op. cit., p. 56 n. 3.
[36] Cf. Kirwan, *Excavations at Firka*, p. 50; Christianity and the Qura'an, *JEA* XX, pp. 201 ff.
[37] *See Chronique de Michel le Syrien*, ed. & transl. Chabat, (1905), III, p. 413; Abu Salih el Armani, *Churches and Monasteries of Egypt*, transl. Evetts, pp. 230 f.; see also Shinnie, P. L., *Medieval Nubia*, p. 7.
[38] E.g., Ibn Selim el-Aswani, in Maqrīzī, Khitat, I, pp. 311 f.; Abu Salih, op. cit., p. 263, al-Idrisi, *Description de l'Afrique et de l'Espagne*, ed. Dozy and Goeje (1866), text p. 27.
[39] The date of the unification is not certain. Kirwan (JEA, XXI, pp. 61 f.) suggests that it took place as a result of the Arab threat. Meantime de Villard (op. cit., pp. 78–83) gives reasons for a date between 690–3 and 710. See also Trimingham, op. cit., p. 63 n. 2; Crawford, *Fung kingdom of Sennar*, p. 23; *Antiquity* XXI, p. 12. The treaty between the Arabs and the Nubians (651–2), however, mentions only two Christian kingdoms in Nubia.
[40] *Patr. Gr.* III, ed. Migne, pp. 1122 f.; Maqrizi, *Geschichte der Copten*, ed. Wustenfeld, pp. 22. Cf. Kirwan, *Excavations at Firka*, p. 49; Griffith *LAAA* XIII, p. 52.
[41] See e.g., de Villard, op. cit., p. 61; Shinnie, op. cit., pp. 2 ff.; *SASOP*, 3, p. II n. 16.
[42] Kirwan, *SNR* XX, p. 289, Groves, op. cit., p. 49 n. 4.
[43] Junker, H. Die Christliche Grabsteine Nubiens, *ZAS* 60 pp. III–48.; see also Kirwan, *Excavations at Firka*, p. 50; Macadam, M. F. Laming, in *SOSAP*, 2, pp. 41 f.
[44] Kirwan, *Excavations at Firka*, pp. 50 f.
[45] Hellenistic influence had been clear during the Meroitic period. Cf. Trimingham, op. cit., p. 49.
[46] Abu Salih, op. cit. p. 272.
[47] Ibid., loc. cit.
[48] Groves, op. cit., p. 39.
[49] See Macadam, op. cit., p. 43.
[50] Kirwan, *Excavations at Firka*, p. 56; *JEA*, XX, p. 202.
[51] Griffith, *LAAA*, XIII, pp. 53 f.; Macadam, op. cit., p. 43; See also Trimingham, op. cit., pp. 66, 72.
[52] Shinnie, op. cit., p. 7.
[53] Cf. Trimingham, op. cit., p. 63 n. 2.
[54] E.g., King Cyriacus invaded Egypt in the year 745 in defence of the Patriarch of Alexandria who had been imprisoned and could agree with the Arabs to set him free. See, however, Shinnie, op. cit., p. 5; Trimingham, op. cit., p. 66.

THE MEDIEVAL HISTORY OF DARFUR IN ITS RELATION TO OTHER CULTURES AND TO THE NILOTIC SUDAN

by

A. J. Arkell

My ideas on this subject were thrown into the melting pot, when I learned that pottery, that must have originated in Christian Nubia (probably at Faras, north of Wadi Halfa) was found 30 years ago in what has hitherto been considered a mosque at Ain Farah in Northern Darfur. I have sent a full account of this discovery for publication in *Kush* VII, and a more popular account (by request) to *The Unesco Courier*, but I do not know whether either of them will appear in print by the time of the Conference. It is now clear that Ain Farah was not the capital of a Moslem sultanate, but that it was a Christian monastery, which must be dated back to between A.D. 900 and 1200, if not earlier. A glass window found there resembles one dated A.D. 700 in Transjordan. Ain Farah was certainly not built *c.* A.D. 1585 for King Idris Aloma of Bornu, as I have previously suggested.[1]

I have now therefore to attempt a fresh reconstruction of the medieval history of Darfur. The Middle Ages are usually considered to run from the fourth century A.D. to A.D. 1500. In the history of the Sudan, this corresponds with the period between the fall of Meroë and the rise of the Fung kingdom. Nothing is known for certain about the fall of Meroë, but since, as we have now discovered, Darfur was within the sphere of influence of Christian Nubia, it is all the more likely to have felt some influences from greater powers that held sway in the same area at an earlier date, i.e. from Ancient Egypt, especially when it occupied the northern Sudan *c* 1500 B.C., and from the Kigdom of Cush at its most powerful, 750–250 B.C. There is indeed some reason to surmise that the royal family of Cush, which ruled at Napata and then at Meroë for the incredibly long period of over a thousand years, in the 4th century A.D. fled westward from the Nile, away from the reach of Meroë's rising trade rival Axum. It is probable that the legendary Daju sultans[2] of Darfur have their roots in that past when Meroë and perhaps even Egypt held sway on the Nile, and that from Egypt came originally to the Daju, perhaps via Cush, the pattern of the divine king that survived in the Fur sultanate till after the end of the medieval period, indeed down to 1916.

Meroë was superseded on the Nile by the kingdom or kingdoms of the X Group, in Dongola probably the Nobatae, who were in trade contact with Byzantine Egypt and indirectly with the Far East. The discovery of local copies of Egyptian bronze *objets d'art* on the Gold Coast[3] make it appear probable that at this time, as now, there was a route across Africa from E. to W. running between the desert and the forest—and so through Darfur—along which the manufactures of Egypt reached West Africa.

It is not improbable that in the closing centuries of the kingdom of Meroë, Tuareg camel owners from Asia had been settled in the plains of Northern Kordofan and eastern Darfur, so suitable for camels,[4] and were the original Anaj of Kordofan, giving rise to the traces of Tuareg influence that are to be glimpsed in Darfur during our period. If so, they must have continued to provide camel transport for the Christian kingdoms of Nubia, and particularly for Dongola, which only collapsed finally in A.D. 1340, almost exactly 1000 years after the fall of Meroë, and 800 years after the conversion of the King of the Nobatae to Christianity[5] in A.D. 543. The kingdom of Makuria or Mukurra, with its capital at Old Dongola, was converted to

Christianity in 569[6], and now that Christianity is seen to have been firmly established in northern Darfur, one realizes that it had some seven centuries in which it may have spread its influence westward from Nubia and that the traditional Christianity of the Bedayat of Ennedi may have gone there direct from Nubia (from Dongola or further north via Selima and Merga or via the Wadi Howar) or may have spread to Ennedi from Darfur. It is anyhow easier than ever now to understand how there are still Nubian-speaking people in both Kordofan and Darfur. The natural route between Dongola and Ain Farah follows the Wadi Milk[7] across N. Kordofan. In this area Zankor certainly with its large red bricks, and Abu Sofian possibly were Christian centres. Between those sites and the Dongola reach of the Nile is Awadun, where there is a Christian graffito in Old Nubian that may date from not long after the coming of Christianity to Dongola, for in it the old name of Cush still survives[8].

Darfur tradition has it that the first sultans of Darfur, the Daju, who moved west to Dar Sila, were superseded by the Tungur. We now know that the Tungur settlement at Ain Farah was not a royal palace but a monastery with two churches; but the larger Tungur walled stone town of Uri[9] in the hills east of Ain Farah may well have been the capital of a native ruler tributary to Christian Nubia, in whose territory Nubian monks from Dongola built their monastery at Ain Farah; or it may have been another Nubian settlement which subsequently became independent. All sites in Darfur traditionally associated with the Tungur[10] and/or Show should now be carefully examined for evidence of the influence of Christian Nubia. Ain Farah, being apparently the only site where red brick was employed and the architecture definitely derived from Christian Nubia, *seems* to have been the centre of Christian missionary enterprise, but a more detailed archaeological survey of sites may lead to a revision of this idea. Special attention should be paid to the hill settlement of Māsa, between Kutum and El Fasher, locally said to have been an earlier Tungur capital than Uri, and also to Kusi, the site known as Show's House[12] in NE. Jebel Marra. On the map[10] it will be seen that Ain Farah lies in the middle of a group of Tungur sites which stretch from Kusi and J. Hareiz in the south to Kabsoru and Gutera in Dar Zaghawa in the north. This was presumably the main area of Nubian influence in Darfur. Two other isolated sites in Dar Gimr lie on the route to Wara, the ancient capital of Wadai. Since, as we shall see, it was probably Islam advancing from the west in the 13th or 14th century that put an end to the Christian settlement at Ain Farah and Nubian influence in Darfur, the question now arises whether the Tungur capital at Wara in Wadai may not have been another Christian settlement founded during the existence of the monastery of Ain Farah, rather than a later capital of the Tungur after their expulsion from Darfur. The name Wara almost certainly means capital; but it may have only become independent as the power of Nubia failed. Show is said at Ain Farah to have fled not to Wadai but to Bedayat country (Ennedi).

The origin of the name Tungur is still a problem, but the fact that their ancestor is traditionally said to have been el Ma'agūr 'the Hamstrung' suggests that an earlier form of the name was Tumgur, and I still think it probable that it is connected with the name of the Tumagera of Tibesti who are said by Imam Ahmed of Bornu to have been people of Kira, while the Tungur are known in Darfur as Kirāti. Since the Tungur were Christian and probably from the kingdom of Mukurra or Makuria (modern Dongola), their name may also be connected with the name of that kingdom, and probably enshrines the title Kūr, recently shown [13] to have been the title (in Dongola) of the rulers of Cush, who formed the Twenty-fifth Dynasty of Egypt and of whom all but one were buried at *Kur*ru. It still seems to me possible that there is a connection between Tumagera and Sahib el jebel, the title of the representative of the King of Mukurra in Lower Nubia[14]. Indeed it now seems possible that we hear of him

operating in Darfur in the record of Idrisi (*d.* A.D. 1153), that Simia, in the land of the pagan Tajuwiin (Daju), which is coterminous with Nubia, was burnt and utterly destroyed by Sahib Bilāq (Philae), an emir of the King of the Nuba[15]. This hitherto improbable-sounding statement now fits in to the little that we know for certain of the history of Darfur at this time, and if correct, makes it look as if the Tungur 'sultanate' in Darfur was never independent (unless right at the end) but dependent on Christian Nubia, the latter intervening to destroy the power of the Daju princeling of Simiat, east of El Fasher, who must have been interfering with the Darfur Christians.

Soon after this the power of the Christian kingdom of Dongola no doubt began to crumble, for two expeditions were sent against it by Saladin, who had seized power in Egypt in 1171, and *c.* A.D. 1240 the Moslem powers of Egypt and Kanem linked up in the vicinity of the 2nd Cataract, for the great king Dunama of Kanem claimed that he controlled all the trade routes between Kanem and Sai Island (in Dongola), where was a fortified town, once the seat of a bishopric. Ain Farah was burnt and a musket ball was found there; its destruction, and the collapse of the Tungur power in Darfur cannot have been unconnected with the advance of Moslem Kanem.

It is to the period between the 13th century, when Kanem's influence reached Sai, and 1603, when the empire of Idris Aloma of Bornu collapsed on his death, that must date all the influence of Bornu that we can trace in Darfur. I have recorded the evidence elsewhere[16]. Here it is sufficient to mention the organization of the early Fur sultanate, with ranks and titles that also occur in Bornu, including the name of El Fasher for the space in front of the sultan's palace, the institution of the large door for men and the small door for women, and the cultivation of tree cotton, with a vocabulary much of which can be traced through Bornu to West Africa. Islam in Darfur too has always followed the Maliki code, as we know that Kanem did. Indeed Ibn Said, quoted by Abu al Fida, records that 'the Zaghawa (presumably of N. Darfur), who lived 20 stages west of Dongola' became Moslems and came under the dominion of Kanem. Kanem's rise is attributed to the friendship of Tunis, whence no doubt were obtained the first firearms seen in central Africa, which would account for the ease with which its power expanded. The details of its expansion escape us as yet. The History of Qalaun[17] records that the Anaj kingdom (some little state in N. Kordofan?) was invaded from the west *c.* 1287 (presumably either by a force from Kanem, or from Darfur now perhaps a province of Kanem). By this time, Christian Nubia being no longer able to restrain them, hordes of Guhayna and other Arabs were pouring into the Sudan, and by 1386[18] some of them had passed through northern Darfur and reached Lake Chad in sufficient numbers to help a cadet branch of the ruling family of Kanem (or Bornu as it was now called) to expel the ruling family. Little more than a century later (*c.* A.D. 1500) the original royal family were able to drive out their rivals. A Bornu tradition records that one of the now expelled princes went east 'to Makāda' (Moslem Abyssinia) and set up a kingdom; but the tradition clearly implies that Sennar not Abyssinia is indicated[19]. Crawford has recently tried to bring the Fung sultans to Sennar from the east,[20] but to me the Black Sultans (*sultana zerqa*) who, *c.* A.D. 1504, introduced Islam after the Maliki persuasion, institutions such as the *kukur* throne and the name Hamaj for subject peoples, into the vacuum caused by the gradual collapse of the southern Christian kingdom of Alwa (Soba), are more likely to have come from the west, where black sultans complained in 1391 that nomad Arabs from the east were enslaving their people, where Islam has always followed the Maliki sect, and where both *kukur* and *Hamaj* are also at home. It was certainly a civil war in the early Fur sultanate of Darfur that led to the foundation of the kingdom of the Musabaat in Kordofan, and Kordofan was claimed as theirs in historic times by both Fur and Fung sultans.

Suggested Chronology based on the above

4th century A.D.	The royal family of Cush leaves Meroë and moves west. Tuareg camel-owning nomads (Anaj) in W. Kordofan. Daju ruling in Darfur.
5th century A.D.	Nobatae in trade relations with Egypt and W. Africa
6th century A.D.	Mukurra (Dongola) converted to Christianity.
7th century A.D.	Christian graffito at Awadun, N. Kordofan.
8th century A.D. to 10th century	Christian influence spreading westwards, leading to foundation of monasteries at Zankor in NW. Kordofan and Ain Farah in N. Darfur.
	Tungur rule in Darfur under protection of Christian Nubia. Their capital at Masa and then Uri.
	Kusi founded in N. Jebel Marra.
	Further Tungur settlements in Wadai and near Lake Chad?
c. 1150.	Nubian expedition to Darfur destroys Daju town of Simia.
1171.	Saladin seizes power in Egypt, and sends two expeditions against Dongola, weakening the power of that kingdom.
1240.	Dunama, King of Kanem, claims to control trade route to Sai in Dongola—i.e. Moslem powers of Kanem and Egypt link up near Second Cataract. Monastery at Ain Farah destroyed. End of Tungur power in Darfur. Islam comes to Darfur from Kanem. N. Darfur Zaghawa under Kanem.
1287.	Anaj kingdom (N. Kordofan) invaded from the west (by Kanem ?) Guhayna and other nomad Arabs begin to enter N. Sudan from Egypt.
1386.	These Arabs have reached Lake Chad area, and assist in the overthrow of the ruling house in Bornu by a cadet branch of that family.
1391.	Bornu sultan complains to Cairo that Arabs are enslaving their people.
1500.	The lawful rulers recover the throne of Bornu, and one of their rivals, being expelled, goes east and founds the Fung sultanate at Sennar on the Blue Nile.

NOTES

[1] Arkell, 'History of Darfur', *SNR* 33, pp. 258–60, and *A History of the Sudan*, pp. 211–2.
[2] Arkell, *A History of the Sudan*, p. 176.
[3] *op. cit.* pp. 182–3.
[4] *op. cit.* p. 151, 197.
[5] *op. cit.* p. 181.
[6] *op. cit.* p. 185.
[7] *op. cit.* see map 8 on p. 175.
[8] *op. cit.* p. 174.
[9] 'Darfur Antiquities III', *SNR* 27, pp. 185 ff.
[10] H. G. Balfour-Paul, 'History and Antiquities of Darfur', *SAS Museum Pamphlet* No. 3; map at end, sites marked T (and a few others).
[11] Arkell, 'History of Darfur IV', *SNR* 33, p. 251.
[12] Arkell, 'Darfur Antiquities II' *SNR* 20, pp. 101–3. It looks now as if Kusi may have been a stone-built monastery and church(?) on the edge of a stone-built town.
[13] *Bulletin de l'Institut français d'Archéologie orientale*, 1952, pp. 157–207, and Arkell, *Kush* III, p. 94.
[14] Arkell, *History*, p. 191 n.
[15] Arkell, 'History of Darfur', *SNR* 32, p. 63.
[16] Arkell, 'History of Darfur', *SNR* 33, pp. 129–155.
[17] Arkell, *History*, pp.196–7.
[18] *op. cit.*, p. 199.
[19] *op. cit.*, p. 206.
[20] O. G. S. Crawford, *Fung Kingdom of Sennar*, pp. 143–155.

نظرات عامة في تاريخ تعريب السودان

تأليف

عبد لمجيد عابدين

(١)

في عصور ماقبل الاسلام ، نزحت جماعات من العرب الى مناطق افريقية ومنها السودان . فمنذ القرن الخامس قبل الميلاد نزل عرب جنوبيون في بعض جزائر البحر الاحمر ، وانتشروا على امتداد سواحل افريقية الشرقية . وأسسوا طرقا للقوافل بلغوا بها المناطق الداخلية (١) . وفي العصر المسيحي سكن بعض ديار مصر جماعات من غسان وخزاعة وبلي (٢) . ويقال ان حملات حميرية ، قد ارسلت في العصر المسيحي الى بعض جهات السودان وشمال افريقية (٣) . وان جماعات من بلي نزحت الى بلاد البجة قبل الاسلام (٤) ، وان الحدارب ، وهو لفظ محرف لكلمة حضارمه . نزلوا بين البجة في القرن السادس الميلادى (٥) . اضف الى ذلك ان الرابطة بين ساحلي البحر الاحمر ، منذ أقدم العصور لم تكن ضعيفة يوما ما ، وان الممر بين السا حلين كان سهلا ميسورا . (٦)

فاذا كانت الروايات الوطنية السودانية قد أغفلت ذكر هجرات العرب الى السودان قبل الاسلام ، فان ذلك راجع الى أن العرب المسلمين لم يكن يعنيهم الإشارة الى تلك الهجرات البعيدة التي نزحت في عصر الجاهلية الى السودان . فقد كان هدفهم جميعا ينحصر في رد أنسابهم الى أصول اسلامية والوقوف عندها (٧) .

ولكن لا ننس ان العرب في العصور الوثنية والمسيحية ، عندما هاجروا الى افريقية ، كانوا يعرفون عادة باسماء قبائلهم الخاصة ، وكانوا يتكلمون لغات سامية متعددة ، ويدينون بأديان مختلفة . ولم يتح لهم في السودان ما أتيح لإخوانهم عرب اليمن في إثيوبيا من تأسيس دولة أكسوم القوية التي تركت أثرا واضحا في تاريخ افريقية القديم .

لهذا كله تفككت عرى الهجرات العربية على مدى تلك العصور ، وابتلعتها أرض السودان الشاسعة . وهذا قد يفسر لنالماذا لم يحفظ التاريخ شيئا يذكر عن هذه الهجرات البعيدة التي نزحت الى السودان قبل الاسلام .

(٢)

واذا كانت الروايات الوطنية السودانية ، قد زعمت ان عددا من القبائل ، في عصور الاسلام ، عبر الى السودان من جزيرة العرب مباشرة من طريق البحر الاحمر ، فلعل أصحابها قصدوا بذلك أن يدعموا قولهم بالانتساب الى أصول عربية جائت من مهدها

مباشرة ، ولكن ليس لدينا دليل كاف على نزوح هجرات كبيرة واسعة من بلاد العرب مباشرة الى السودان ، والشواهد التي لدينا تؤيد أن أكثر الهجرات العربية وفدت إلى السودان من طريق وادى النيل (٨) .

على أنّ هذه الهجرات قد تمت على مراحل ، أهمها تلك التي حدثت في خلال سبعة قرون تقريبا (من القرن السابع الى القرن الرابع عشر الميلادى) . ومن الملاحظ ان العوامل الرئيسية لهذه الهجرات كانت مرتبطة ارتباطا وثيقا باحوال العالم الاسلامي في تلك العصور.

ا — ففي العهد الذى كتبه عبد الله بن سعد بن أبى السرح سنة ٦٥١ م لأهل النوبة ، اشترط بناء مسجد في فناء دنقلة ، وحماية التجار وغيرهم من المسلمين الذين يطرقون بلادهم . وبذلك وضع عبد الله الأساس الاول الذى مهّد الطريق لما حدث فيما بعد من تغلغل العرب المسلمين في هذه البلاد (٩) .

ولعل أقدم هجرة عربية إسلامية ، وصلت الينا آثارها ، ماورد في بعض شواهد القبور التي عثر عليها في (نبت) — في منطقة البجة — لبعض افراد أوجاليات عربية يرجع تاريخها الى القرن الثانى للهجرة (الثامن الميلادى) (١٠) .

ب — و في القرن الثالث الهجرى (التاسع الميلادى) تغيرت نظرة بعض حكام العالم الاسلامي الى القبائل العربية ، كالمعتصم العباسي في بغداد وابن طولون في مصر (١١) ، فافسحوا الطريق للعناصر التركية للانتظام في فرق الجندية وادارة شئون البلاد ، ولعلّ هذا كان من العوامل التي شجعت جماعات مثل ربيعة وجهينة ، أن يهاجروا الى بلاد البجة ، وربما كانوا قد سمعوا أيضا عن مناجم قديمة للذهب في صحراء النوبة .

تزوج رجال ربيعة من بنات زعماء البجة ، فأصبح أبناؤهم رؤساء لقبائل البجة ، لأن الوراثة عند هذه القبائل هي من طريق الأم . ويقول المسعودى (فقويت ربيعة بالبجة على من ناوأها وجاورها من قحطان وغيرهم من مضر بن نزار ممن سكن تلك الديار) (١٢) . وهذا يعني أن الفرعين الرئيسيين في الانساب العربية التقليدية ، وهما عدنان وقحطان ، قد تمثلا في الهجرات العربية الى السودان منذ القرن الثالث الهجرى (التاسع الميلادى) .

وبعد أن قضى العباسيون على حكم بني أمية في الشام سنة ١٣٢ هـ(٧٤٩ م) ، اتخذ المروانيون من مطارح إفريقية النائية ملجأ لهم ، وظهرت حركة مروانية في أكثر من منطقة من المناطق المحيطة بالسودان ، وربما كانت في بعض جهات السودان نفسه . فقام ثائر أموى في صعيد مصر ، في سنة ١٦٦ هـ(٧٨٢ م) وادعى الخلافة لنفسه ، ثمّ قام

ثائر أموى آخر سنة ٣٩٧ هـ(١٠٠٦ م) في أيام الفاطميين ، هاربا من الأندلس الى صعيد مصر ايضا (١٣) . وربما كان الجنود النوبيون (١٤) في الجيش المصرى في ايام الطولونيين والاخشيديين والفاطميين . وفي اوائل حكم الايوبيين ، من أنصار بني أمية (١٥) . وفي ايام المسعودى المؤرخ ، في سنة ٣٣٢ هـ(٩٤٣ م) كان صاحب الواحات في صحراء مصر الغربية . مروانيّ المذهب ، وهو من قبيلة لواتة المغربية (١٦) . واذا عرفنا الرواية التاريخية القائلة بأن بعض بني مروان بن محمد ، آخر خلفاء بني أمية ، هربوا الى السودان والحبشة على أثر قتل الخليفة مروان في سنة ١٣٢ هـ ، استطعنا ان نفسر لماذا اصبحت هذه المنطقة فيمابعد محطّ انظار المروانيين ومركزا لنشاطهم (١٧) . وقد تغلغل التيار الاموى في السودان ، في خلال القرون التالية حتى وجدنا اخيرا ملوك الفرنج ينتسبون الى بني أمية .

ت — ولم تحدث في عهد الفاطميين ٣٥٨—٥٦٧ هـ(٩٦٩—١١٧١ م) هجرات واسعة الى السودان فيما نعلم . غير أن هذا العهد تميز بأمرين كان لهما أثر واضح في مستقبل العروبة في السودان . الاول هو مولد إمارة عربية قوية اتخذت مدينة اسوان مركزا لها ، وامتد نفوذها جنوبا فى ارض مريس ، وكان مؤسسها زعيما من عرب ربيعة اسمه ابو مروان بشر بن اسحاق (١٨) . والامر الثاني هو تشجيع الفاطميين العرب الساكنين في بلاد الشام على الهجرة الى مصر ، فتدفقت حينئذ فروع من قحطان وعدنان الى الديار المصرية (١٩) ، وسكنت جموع منهم في صعيد مصر . ولهذا الحادث أهمية خاصة ، اذ قرّب مساكن هذه القبائل من منطقة السودان ، وجعل إمكان الهجرة اليها ايسر عليهم من ذى قبل . وسوف نجد أن هذه القبائل عندما أحسوا بالضغط من جراء سياسة المماليك البحرية ، كان من الايسر عليهم أن يعبروا الى السودان .

ث — بلغ الضغط على القبائل العربية أقصاه في عصر المماليك البحرية ٦٤٨ — ٧٨٤ هـ(١٢٥٠—١٣٨٢ م) فتمّ عزلهم عن ميادين السياسة والحرب ، ونظر المماليك الى هؤلاء « العربان » نظرة عداء شديد ، ومن القبائل التي سكنت في صعيد مصر في ذلك الحين بلىّ وجهينة وهلال وقريش والانصار وكلاب وثعلبة وجذام ، وكان المصدر الرئيسي لأرزاقهم حراسة الحجاج والتجار القادمين من جهات مصر والمغرب والهند واليمن والحبشة . وكان على الحجاج والتجار أن يسافروا الى صعيد مصر ثم يقطعوا الصحراء الى عيذاب (٢٠) . ولكن غارات البجة على المسافرين ، وسياسة المماليك ازاء الصعيد ، ومصاعب الطريق الموحشة ، قد أدّت الى إغلاق هذا الطريق الذى كان مصدر رزق أساسيا لهذه الجماعات

الضخمة الهائلة . وكان طبيعيا ان يثور العربان على دولة المماليك مرات عديدة (راجع في تاريخ مصر لابن اياس ، حـ ١ (ط • بولاق ١٣١١ هـ) حوادث السنوات ٧١٣ ، ٧١٦ ، ٧٥٤ ، ٧٨١ ، ٧٨٢ ، ٧٨٣ هـ الخ . . .) . وكان طبيعيا ايضا ان يلتمسوا لأنفسهم مهربا في بلد قريب كالسودان . وليس ببعيد أن تكون الأخبار قد ترامت اليهم حينئذ بسقوط مملكة دنقلة المسيحية ، وانفساح طريق الهجرة امامهم ، حيث تنتظرهم المراعي الغنية في الجنوب .

والاخبار التي دونت عن الهجرات العربية الى السودان ، في عهد المماليك البحرية غير قليلة ، وحسبنا ان نشير منها الى امثلة لا تزال بحاجة الى البحث والاستقصاء :

احدها نصّ ذكره ابن اياس تحت سنة ٧٥٤ هـ(١٣٥٣ م) يصف فيه احدى ثورات العربان على المماليك في صعيد مصر ، فقد تجمعت القبائل برئاسة شيخ قبيلة (عرك) حتى « سدّوا الفضاء » واحتدم القتال بينهم وبين المماليك ، وانهزم العربان ، وهرب كثير منهم الى الجنوب « ومشى الامراء وراء العربان الذين هربوا مسيرة سبعة أيام حتى دخلوا اطراف بلاد الزنج » (٢١) . وهذا الخبر قد يفيدنا في تتبع اوائل هجرة العركيين الذين كان لهم فيما بعد أثر واضح في نشر الثقافة الدينية في السودان .

الثاني نصّ اورده القلقشندى في صبح الاعشى (٢٢) ، يذكر فيه اسماء ثمانية شيوخ لقبائل عربية كانت تقيم « بالطرقات الموصلة من الديار المصرية الى بلاد الحبشة وغيرها » ، وكانوا يراسلون سلاطين المماليك البحرية . ولم يذكر المؤلف من أسماء قبائلهم سوى ثلاث : دغيم والجوابرة والنمانمة . واسماء القبائل والشيوخ هؤلاء ، لا تزال بحاجة الى مزيد من البحث والاستقصاء .

الثالث نصّ يحدثنا فيه القلقشندى ايضا (٢٣) عن قبائل منها جذام نزحت الى دارفور واجتاحت مملكة الزغاوة .

الرابع احتدام النزاع في بلاد الحبشة بين ملوك الطراز الاسلامي ، وأصلهم من عرب اليمن ، وبين ملوك الدولة السليمانية المسيحية (٢٤) . وقد امتدّ نفوذ ملوك الطراز المسلمين على طول الساحل الافريقي للبحر الاحمر من شمال سواكن الى ألصومال حيث بسطوا نفوذهم غربا (٢٥) . واستمر النزاع بين الفريقين الى القرن السادس عشر ، ومن المفيد ان يعنى الباحثون بما قد يكون من

أصداء هذا النزاع في بلاد مجاورة كالسودان ، وما قد يكون من هجرات عربية من منطقة الطراز الاسلامي الى السودان في هذه الفترة .

الخامس وثيقة كتبها الفقيه محمد ابو دليق ونشرها الشاطر بصيلي في كتابه : معالم تاريخ وادى النيل (ص ٢٥١) ، ولم تدرس الى آلان . والوثيقة تتحدث عن هجرة ثلاث عشرة طائفة من العرب هاجروا منذ سنة ٦٧٢ هـ(١٢٧٣ م) الى مناطق من شمال افريقية وشرقيها ، ثم انتقل بعضها الى جهات مختلفة من السودان .

(٣)

ومنذ اواخر القرن الرابع عشر او في القرن الخامس عشر ، بدأ المهاجرون من العرب يؤلفون مشيخات صغيرة في السودان ولا سيما في حوض النيل الاوسط (٢٦) . ويبدو أن هذه المشيخات كان لها اثر في تغيير بعض النظم السياسية والاجتماعية التي جرى عليها السودانيون من قبل (٢٧) .

ثمّ ظهر بعد ذلك ، تشكيلات كبرى تولت زمام الحكم في عدة مناطق من السودان الشمالي ، فقامت سلطنة الفونج في سنار في القرن السادس عشر ، وقامت سلطنة الجعليين في تقلى ، بعد حوالي ربع قرن من قيام الفونج ، وتولى سليمان سلونج (وسلونج معناها عزبى) أمير السلطنة في دارفور في القرن السابع عشر . وخضعت المشيخات الصغيرة السابقة لهذه السلطنات .

وفي هذه الفترة ايضا ، حدث تغيير في توزيع القبائل المهاجرة على اقاليم السودان . فلم تكد تسقط آخر مملكة مسيحية في السودان ، حتى [illegible]فقت القبائل صوب الجنوب ، والجنوب الغربى ، والجنوب الشرقي (٢٨) .

وكان لهذين الحادثين الكبيرين : أعني تشكيل السلطنات الكبرى ، وتوزيع القبائل على السودان الشمالي كله ، آثار عميقة في المجتمعات السودانية ، وفي نشر الثقافة العربية والاسلامية .

(٤)

حمل العرب لهجاتهم الى السودان ، فوجدوا لغات السكان الذين سبقوهم . وحدث صراع بين اللهجات الطارئة واللغات السابقة ، ونتج عن هذا الصراع تغلب العربية في مناطق كثيرة ، كما نتجت آثار متبادلة لا تزال ماثلة في كل مكان من اللهجات العربية واللهجات المحلية الباقية .

فالنوبية الآن تستعير حوالي ثلاثين في المائة من مجموع الفاظها من العربية ، كما ان التبداوية ، وهي لغة البجة الرحل الذين يعيشون على تلال البحر الاحمر من مصر الى كسلا ، قد تمثلت عددا غيرقليل من الالفاظ والصيغ العربية (٢٩) .

كذلك اللهجات العربية ، اخذت من النوبية والتبداوية ولغات غرب السودان (٣٠) .

ونستطيع ان نفترض ، في ضوء قوانين علم اللغات ، أنه سيأتى الوقت الذى تتغلب فيه العربية على سائر اللغات المحلية في السودان .

ومن أشهر صور الشعر الشعبي في السودان ما يسمّى بالدوبيت . وهو لا يزال يستعمل بين أهل البادية من عرب السودان . ولكن يوجد لدى قبائل الهدندوة شعر ينظمونه على وزن الدوبيت باللغة التبداوية . وبالرغم من ان هذا الوزن يحمل عنوانا فارسي الاصل (فدوبيت معناه البيتان في الفارسية) ، فهو رجز عربى بدوى يختلط احيانا ببحر الكامل (٣١) . والصلة وثيقة بين تفعيلات الرجز وخطوات سير الابل في الصحراء ، ولهذا كان أصلح الأوزان لحداء الابل . ولذلك نرجح أن البجة ، الذين لم يكونوا في نشأتهم الاولى أهل إبل ، قد استعاروا هذا الرجز من جيرانهم العرب . لاستخدامه في حداء ابلهم .

واذا تتبعنا ظهور الدوبيت وتطوره في الادب الشعبي في انحاء السودان ، وجدناه يظهر اولا في بوادى شرق السودان ، ثم يتجه الى السودان الاوسط . ثم ينتقل اخيرا ، ربما في عهد المهدية ، الى غرب السودان (٣٢) .

ويشتمل الدوبيت موضوعات تعكس الوانا من الحياة والافكار والاخيلة تذكرنا بما تضمنه الشعر العربى في عصوره المبكرة . ومن المفيد دراسة «المساديرِ» في الدوبيت بنوعيها : المساديرِ الاستعراضية التي يسرد فيها الشاعر مشاهد الصيد ، وامكنتها التي تنقلّ فيها ، ومساديرِ (المجادعة) التي تكون حوارا بين شخصين او اكثر ، ومن امثلة النوعين ما نجده في الاشعار الرائعة التي نظمها الحاردّلو شاعر الشكرية المتوفي سنة ١٩١٧ م . وكذلك رحلة « ود الفراش » الذى عاش في اثناء العصر التركى في بربر ، والرحلة تشبه من حيث العرض النوع الاول من المساديرِ ، وهناك اشعار الحماسة التي نظمتها شاعر المورغماب « شغبة » في البطانة في ايام الفونج (في القرن الثامن عشر) . ثم اشعار المغامرات التي قالها (الهمباته) الذين يعيشون في جهات الكبابيش عيشة تذكرنا بحياة شعراء الصعاليك في الجاهلية . وسوف يجد الباحثون في هذا كله ، وفي اشعار الغزل والرثاء والمدح والهجاء (٣٤) ، كثيرا من المثل الاجتماعية والقبلية التي اصطنعها العرب الاوائل من قديم .

وللامثال الشعبية في السودان نظائر كثيرة في البلدان العربية الاخرى . ونستطيع ان ندرك مدى تمثل السودان الشمالي للروح العربية في ضرب الامثال ، اذا قارنا بين الامثال الشائعة في السودان اليوم ، وبين امثال بلد مجاور غير عربى ، كالحبشة مثلا ، فاذا رجعنا الى ما اورده (بيتمان) (٣٥) في قاموسه من أمثال امهرية ، اتضح لنا انه ليس هناك ارتباط ظاهر بين هذه الامثال ، والامثال العربية المشتركة في البلاد العربية ومنها السودان .

وللقصص الشعبية . كماللامثال والشعر . اثر كبير في تعريب العقلية العامة في السودان الشمالي . ومن هذه القصص عدد معروف في سائر أقطار العالم العربى ، انتقل الى السودان مع العرب المهاجرين . من ذلك قصة سيف بن ذى يزن وقصة أبى زيد الهلالي . وقد كتبت نواتها في مصر (٣٦) .

وبالرغم من ان سيف بن ذى يزن قد عا ش قبل الاسلام ، فان القصة تحكى حربا وقعت بينه وبين « سيف أرعد » ملك الحبشة المسيحي الذى عاش في القرن الرابع عشر الميلادى . وتروى القصة — في تخليط تاريخى ظاهر — كيف حارب سيف بن ذى يزن بلاد السودان والحجاز مبشرا بظهور الاسلام ومجيء النبي محمد عليه الصلاة والسلام . ومن المحتمل أن بعض قبائل جهينة او غيرهم حملوا هذه القصة معهم الى السودان في القرن الرابع عشر ، ولهذه القصة شهرة في غرب السودان . حتى ان ملوك البرنو والكانم قد انتسبوا الى بطل القصة ، سيف بن ذى يزن ، وربما كانت هذه النسبة صدى لشعور الإعجاب ببطولة سيف كما صورتها هذه القصة .

اما قصة أبى زيد ، فقد أمعنت في تصوير البطولة ، وأهوال المعارك ، ومغامرات الحب ، وتتمثل فيها (الجازيه) امرأة بديعة الجمال عديمة المثال ، يتزوجها (شكر) وينظم في جمالها اشعارا تزرى بقصة المجنون مع ليلى . ويفرّق الهلاليون بينهما ، فيحزن عليها شكر حزنا شديدا . وكذلك (سعدى) بنت (الزناتى) تلمح في قصتها اثرا من قصة مجنون ليلى (٣٨) .

ويتمثل ابو زيد في القصة اسود اللون ، كما يتمثل سيف بن ذى يزن في قصته اسمر اللون لانه كان قد ولد لأبيه في افريقية .

واغلب الظن ان بعض القبائل ، كبني هلال ، حملوا قصة أبى زيد معهم من مصر أو من شمال افريقية الى السودان . وكان لها اثر بالغ في توجيه القصص الشعبية المحلية في السودان إلى النزعة الرومانسية في تصوير الحب والبطولة . ومن الشواهد الدالة على مدى

تأثير هذه القصة في عرب السودان ، ما روى من ان الرزيقات نسبة الى (رزق) والد أبى زيد الهلالي الذى ورد ذكره في القصة .

وهناك غير هذه القصص ، أخبار وحكايات محلية ، تؤلف جزءا من تاريخ السودان الوطني ، ومنها وصف لأيام العرب في السودان ، اى الحروب والمغامرات البطولية التي حدثت بين القبائل وهي في موضوعها وغايتها وطريقة سردها ، تكاد تنطبق على ما نعرفه عن أيام العرب في العصور المبكرة (٣٩) .

(٥)

فاذا انتقلنا الى بواكير الثقافة الاسلامية التعليمية في السودان ، فاول مانلاحظه انه كان للمجموعات الجعلية الدنقلاوية في نشر هذه الثقافة ، نصيب أوفر وأعظم مما كان للمجموعة الجهنية . ولعل هذا راجع الى أن معظم المجموعة الجعلية تسكن في رقعة ملمومة حول ضفاف وادى النيل من جنوب الخرطوم حتى دنقله شمالا ، وان هذه المنطقة كانت تحظى غالبا بنصيب أوفر من الحضارات والثقافات المتعاقبة التي تواردت على السودان قبل الاسلام وبعده . أضف الى ذلك أن هذه المجموعة منذ أن هاجرت الى السودان ، كانت فيما يبدو اميل الى الحياة الحضرية ، لذلك آثرت حياة المدن على ضفاف النيل ، وتحاشت البوادى ، كل ذلك ساعد على هذا التفوق الذى أحرزته هذه المجموعة في الميدان الثقافي والتعليمي . ولعلّ من اقدم من نزل في هذه المنطقة من العلماء المسلمين غلام الله بن عائذ (اوعايد) الذى قيل انه سكن دنقله في النصف الثاني من القرن الرابع عشر الميلادى (٤٠) . وهو جدّ الركابية ، ولهم شهرة في الفقه ، وكثير منهم تولى مناصب القضاء . وبعضهم يعيش الآن بين الدناقلة ، وهاجر منهم كثير الى كردفان والى الاطراف الشمالية من جبال النوبا ، فاختلطوا بالسكان ، وكانوا من اشهر العاملين على نشر الاسلام والثقافة الاسلامية في جنوب كردفان (٤١) . ولا نعرف شيئا محققا عن الموطن الذى نزح منه غلام الله الى دنقله ، ولا عن قبيلته او اسرته الي ينتمي هو اليها . غير ان الركابية ينتسبون الى ذرية الحسين بن على (٤٢) ، ويروى كذلك ان غلام الله نزح من بلاد اليمن (٤٣) . واسم عائذ او عايد هذا ، يذكرنا باسم بني عائذ او عايد قبيلة يمنية كانت قد استوطنت الجزء الجنوبى من شبه جزيرة سيناء وبعض مناطق وادى النيل في مصر ، في عصر المماليك ، وكانت مهمتهم حراسة الحجاج (٤٤) . ولكن لاندرى شيئا محققا الى الآن عن العلاقة بين غلام الله وهذه القبيلة .

وفي عصر الفونج أصبحت سنار مركزا علميا تطلع اليه اهل السودان في الشرق والغرب ، ورحل الى عاصمة الفونج كثير من العلماء ، وجمعت حلقات الدرس وفودا من التلاميذ جاءوا من أقاصى غرب السودان (٤٥) . واستعانت سلطنة دارفور بفقهاء من جزيرة سنار لينشروا العلم في ربوع دارفور(٤٦) .

وكان لرواد الدعوة الى الاسلام الذين وفدوا من الحجاز والمغرب ومصر والعراق في عصر الفونج فضل كبير في هذا المجال . ومن الملاحظ ان التأثير المصرى قد تميز بعض الشيء عن غيره من التأثير بانه ذوطابع علمي في معظمه . أعنى ان الذين حملوا الثقافة المصرية الى السودان . اتجهوا منذ البداية الى تعليم الفقه والتوحيد واللغة وغيرها من العلوم في حين كان الطابع الصوفي أوالصوفيّ العلمي معاً غالبا على تعليم ذوى الثقافة الحجازية والمغربية والعراقية . وتستطيع ان تلمح شيئا من هذه الظاهرة في النص الوارد على الصفحة الخامسة من كتاب طبقات ود ضيف الله (نشر ابراهيم صديق) .

وقد وجدت الطرق الصوفية في السودان اقبالا شديدا وترحيبا شعبيا منذ البداية . وظل الصوفي الى عهد قريب مميزا في نظر العامة عن الفقيه العالم . وفي بعض ما اورده ود ضيف الله مايصوّر تلك المحاورات التى جرت بين الصوفية والفقهاء . ومن الطريف ان الصوفي كان دائما يتغلب « بالكرامات » على زميله الفقيه الذى لم يمنحه الله شيئا منها (٤٧) . ولما قدم الشيخ تاج الدين البهارى من العراق ، ونشر طريقة القادرية . عرض الطريقة على احد الفقهاء السناريين ، الشيخ عبد الله العركي، فامتنع في بادىء الامر ، بحجة أنه عالم لا يريد ان يشتغل بغير العلم ، ولكنه عاد بعد فترة من الزمن فأخذ الطريق وصار صوفيا (٤٨) .

ومن أسباب تغلغل الطرق الصوفية في السودان ، انها كانت قد انتشرت من قبل في مناطق مجاورة للسودان ،كالحجاز ومصر واليمن والحبشة وبلاد برنو وكانم . كذلك نشط ملوك الفونج لتشجيع مشايخ الصوفية واعانتهم ماديا وأدبيا . اضف الى ذلك ان الاحوال السياسية والاجتماعية التى سادت العالم الاسلامي في ذلك العصر ، والمنازعات الداخلية ، والعصبيات القبلية قد أورثت في نفوس السودانيين حينئذ استعدادا قويا ورغبة شديدة في حياة روحية بعيدة عن مزالق السياسة والعصبيات (٤٩) . زد على ذلك ان السوداني بفطرته يحس احساسا داخليا يدفعه الى الانتظام في سلك العبادة الجماعية المنتظمة ، (وهو احساس وليد اجيال او قرون ، ولعله احساس يرجع الى ما قبل الاسلام نفسه) (٥٠) .

وكان من أثر تشكيل الطرق الصوفية ، ان تولدّت تجمعات دينية وحدّت بين افراد كل مجموعة على اختلاف قبائلهم واجناسهم . بل اصبح من العسير ان نفرق اليوم في بعض مناطق السودان ، بين الطريقة الصوفية واهل القرية او العشيرة الواحدة . فهناك جماعات كانت نواتها شيخ الطريقة ، ثم وفد اليه الناس من جهات متعددة والتفوا حوله ، واقاموا في محله ، واصبحوا ، على مر الزمن اسرة واحدة (٥١) .

[For the footnotes to this paper, v. *infra*, pp. 64-67]

SOME GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE ARABISATION OF THE SUDAN

by

'Abd al-Magid 'Abdin

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I

Certain groups of Arabs settled in some African regions, including the Sudan, in pre-Islamic times. In the fifth century B.C. some Southern Arabians settled in the Red Sea Islands and then spread along the shores of East Africa where they established camel-routes by which they could reach the interior.[1] In Christian times certain tribes from Ghassān, Khuzā'a and Balii settled in Egypt.[2] It has also been related that Himyarite invasions of some Sudanese areas and North Africa took place in Christian times[3] and some tribes of Balii migrated to the Beja lands in pre-Islamic times.[4] Also the Hadāreb, whose name is a Beja corruption of Hadārma, settled among the Beja in the sixth century A.D.[5] Further, the contact between the two shores of the Red Sea was close from very early times and the passage between them was an easy one.[6]

If no mention is made in the local traditions of the pre-Islamic infiltrations, this is due to the concern of the Muslim Arabs to be related to the Muslim patriarchs and not to the idolators of the Jāhiliya.[7]

But we have to bear in mind that when the Arabs came to Africa, in pagan and Christian times, they were usually known by the names of their tribes ; they spoke various Semitic languages, and belonged to various cults. In the Sudan they did not have the chance to unite and establish a powerful state like that of the Axumites, in Ethiopia, which was founded by certain South-Arabian groups, and which influenced the ancient history of Africa. The Arab migration into the Sudan was in these ages dissipated over centuries and scattered in the spacious lands of the Sudan. This explains why history is almost mute as far as these Arab migrations into the Sudan are concerned and why the contemporary chronicles give us very scanty information about them.

II

Although native Sudanese traditions, in support of claims to pure Arab ancestry, assert that certain Arab tribes migrated to the Sudan from Arabia via the Red Sea in Islamic times, there is no other very convincing evidence of large-scale immigrations direct from Arabia. On the contrary the evidence suggests that most of the Arab infiltration came to the Sudan via the Nile Valley.[8]

These migrations took place by stages ; the most important of them occurred in the seven centuries from the seventh to the fourteenth centuries A.D. We notice that these migrations had a close connection with the general circumstances of the Muslim World in these periods.

A—In the treaty of peace which 'Abdullāh ibn Sa'ad ibn Abī-Sarh concluded with the Nubians, he stipulated that a mosque should be built in Dongola. He also demanded the right to protect all Muslims, merchants and others, who came to the land of the Nubians. In this way 'Abdullāh laid the foundation for later Arab penetration of the country.[9]

The earliest Muslim Arab remains in the Sudan are some tombstones found in Nubt, in the Beja area, and belonging to Arab individuals, or settlements, which are dated to the second Hijra century (eighth century A.D.).[10]

B—In the ninth century A.D. the attitude of certain Muslim rulers to the Arab tribes began to change, and they began to favour and encourage other elements, such as the Turks. Among these rulers were Al-Mu'taṣim the Abbāsid Caliph in Bagdad and Ibn-Ṭūlūn in Egypt.[11] This may have been one of the reasons that encouraged some groups such as the Rabī'a and the Juḥayna to migrate to the Beja lands. They may also possibly have heard of the old gold-mines in the Nubian Desert.

Men from the Rabī'a took wives from among the daughters of Beja leaders and consequently their sons became the Beja chiefs because heredity among the Beja is matrilinear. Mas'ūdī says, "Rabī'a was then supported by the Beja against their hostile neighbours and rivals from Qaḥṭan and against other tribes from Muḍar ibn Nizār who settled in these lands".[12] This makes it clear that the two principal branches of the traditional Arab genealogy, Qaḥṭan and 'Adnān, were represented in the Arab migrations to the Sudan from the ninth century A.D.

Some of the Arab groups who fled from Syria due to political pressure after the collapse of Umayyad rule took refuge in remote places in Africa. It is worth mention that the Marwānite movement, after the Umayyad rule was over, began to appear in some places closely adjacent to the Sudan and possibly in the Sudan itself. In Upper Egypt an Umayyad rebel declared himself Caliph of Islam in A.D. 782 (A.H. 166). In A.D. 1006 (A.H. 397), in the Fāṭimid period, another rebel fled from Spain (Al-'Andalus) to Upper Egypt.[13] The Nubians, who were influential in the Egyptian armies in the times of the Tūlūnids, Ikhshids, Faṭimids and the beginning of the Ayyūbids, [14] were inclined to support the 'Umayyads.[15] Al-Mas'ūdi the historian tells us that in A.D. 943 (A.H. 332) the Lord of Oases in the Western Desert was descended from the Maghribite tribe of Lawāta and that he was in favour of the Marwānites.[16] This region may have become a centre for Marwānite activities, if we credit the tradition which says that some Marwānites fled to the Sudan and Abyssinia after the murder of Marwān ibn Muḥammad, the last Umayyad Caliph, in A.H. 132.[17] In the following centuries the Umayyad current spread in the Sudan so that later in history the Fung kings claim that they are descended from the Umayyads.

C—We do not know of any important Arab migrations to the Sudan in the Faṭimid period (A.D. 969–1171). Nevertheless, this period is characterised by two developments that greatly influenced the Arabisation of the Sudan. The first was the birth of a strong Arab Emirate which took Aswān as its capital and whose power stretched as far as Marīs in the south. The founder of this emirate was a chief from the Rabī'a called 'Abu Marwān Bishr ibn Ishāg.[18] The second development was the Faṭimid encouragement of migration to Egypt by the Arab tribes dwelling in Syria, which led to large-scale immigration by certain branches of Qaḥṭān and 'Adnān,[19] many of whom went to dwell in Upper Egypt. This incident is of particular interest as it brought the dwelling places of these tribes nearer to the Sudan and thus facilitated migration to the Sudan. We shall see that it was an easy process for these tribes, when suffering from the political pressure of the Baḥrī Mamlūks, to cross to the Sudan.

D—In the time of the Baḥrī Mamlūks (A.D. 1250–1382) the Arabs were completely excluded from politics and war. The Mamlūks regarded the '*Urban* (Arab bedouins) with much hatred. In Upper Egypt there were settled many Arab tribes such as the Balii, Juhayna, Hilāl, Quraysh, 'Anṣār, Kilāb, Tha'alaba, and Djudhām. Their most

important source of livelihood was the protection of the pilgrims and merchants coming from Egypt, Maghrib, India, Yemen and Abyssinia. These pilgrims and merchants had to pass through Upper Egypt and then cross the desert to 'Aidhab on the Red Sea.[20] But eventually this route was deserted due to the raids of the Beja tribes, the policy of the Mamlūks towards Upper Egypt, and other difficulties. These tribes were deprived of their most important source of life. It is, therefore, not to be wondered at that the Bedouin Arabs repeatedly revolted against the Mamlūks (cf. Ibn 'Iyās, Tārīkh Miṣr, Vol. I, Būlaq A.H. 1311, under the years A.H. 713, A.H. 716, A.H. 754, A.H. 781, A.H. 782, A.H. 783, etc. . . .). It was natural too for them to seek a refuge in a neighbouring country like the Sudan. They may also have learned that the Christian kingdom of Dongola had fallen and that it would be easy to migrate to its territories where rich pastures were waiting for them in the South.

Information on the Arab migrations to the Sudan during this period, is fairly plentiful. I append below some examples which are still in need of further investigation.

1. In one of the revolts of the Bedouins ('Urbān) against the Mamlūks, Ibn 'Iyās (in the year A.D. 1353—H. 754) tells us about certain tribes that gathered in Upper Egypt under the leadership of the chief (Sheikh) of the 'Arak tribe. Many Arab tribes flocked to his side until "they blocked the open air". They were defeated in battle by the Mamlūks and many of them fled to the South, "And the Mamlūk Emīrs pursued the fleeing Bedouins the distance of a seven-days' march, until they entered the outskirts of the Zindj lands".[21] This text is of interest as it may help in working out the earliest migration of the " 'Arakyyūn " who evidently played a part in promulgating religious culture in the Sudan.

2. In his Subh al-A'shā', Qalqashandī mentions a text in which he counted names of eight Sheikhs of Arab tribes, which had settled in the routes that lead from Egypt to Ethiopia and other countries. They used to correspond with the Sultans of the Baḥri Mamlūks. The author mentions only three of these tribes by name : Dughaim, Djawābra, and Namānima. All these names of tribes and Sheikhs, are in need of further investigation.

3. Qalqashandī,[33] also tells us about certain tribes, Djudhām being one of them, which migrated to Dārfur and invaded the kingdom of Zaghāwa.

4. In this period conflict was at its height between the Abyssinian Moslem Sultans of the Tirāz (originally a branch of the Southern Arabians) and the kings of the Christian Solomonic Dynasty in Ethiopia.[24] Ṭirāz Sultanates extended along the African shore of the Red Sea from a point north of Sawākin southwards to Somaliland, whence they penetrated westwards.[25] Conflicts between these two Powers continued until the sixteenth century. It is worth noting that scholars might profit from taking into consideration what is behind these conflicts and their echo in the Sudan, expecially when working out the Arab immigrations that took place in this period.

5. A document written by Fakih Muhammad Abu Deleiq, was published in *Ma'alim Tarīkh Sūdān Wādi al Nīl* by Chater Bosayley (Cairo 1955 ; p. 251 ff.) but not studied. It deals with 13 groups of Arabs who migrated in A.H. 672 (A.D. 1273) into North and East Africa, and then to different parts of the Sudan.

III

From the late fourteenth century, or the fifteenth century, the immigrant Arabs began to form small tribal organizations (مشيخات) in the Sudan, especially in the Middle Nile region.[26] These organizations had an influence in changing some of the political and social institutions previously practised by the Sudanese.[27]

Then there appeared larger political formations which gained control of various regions of the Northern Sudan: the Fundj kingdom in Sennar, in the sixteenth century ; the Dja'li kingdom in Tagalī, a quarter of a century after the Funj movement and Sulaimān Solong's Dynasty in Darfur (Solong means Arabian) which held the throne in the seventeenth century. The earlier small organizations submitted to these new kingdoms.

In this period, also, a change in the distribution of the immigrant tribes in the Sudan took place. No sooner had the last Christian kingdom ('Alwah) fallen in the Sudan, than the tribes poured southward, south-westward, and south-eastward.[28]

These two important changes—the formation of the large Sultanates and the distribution of the tribes throughout the Northern Sudan—had a profound influence on the Sudanese Communities and on the diffusion of Arabic and Islamic culture.

IV

The Arabs conveyed their dialects to the Sudan where they found other languages existing before their arrival. Conflicts took place between the new dialects and the old languages, and the result was the victory of Arabic in many regions. Some linguistic exchanges, too, are still evident in the two conflicting groups.

The Arabic loan to the modern Nubian language is about thirty per cent of its vocabulary. Tu-Bedawie, the language of the majority of the nomad Beja of the Red Sea Hills from Egypt to Kasala, has absorbed a good number of Arabic roots and grammatical forms.[29]

Also the Sudanese Arabic dialects borrowed from the Nubian, Tu-Bedawie and Western Sudanic Languages.[30]

We may expect, in the light of linguistic laws, that a time will come when Arabic will overcome all local languages in the Sudan.

One of the most famous forms of popular poetry among the Sudanese is the "Dūbeit" which was and still is used by Arab Bedouins in the Sudan.

The Hadendowa compose poems in the Dūbeit metre in Tu-Bedawie. Although this metre bears a Persian term (Du-beit=two verses of poetry) yet it is an Arab "radjaz" sometimes confused with the "Kāmil" metre.[31] The connection is strong between the "radjaz" metre and the rhythm of a camel walking in the desert and therefore it is the most suitable form of poetry for Bedouins to use during their journeys with their camels. It is possible, therefore, that the Beja tribes, who were not originally camel owners, may have borrowed this radjaz from their Arab neighbours, for urging their camels forward by singing.

If we trace the appearance of the Dūbeit and its evolution in the popular poetry of the Sudan, we find that it first appeared in the desert of the Eastern Sudan, that it then moved to the central Sudan, and at last, perhaps in the period of the Mahdia, it was carried to Western Sudan.[32]

The contents of the Dubeit reflect certain modes of life, ideas and images which remind us of Arabic Poetry in its early periods. It is profitable to study the "Musdārs" (المسادير) in the Sudanese Dubeit, some of which are narrative poems describing hunting journeys, others colloquies between two persons or more. The two kinds of "Musdārs" are represented in the excellent poems of Ḥārdallo, a Shukri poet who died in 1917.[33] The Riḥlah (journey) of "Wad al Farrāsh" who lived in Barbar

during the Turkish period, is very similar to the narrative Musdār poems. There are excellent "Ḥamāsa" poems composed by the female poet "Shaghaba" who lived in the Butāna in Fundj times (in the eighteenth century); and there is the adventure poetry recited by the "Hambāta" who led in the Kabābīsh region a life very similar to that of the Arab Sa'ālīk poets (سعرأ الصعاليك) in the pre-Islamic period. We can find too many of the social and tribal ideals which were held by the early Arabs, in the poems of elegy, praise and satire which have been composed by Arab poets in the Sudan.[34]

Many popular proverbs in the Sudan are similar to those of other Arab countries. We can appreciate how far the Northern Sudan has assimilated the Arab spirit in its proverbial sayings if we compare the popular proverbs of the Sudan today with those of any neighbouring non-Arabic country such as Ethiopia. If we refer to the Amharic proverbs which Baetman cites in his dictionary it is obvious that they lack any evident relationship with the proverbs common in the Arab countries including the Sudan.[35]

Popular tales and proverbs have had a strong influence on the Arabisation of the public mentality in the Northern Sudan. There are several tales which circulated in the Arab world and were then carried by the Arabian tribes to the Sudan. Among such tales are that of Sayf ibn Dhī Yazan and that of Abu Zayd al-Hilāli ; both were first written in Egypt.[36]

Notwithstanding the fact that Sayf ibn Dhī Yazan lived in Pre-Islamic times, the tale relates how he warred with Sayfa Ar'ad, the Christian King of Ethiopia who lived in the fourteenth century A.D. The story goes on, with extreme chronological confusion, to tell how Sayf ibn Dhī Yazan fought in the Sudan and the Hijāz heralding the appearance of Islam and the Prophet. It is probable that some of the Juhayna tribe, or others, may have carried this tale to the Sudan in the fourteenth century. It has become so popular in the Western Sudan that the Kings of Bornu and Kānem have been affiliated to Sayf ibn Dhī Yazan ;[37] this affiliation doubtless reflects their admiration of the heroism of Sayf as illustrated in the tale.

As for the tale of Abū Zayd, it lays an exaggerated emphasis on heroic deeds, the horrors of war, and the adventures of love. The heroine, Djāzia, is reported as a woman of unsurpassed beauty whom Shukr marries, and for whom he composes poems about her great beauty, poems which rival the tale of "Madjnūn and Layla". Then the Hilāliyūn separate the lovers and therefore Shukr falls into deep distress. We can also see certain traces of "Madjnūn and Layla" in the story of Su'da daughter of al-Zanātī.[38]

Abū Zayd is represented in the story as black; and Sayf ibn Dhi Yazan is represented as swarthy, as he was born to his father in Africa.

It seems likely that certain tribes, such as the Bani Hilāl, must have carried the story of Abū Zayd with them from Egypt or from North Africa to the Sudan. It has had a profound influence on the local popular narratives of the Sudan, with their tendency towards the romantic Arabic tradition of depicting love and heroism. One piece of evidence which shows how much this story was admired by the Arabs in the Sudan is the tradition that the Rizaiqāt are affiliated to Rizq, who, as the father of Abū Zayd al-Hilāli, is mentioned in the story.

There are native chronicles and tales, forming a part of the national history of the Sudan, some of which deal with the "Ayyām al-'Arab" of the Sudan—the wars and heroic adventures which took place between the tribes. These are very similar, in subject, scope and narrative style, to the "Ayyām al-'Arab" of the Arabian Jāhiliya.

V

The Ja'ali-Dongolāwī group played a greater part in the diffusion of educational Islamic culture than the Juhayna group. This may be due to the settlement of most of the Ja'ali group in a confined area in the Nile Valley extending from a point south of Khartoum as far as Dongola in the north. This was the area which underwent the greatest influence from the various civilizations and cultures that reached the Sudan both before and after Islam. Another reason may be the tendency of the Ja'aliyyūn to adopt the settled life after they had migrated into the Sudan; they often shunned the deserts and preferred an urban life in the Nile Valley. All this favoured the pre-eminence of this group in the cultural and educational field.

It appears that the first of the Muslim 'ulamā to settle in this area was Ghulām Allāh ibn Ayidh (or 'Āyid), who is said to have been settled in Dongola during the second half of the fourteenth century.[40] He is the ancestor of the Rikabiyyah some of whom live among the Danāqlah, and many of whom have occupied the post of Qaḍi. Many of the Rikābiyyah migrated to Kordofan and to the Northern margins of the Nuba mountains. There they intermingled with the inhabitants and became one of the best-known agents in the diffusion of Islam and Islamic culture in the south of Kordofan.[41] We are not sure of the home from which Ghulām Allāh migrated to Dongola or of the tribe or the family to which he belonged; the Rikābiyyah are affiliated to the progeny of al-Ḥusain ibn 'Ali.[42] It is also related that Ghulām Allāh migrated from Yemen.[43] The name 'Āyidh reminds us of the Bani 'Ayidh (or 'Ayid) tribe which was of Yemenite origin, and which settled in the south of Sinai and also in some areas of the Nile Valley in Egypt, in the time of the Mamlūks. Their occupation was the protection of pilgrims.[44] But we are not as yet sure about the relation between Ghulām Allah and this tribe.

In the Fundj period, Sennar became a cultural centre to which the Sudanese both in the East and in the West looked with admiration. Many 'ulama migrated to the Fundj capital. "Circles" of disciples who came from the remote eastern parts of the Sudan, gathered round these sheikhs.[49] The Sultanate of Dārfūr made use of jurists from Sennar to spread learning in Dārfūr.[46]

The pioneers of the call to Islam who came in the time of the Fundj from Hijāz, Maghrib, Egypt and 'Irāq, made a great contribution to the diffusion of Islam and Islamic culture. It is to be noted that the Egyptian influence has been distinguished by being almost of a formal scientific nature, that is to say that those who were of Egyptian culture from the beginning, tended to teach the people jurisprudence (fiqḥ), monatheism, linguistics and other sciences; whilst the mystic (Sūfi) trend, or a mystical type mingled with formal learning, was dominant in the cultural tendencies of Hijāz, Maghrib and 'Irāq. One can see something of this by reference to the text cited by "Wad Daif Allah" in his "Tabaqāt", (p. 5, ed. Ibrāhīm Saddīq).

From the beginning the Sūfi religious orders met with great success and a popular welcome in the Sudan. Until recent times a Sūfi was more venerated by the common people than a jurist (faqīḥ). Wad Daif Allah cites certain stories about the friction between the jurists and the mystics. It is interesting that in these stories the mystic always used to get the better of the jurist through the "Karāmāt" with which God was supposed to have endowed the mystic but not the jurist.[47] When Sheikh Taj al-Dīn al-Bahāri came from 'Irāq, and spread the Qādiriyyah order, he suggested initiation into his order to 'Abdallah al-'Araki, one of the jurists of Sennar. Sheikh 'Abdallah did not at first consent, saying that he was unwilling to occupy himself with activities other than the religious sciences; but he embraced the order after a while and became a mystic.[48]

Among the factors that helped the mystic orders to spread in the Sudan was their previous spread in surrounding areas such as Ḥijāz, Yemen, Ethiopia, Egypt and the lands of Bornu and Kānem. Also, the Fundj kings encouraged the Sheikhs of the mystic orders and gave them material and spiritual help. Further, the political and social circumstances that dominated the Islamic world at that time, the internal schisms and the hostilities promoted by tribal exclusiveness (ʿaṣabiyyāt) encouraged the Sudanese of the time to seek an escape from the political and social miseries of their life.[49] Furthermore, the Sudanese, by nature, has an inner feeling that urges him to be linked together in regular congregational worship. It is a feeling that can be traced back for generations or even centuries and perhaps even to pre-Islamic times.[50]

The formation of the mystic orders has produced religious formations, with complete unity and equality among all their followers, irrespective of their tribe or race.

It is difficult to differentiate today, in some regions of the Sudan, between the mystic order and the people of the same village or the same clan. There are certain groups in the Sudan originated by the settlement of the Sheikh of the order in a certain area; then people came to him, followed his order and eventually they became one family.[51]

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٤٥ — تاريخ الثقافة (مرجع سابق) ص ٦١ — طبقات ود ضيف الله — نشر ابراهيم صديق (المطبعة المحمودية التجارية بمصر) ص ١٨ ، ٦١ .

٤٦ — تاريخ الثقافة (مرجع سابق) ص ٥٨ — MACMICHAEL, *op. cit.*, I, p. 198; *Islam in the Sudan* by S. TRIMINGHAM, p. 90

٤٧ — مثال ذلك قصة القاضى دشين مع الصوفي الشيخ محمد الهميم (طبقات ود ضيف الله (مرجع سابق) ص ٩٠ .

٤٨ — طبقات ود ضيف الله (مرجع سا بق) ص ١١٢—١١٣ .

٤٩ — تاريخ الثقافة (مرجع سابق) ص ٦٣ .

٥٠ — السودان الشمالي (مرجع سابق) ص ١٨ .

٥١ — طبقات ود ضيف الله ص ١١٨ — تاريخ السودان لنعوم شقير ج ٢ ص ٧٥ مجلة النهضة السودانية اعداد سنتى ١٩٣١—١٩٣٢ — عدد ٢٠ ص ٦ (تاريخ الثقافة العر بية في السودان ص ٢٥٩) .

مناقشة الموضوع

Mr. Kirwan expressed his admiration of Dr. 'Abdin's paper and asked whether there was any evidence of the date of the earliest Arab infiltration from Egypt into Nubia. In 1906 Mr. Firth of the Archaeological Survey of Nubia excavated in Ginari, in Lower Nubia, Arabic cemeteries dated from the seventh century A.D., where he found tombstones (now in Cairo Museum — unpublished). Mr. Kirwan believes that if these tombstones were identified they would be a first class contribution.

Arabic translation:

(عبر مستر كيروان عن اعجابه ببحث الدكتور عابدين ثم تسائل عما اذا كان هناك اى دليل فيما يختص باقدم تسرب عزبى من مصر الى النوبة . فقد وجد مستر فيرث في حفائره في جينارى في النوبة السفلى — وجد مدافن عربية من القرن السابع الميلادى وبها شو اهد قبور (الآن في متحف القاهرة — ولم تنشر بعد) — ويعتقد مستر كيروان ان تحقيق هذه الشو اهد سيعود بفائدة كبيرة في هذا الموضوع .)

وقد اعجب الدكتور عابدين بما تضمنه هذا السؤ ال وقال انه يثير الاهتمام فعلا ، ثم قال ان مبلغ علمه هو ان هناك جاليات عربية اسلامية كانت في منطقة البجه في القرن الثاني الهجرى (الثامن الميلادى) . اما اذا كان مستر كيروان يشير الى اقدم هجرات عربية قبل الاسلام ، فان معرفة تاريخ محدد لذلك امرليس باليسير . وعلى كل حال

فنحن نعلم ان هناك آثارا للاراميين — وهم من العرب اصلا — ترجع الى بضعة قرون قبل ميلاد المسيح ، كانت موجودة في اقصى صعيد مصر ، في جزيرة الفنتين .

English translation:

(Dr. 'Abdin was interested in the question and said that, as far as he knew, there were Islamic Arab settlements in the Beja region in the second century A.H. (eighth century A.D.). But if Mr. Kirwan meant the earliest pre-Islamic Arab migrations, it is not easy to date them. Yet Aramaic remains were found in Elephantine (dated from some centuries B.C.) and the Arameans are of Arab origin.)

ثم قام الدكتور مصطفى مسعد واضاف الى تعليق مستر كيروان ، ان منطقة نوباتيا او مريس اشار اليها المسعودى فذكر ان العرب اشتروا فيها املاكا ، وذكر ابن سليم الاسواني ان العرب كانوا يعيشون في هذه المنطقة الى جانب النوبيين . وعثر على شواهد قبور عربية تؤيد ماذكره مستركيروان بان هناك تسربا عربيا في وقت مبكر منذ القرن السابع الميلادى . هذا إلى ان اشارة المسعودى صريحة بانه كان للعرب ضياع اشتروها في صدر الاسلام .

English translation:

(Dr. Mustafa Mus'ad added that Nobatia or Maris was referred to by Mas'udi who says that Arabs bought estate there. Further, Ibn Salim al-Aswani states that the Arabs lived in this area, side by side with the Nubians. Arabic tombstones were found, and this agrees with what Mr. Kirwan mentioned concerning earliest Arab infiltration in the seventh century. Again, Mas'udi's account about Arabs' estates in early Islam is clear evidence.)

Mr. Kirwan agreed that there were early Arab infiltrations. As far as he knows, they were in the eighth and ninth centuries. He said that if one gets further North, nearer to the First Cataract, one might find tombstones from the seventh century A.D.

Arabic translation:

(وقد وافق مستر كيروان على وجود تسرب عزبى يرجع — على حد علمه — الى القرنين الثامن والتاسع الميلاديين — ويقول انه كلما اقترب الانسان شمالا من الشلال الاول ، كان الاحتمال كبيرا في العثور على شواهد قبور من القرن السا بع الميلادى) .

وسأل طالب في جامعة الخرطوم كيف تسربت بعض الكلمات البجاوية الاصل متل عنقريب وبعشوم الى العربية .

English translation:

(A student of the University of Khartoum asked how some words of Beja origin, such as 'Anagrib and ba'shun, came into Arabic.)

فأجاب الدكتور عابدين بان احتكاك اللهجات العربية باللهجات المحلية هو الذى ولد هذا التأثير .

English translation:

(Dr. 'Abdin answered that the contact of Arabic and local dialects resulted in such influence.)

Mr. George Lengas said that he read on page 4 of the translation that the Dūbeit originated in the Eastern Sudan and spread to the centre of the country. He said that he was under the impression that literature spreads from the more to the less developed parts of a country and he should like to know how the reverse took place. It is easier for ballads than poetry to flourish in deserts and other scantily populated areas.

Arabic translation:

(ثم قال الطالب جورج لانجاس انه قرأ على صفحة ٤ من الترجمة ان الدوبيت نشأ في شرق السودان وانتشر الى وسطه ولكنه يعرف ان الادب ينتشر من الجهات الاكثر تقدما الى الاقل تقدما وهو لا يفهم كيف حدث العكس . كما انه من الاسهل للقصة الشعرية — عن الشعر — ان تزدهر في الصحراء والجهات القليلة السكان) .

واجاب الدكتور عابدين بان الدوبيت رجز يناسب البادية ، وانه توصل الى هذا الحكم بعد استقراء شواهد الدوبيت التي حصل عليها . فاقدم ماوصل منه شعر (شغبة) في عصر الفونخ . ثم شعر ود الفراش في بربر . وكانت له صلة بشرق السودان ، فاذا عرفنا ان هذا الوزن يستعمل بين البجه بلغتهم المحلية ، استطعنا ان نرجح ان الدوبيت ظهر اولا في الشرق ثم انتقل الى السودان الاوسط . ثم عرف هذا الوزن في مجالس الخليفة عبد الله في امدرمان ، وكانت هذه المجالس تضم جماعات وافدة من غرب السودان ، ويظهر انهم نقلوه معهم الى الغرب .

English translation:

(Dr. 'Abdin answered that the Dūbeit is a "radjaz" which suits the desert. He could come to this conclusion after a study of the evidence he could get for the Dūbeit. The oldest is Shaghaba's poetry in Fundj times, then the poetry of Wad al-Farrāsh in Barbar. It has relations with Eastern Sudan as this metre is used by the Beja in their local language, and accordingly we can estimate that the Dūbeit appeared first in Eastern Sudan then in the Central Sudan. Then this metre was used in the sittings (the literary assemblies) of the Khalifa 'Abdallāhi, in Omdurman, which comprised people from Western Sudan, who might have carried to the west.)

Professor M. Shebeika commented that it appeared that G. Lengas had not understood the point in question. The Dūbeit poetry is clearly associated with the nomads living on camel-breeding. He explained the practical effect of the Dūbeit on camels and said it was an essential qualification of a camel-man to know some Dūbeit poetry. Then Professor Shebeika addressed Dr. 'Abdin in Arabic and said:

ان مسألة الاغاني بالدلوكه لها اتصال بالدوبيت وتحدث عن اسلافهم ومحاسنهم ، ثم مسألة السومار — وهي ان تصف احدى النساء « الديس » او الولد المختون باوصاف اسلافه وحروبهم وامجادهم وكراماتهم الى غير ذلك — هذا السومار يختلف من بلد الى

آخر وتساءل الدكتور شبيكه عما اذا كان في هذا تأثير افريقي ، اكثر من ان يكون اثرا عربيا خالصا . فالدلوكة مثلا تختلف عن الاغاني العربية في غير السودان ، والنوبيون يتأثرون بالاغاني العربية وان كانوا لا يفهمونها .

Translation:

(علّق البروفيسور شبيكه قائلا انه يبدو ان السائل لم يفهم ماجاءفي بحث الدكتور عابدين خاصا بهذه النقطة ، اذ من الواضح ان للدوبيت علاقة بالبدو رعاة الابل . وشرح الاثر العملي للدوبيت على الابل قائلا انه من مؤهلات راعي الابل ان يعرف بعض اشعار الدوبيت . ثموجه الدكتور شبيكه حديثه الى الدكتور عابدين بالعربية قائلا (الترجمة) .

Songs by "Dalluka" had a connection with the Dūbeit. They tell about the ancestors and their glories and honours. Also the "Sūmār" in which a woman describes the "Dīs" or the circumcised boy by the description of his grandfathers, their wars, heroic deeds and their "karāmāt", etc. As this "Sūmar" differs from one place to another, Professor Shebeika asked whether one might suppose an African influence rather than to suppose it was pure Arabic. The "Dalluka" for instance differs from Arabic songs outside the Sudan. The Nubians are influenced by Arabic songs although they do not always understand them.)

وقد رد الدكتور عابدين قائلا انه لابد من دراسة هذه الاغاني بالتفصيل ، وهو عمل لا يستطيع ان يقوم به ، وربما كان السودانيون الذين يعرفون — الى جانب العربية — لهجات محلية اخرى ، اقدر على هذا . ومن الملاحظ ان هناك غير الدوبيت — اغاني سودانية تتفق في وزنها مع « الزجل » المصرى . ومع ذلك فهناك اغان لم يعرف بعد وزنها الشعرى ، ولم تدرس حتى آلان .

English translation:

(Dr. 'Abdin said that it is necessary to study these songs in detail, and that he is unable to do such a work which may be easier for Sudanese who know, besides Arabic, other local dialects. It is also noticed that there are other Sudanese songs which agree with the metre of the Egyptian "Zadjal". Further, there are songs whose poetic metre has not been identified and they have not been studied yet.)

وقال السيد نصر الحاج على ردا على ما ذكره الدكتور عابدين من ان الذين نزلوا اكسوم جماعات عربية نزحت الى اثيوبيا وتنصرت فيما بعد ، وكونت دولة . قال ان هؤلاء الاحباش امهريون وليسوا عربا فيما يعلم . ولكن الدكتور عابدين قال ان عربا جنوبيين هاجروا الى ساحل البحر الاحمر منذ القرن الخامس قبل الميلاد وامتدت قوافلهم الى داخل افريقية ، واشهر قبائلهم « الحبشات » و « اجاغر » وهما القبيلتان اللتان استطاعتا

تكوين دولة اكسوم . ولا نعرف عن الامهرية شيئا الا في العصور المتأخرة . واللغة الأمهرية مشتقة من لغة شقيقة للغة الجعز القديمة المنسوبة الى الاجاعز.

English translation:

(Sayed Nasr El Hag Ali questioned Dr. 'Abdin's statement that Arab groups migrated to Axum, were converted to Christianity and, later, established a state. Sayed Nasr said that, as far as he knows, these Abyssinians were Amharites and not Arabs. Dr. 'Abdin said that South Arabians had migrated to the Red Sea coast since the fifth century B.C. and their caravans spread into Africa. Their most well-known tribes were the "Habashāt" and the "Ag'azyan" which founded the Kingdom of Axum. He added that nothing was known about Amharic until later times. Amharic language is derived from a language akin to the old Ge'ez language which is named after the Ag'azan.)

واشار السيد ميرزا صالح الى انه قرأ في كتاب تاريخ الحبشة لمنرو ان الحبشة نسبة الى حبشات ولكنه لم يذكر تاريخ قبيلة حبشات هذه . والاحباش اليوم لا يرون انهم من اصل عزبى ، ويصرون على تسمية بلادهم باثيوبيا . وتسائل اى الاسمين اقدم من الآخر، ومتى قدم الاجاعز الى اثيوبيا .

English tranlation:

(Sayed Mirza Salih said that he had read in *A History of Ethiopia* by Monroe that Abyssinia is named after the "Habashāt"; but Monroe does not give a history of the Habashāt. The Ethiopians of today do not see that they are of Arab origin and insist that their country should be called Ethiopia. He inquired which of the two names is older and asked when the Ag'āzyān came to Ethiopia.)

فاجاب الدكتور عابدين بان كتاب تاريخ الحبشة لجونس ومنرو ليس من المراجع الكافية في هذا الموضوع وتسمية البلاد بالحبشة لم توجد الا بعد دخول هذه القبائل هناك . اما اثيوبيا فمعناها كان يتسع ويضيق مع اختلاف العصور. ولكنه كان يشمل بلاد الحبشة على اى حال . ويعتقد الدكتور عابدين ان مدلول اثيوبيا كان اقدم من كلمة الحبشة .

English translation:

(Dr. 'Abdin said that *A History of Ethiopia* by Jones and Monroe is not a sufficient reference on this subject. Calling the country Abyssinia did not take place until after the immigration of these tribes there. The word Ethiopia had different senses—as regards the territories it comprised—in the different ages, but it implied Abyssinia any way. Dr. 'Abdin believes that the signification of Ethiopia is older than the word Abyssinia.)

وعلق الدكتور محمد السيد غلاب على ذلك فذكر ان هجرات سا مية كبيرة انبعثت من شبه جزيرة العرب الى الهلال الخصيب من ناحية ، والقرن الافريقي من ناحية اخرى منذ الالف الثالث قبل الميلاد حتى القرن السابع الميلادى . وهذايؤكد الاتصال الحضارى والثقافي بين بلاد اليمن والحبشة . فتاريخ كل منهما يرتبط بالاخر. ويستعمل العلماء الاوربيون

تعبير (سامي) بينما يفضل العلماء السوريون وعلى رأسهم « فيليب حتى » وزملاؤه تعبير (عزبى) . والمؤرخون العرب انفسهم تحدثوا عن العرب العاربة او البائدة والعرب المستعربة او الباقية. والدكتور غلّاب يفضل استعمال تعبير (عزبى) على تعبير (سامي) فعلى هذا الاساس يكون سكان الحبشة السا ميون عرب قدماء . ولعل كلمة الحبشة ، وهي مشتقة من (حبش) بمعنى خلط تؤيد هذا ، فهم خليط : ذلك ان قبائل عربية معروفة قد انتقلت الى اثيوبيا قبل الاسلام وا ختلطت بقبائل متزنجة وحامية اخرى ، ومن هنا سميت (حبشة) دليلا على الاختلاط الاثنوجرافي الموجود حاليا في بلاد الحبشة .

English translation:

(Dr. Mohammad El-Sayed Ghallab added that large Semitic emigrations had issued from the Arabian Peninsula to the Fertile Crescent on one hand and to the Horn of Africa on the other hand from the third millennium B.C. to the seventh century A.D. This ascertains the cultural relation between Yemen and Ethiopia; and the history of each of them is connected with the other. European scholars use the term "Semitic", whereas the Syrian scholars, with Philip Hitti as their head, prefer the word "Arab". The Arab historians themselves speak of the "'Āriba" Arabs or the extinct Arabs, and the Musta'riba Arabs or the remaining Arabs. Dr. Ghallab prefers the term "Arab" to the term "Semitic". Accordingly the Semitic inhabitants of Abyssinia are early Arabs. The word Abyssinia which is derived from "Habash"—meaning to mix—supports this view as they are a mixture: certain Arab tribes emigrated to Ethiopia before Islam and intermingled with other negroid and Hamitic tribes and hence it was called Abyssinia which reflects the present ethnographic mixture in Abyssinia.)

وسأل الاستاذ دوليب المهدى عن اصل الفونج ، فقال ان سو اد لونهم ربما يشير الىانهم من اصل زنجى ، لكن لغتهم هي العربية ودينهم الاسلام ، وآركل يقول انهم من البرنو.

English translation:

(Sayed Doleib al-Mahdi inquired about the origin of the Fundj. He said that their black colour may suggest a negro origin, but their language is Arabic and their religion is Islam; and Arkell says that they are from Bornu.)

فاجاب الدكتور عابدين بان اصلهم لا يزال غير محقق ، ويبدو ان هناك قوميات افريقية لعبت دورها في ارجاع اصولهم اليها . فهناك من يقول انهم من الحبشة ، وهناك من يقول انهم من السودانالغزبى . وهناك رأى آخر حديث يقول انهم من الصو مال . هذا الى قول الفونج انفسهم بانهم عرب من بنى امية .

English translation:

(Dr. 'Abdin said that the origin of the Fundj is still not certain, and it appears that certain African nationalities played a part, in that they relate the Fundj to themselves. Some claim that they are from Abyssinia, others say that they are from the Western Sudan, a third and recent view maintains that they are from Somaliland, whereas the Fundj themselves assert that they are Arabs from the Umayyads.)

وسأل الدكتور هادى النقر عما اذا كان للفونج صلة بالدينكا ، فانه سمع في لغة الدينكا كلمة بونك ومعناها عزبى (جلابى) ومن اليسير ان تتبادل الباء والفاء فتنطق كلمة فونك او فونج.

English translation:

(Dr. Hadi al-Nagar asked whether the Fundj have any relation with the Dinka. He heard the Dinka use the word "Punk" in the sense of "Arab" (Gallabi); and it is easy for the "p" and "f" to be exchanged and accordingly the word "Punk" can be pronounced "Fung".)

وقد اجاب الدكتور عابدين بان هذا القول يذكرنا — مع الفارق — برأى الرحالة بروس الذى يرجعهم الى الشلك ، ولكن المسألة — كما قال من قبل — لا تزال في حاجة الى تحقيق .

English translation:

(Dr. 'Abdin said that this reminds us of Bruce the traveller who relates them to the Shilluk. But as he has said the problem needs more investigation.)

وعلق الدكتور صلاح الشامي على ماذكره الدكتور عبد المجيد من ان الفونج كانوا يشجعون الطرق الصوفية ، وان هذه الطرق كان لها اثر في ادماج الجماعات المختلفة تحت لواء صوفي واحد فقال ان السلطنة الزرقاء صنعت ذلك لاسباب اقتصادية في الغالب ، فقد اعتمدت على التجارة وكانت عاصمتها سنار مركزا تجاريا بين مصر والبحر الاحمر ، فشجعت السلطنة الزرقاء الطرق الصوفية لان الاخيرة تدعو الى نبذ التعصب وتدعو الى التآخي. وهذا يتفق مع النظرة التجارية التى تهدف الى الاستقرار ، وكانت تخشى على قوافلها ان تصاب بسوء . ولا شك ان النظام القبلي كان ضد مصالح التجارة .

English translation:

(Dr. Salah al-Shami referred to Dr. 'Abdin's statement that the Fundj kings encouraged the mystic orders and that these orders succeeded in linking together different groups into one order. Dr. al-Shami added that the "Black Sultanate" (Sultana zerga) in doing this, was most probably instigated by economic reasons as it depended on trade, and Sennar, its capital, was a trade centre between Egypt and the Red Sea. Accordingly the Fundj Sultans encouraged the mystic orders as these latter call for fraternity and giving up fanaticism. This agrees with the commercial attitude which aims at stability. They were worried that their caravans might be endangered, and no doubt the tribal system was against their trade interests.

وتسائل السيد محمد ابراهيم النوركيف نفسر التطابق بين افكار وردت في شعر اموى قديم واخرى وردت في شعر قومى سوداني ، فالشاعر الاموى القديم يقول :

تراه في الامن في درع مضاعفة — لا يأمن الدهر ان يدعي على عجل
قد عود الطير عادات وثقن بها — فهن يتبعنه في كل مرتحل

وتقول بت مسيمس الشا عرة السودانية :

جنك ورقات جيب ردهن
تكتب عليهن لا تعدهن
صقور الجو جنك قوم غدهن
يا مقنع الكاشفات لامدهن

فكيف تسنى ان تقول الشا عرة الامية التي عاشت في السودان دوبيتا يعتبر صورة مماثلة لماقاله ذاك الشاعر الاموى الفحل. كذلك هناك تطابق بين بعض ما اورده امرؤ القيس وبين ما ذكره احد شعراء البطاحين و هو ابو مسيكه الذى كان قاطع طريق ، فكيف تفسر العلاقة بين امرئ القيس وابا مسيكه على بعد الشقة الزمنية واختلاف الثقافة .

English translation:

(Sayed Mohammed Ibrahim El Nur asked how one can explain the identity between thoughts that came in the poetry of an Umayyad poet, and verses in Sudanese national poetry. (Mr. Nur quotes two verses of the Umayyad poetry and the similar verses of the Sudanese national poetry.) Mr. Nur asked for an explanation of this similarity. He also asked for an explanation of the similarity between some of the poetry of Umru' al-Qays who lived in the Time of Ignorance and some of the poetry of Aba Misaika, one of the Baṭahīn poets, although they lived in different ages and were of different cultures.

واجاب الدكتور عابدين بان هذا التطابق يدل بصفة عامة على صلة فكرية وروحية ولا بد لنا من أمثلة كثيرة متنوعة حتى نرد الشعر القومي السوداني الى نظائر له من الشعر العزبى القديم ، وهذا النوع من الدراسة قد يؤدى بنا الى معرفة بعض اصول القبائل العربية في السودان بالنسبة الى اخوانهم الساكنين في جزيرة العرب او في سائر البلاد العربية . فلو اتيح لنا امثلة كافية من شعر البطاحين مثلا تؤكد التطابق مع نظائر لها في شعر قبيلة عربية قديمة ، كان هذا قرينة يمكن الاعتماد عليها في الحكم على ان البطاحين تنتمي الى هذه القبيلة وهكذا . على ان اللهجات العربية في السودان قد تداخلت وتمازجت بحيث اصبح من العسير ان نرد كثيرا منها الى لهجات مماثلة معينة في جزيرة العرب او في بلاد عربية أخرى .

English translation:

(Dr. 'Abdin said that this agreement points generally to mental and spiritual relation. We should have enough and variant examples so that we can trace the Sudanese national poetry to similar early Arabic poetry. This sort of study may lead us to know the original relation of the Arab tribes in the Sudan to those in the Arabian Peninsula or other Arab countries. If we have enough examples of "Baṭahīn" poetry, for instance, assuring the identity with the poetry of an early Arab tribe, then this would be taken as evidence that al-Baṭahīn are related to that tribe, and so on. It is to be noted that the Arabic dialects in the Sudan have been so mixed that it has become impossible to trace many of them to similar dialects in the Arabian Peninsula or in other Arab country.

THE HADĀREB

A Study in Arab—Beja Relationships

by
A. Paul

It is, I believe, one of the most firmly held tenets of anthropologists that where Hamite and Semite have intermingled it is the latter strain which predominates in language, custom, and racial characteristics in general. There are, however, exceptions to this as to nearly every rule, and one of them is to be found among the medieval Beja of the Sudan. Although for hundreds of years the descendants of Arab immigrants from the Hadramaut and Egypt were the dominant force in the Atbai, yet in nearly every respect they are indistinguishable from the indigenous Beja among whom they settled.

At a date never precisely determined, but certainly in the Days of Ignorance prior to the Moslem era, and most probably about the end of the sixth century A.D. sections of a Himyarite tribe from Shihr in Southern Arabia found its way across the Red Sea and settled in the Atbai and possibly also further south in the vicinity of Sinkat and Erkowit. It is probable that their arrival found the nomadic Beja tribes of that area in a more than ordinary state of flux and confusion because, not so many years before, their domination of the southern Thebaid between Ibrim and Assuan had terminated with their decisive defeat by Silko, King of the Nuba, who had ejected them from their riverain settlements and thrown them back into the inhospitable deserts from which they had come. Crippled temporarily as a fighting power the Beja relapsed into an anarchic period of petty inter-tribal wars and disputes in which they had ability to harm none but themselves. The newcomers were not, therefore, annihilated or driven into the sea as they might have been, but were able to survive and further to improve their position by marriage with the daughters of local chiefs. Then by reason of the matrilinear system of succession still practised among the Beja their sons succeeded to tribal leadership, and by virtue of this and a superior culture were able to establish themselves as a dominant aristocracy, partly Arab in blood, ruling over a very much larger number of indigenous Beja serfs. The newcomers were described as Hadāreb, a local corruption of Hadarma (inhabitants of the Hadramaut) and it is quite probable that they were also one and the same people as the Bellou (derived from the Tu-Bedawie *belawiet*=to speak a foreign tongue). They are so referred to by the anonymous historian of the Amarar and by Idrisi, though the name does not appear to have come into general use until about the end of the fourteenth century, when the Bellou are found struggling unsuccessfully for survival against the newly emerged and aggressive tribe of Hadendowa. Further study of admittedly obscure and conflicting evidence leads me firmly to the conclusion, and in this I am supported stongly by local tradition, that the Bellou were in fact the Hadāreb at a later stage in their history.

But while they established a political and social autocracy in the Atbai the Hadāreb at the same time lost almost completely their racial individuality in adoption of Beja language, habits and religion, which at that time was a very nominal sort of Christianity. Late in the sixth century they had been converted by the mission sent to Nubia by the Empress Theodora, but it is to be believed that their observance of the new religion was neither very thorough nor very strict, and they did in fact at this time worship a great variety of gods : Isis, whose statue they had once been allowed to remove from

Philae for adoration in their desert fastnesses; Mandulis, for whom the Romans had built a temple at Talmis; and Min, possibly Apollo, the god of thunder.

A very considerable number also were still pagans, worshipping devils, and very much under the awe-inspiring demoniac influence of their shamans.

Writing very much later, at the end of the ninth century, the Arab historian and geographer, Ya'qubi, gives a description of a Beja kingdom which he calls Tankish, lying between Assuan and Khor Baraka, containing gold and emerald mines, and inhabited by Hadāreb and their very much larger serf community, the Zenāfig. The capital of the kingdom was Hadjr or Dherbe, lying in the gold country between Kus and Aidhab on the coast, and it does not seem too fanciful to identify this with Derheib in the Wādi Allagi where the remains of medieval strongholds may still be seen.

About A.D. 850 after an interval of nearly three hundred years, the Beja went raiding again into Egypt with the result that the Tulinid sultans sent against them a series of expeditions in which they were defeated and compelled to acknowledge the Sultan's suzerainty. A further result of thus calling down upon themselves the attentions of the rulers of Egypt was the renewed exploitation of the ancient gold workings in their hills. The Wādi Allagi mines were re-opened in 878, and there followed for some years a steady influx of freebooting Arab tribes, mainly of the Rabi'a, the Beni Tamim, and the Mudr, who fought ferociously among themselves for the mastery of the mines. Final victory went to the Rabi'a who had allied themselves to the Beja by marriage with Hadāreb wives, and were successful in persuading them to abandon Christianity for Islam, but who were otherwise racially assimilated as easily and as completely as their Himyarite predecessors had been before them.

From the various accounts of Arab travellers and historians such as Ibn Selim, Masoudi, Ibn Jubayr, Ibn Batuta, and others, it is possible to piece together a very general picture of conditions in the Atbai in this the heyday of Hadāreb rule. It is a picture not very different from that of the present day. There were a great number of petty tribal sections each under its own chief, leading a pastoral nomad existence each within the limited orbit of its own well-fields and grazing grounds, and only vaguely admitting the paramountcy of the Hidirbi, the chief of the Hadāreb. They were expert camel masters, but seem also to have owned considerable numbers of cattle, much admired for their colour and yield of milk, and in time of war the Hidirbi could assemble a small force of Hadāreb cavalry, and a much larger one of camel-mounted spearmen recruited from the Zenāfig.

From twentieth century survivals among the Beni Amer it is possible also to have some idea of the relationships of the Hadāreb and their serfs. The latter were camel or cattle herdsmen, paying tribute and otherwise ministering to the needs and comforts of their masters, supplying whatever animals or produce they might from time to time require, and enabling them to live a life of indolent ease. Serfs might be transferred like chattels from master to master, but they might not be bought and sold, and in the rare event of a serf killing a Hadārbi compensation took the form of the transfer of the offender and five of his kinsfolk to the family of the deceased. Serfs might own property, but their social inferiority was emphasised by certain outward signs—they might not ride a horse, use riding saddles on their camels, or carry swords, though it does not appear that inter-marriage of Hadāreb with serf women was so strictly forbidden as later on among the Nabtāb aristocracy of the Beni Amer. Serf obligations to their masters were thus considerable, but in return they benefited by patronage and protection, which in those days of constant tribal warfare and ferocious blood feuds were benefits of no little value.

Judging by the great wealth which the Sultans of Egypt were able to extract from the gold and emerald mines of the eastern deserts a very considerable amount of treasure must also have found its way into Hadāreb hands, yet despite it all they seem never at any time to have risen much above the level of desert nomads, and have left behind them no discernible traces of their existence, a most remarkable fact when it is remembered that for nearly eight hundred years they were masters of the Atbai with its wealth of gold and emeralds, and that for much of that time also they had control of one of the richest ports of medieval times. This was Aidhab, whose ruins are still to be seen on the coast not far north of Halaib, an unlovely spot, where water was scarce, and food and fuel not much more plentiful, yet nevertheless in its day one of the most important ports of the known world, being the terminus of the Far East trade with Egypt and the west, as well as being the main pilgrim port for north Africa, much as Suakin is today. Its trade was sufficiently lucrative for the Sultan to maintain an agent there for the collection of port dues of which, however, he was able to secure only a third, the remainder being collected by the Hidirbi. Ibn Jubayr, who spent several months there in the hottest part of 1283, describes it as lacking in all forms of amenity, such water as was available being less agreeable than thirst, and the inhabitants an unpleasant breed of no regard. Even so he is much less critical of them than Maqrizi who states tersely that they were brute beasts rather than men, and that no human characteristics were therefore to be expected of them. What between its climate and the unscrupulous greed of its inhabitants, who fleeced the pilgrims by every known device, Aidhab must have been as near an approach to hell on earth as makes no difference, and it is no wonder perhaps that the graveyards on the landward side of the dunes are as extensive as they are, and that legend marks it as the spot where Solomon was wont to imprison refractory demons.

About the middle of the fourteenth century the fortunes of the Hadāreb in the Atbai began to decline as the mines became exhausted, and trade and the pilgrim traffic began to move to other more convenient ports. They no longer had ability to exercise such strict control over their subject peoples, and the end of the century saw the emergence of the Beja tribes which we know today, the Beshariin, the Hadendowa, and the Amarar whose first struggles were for freedom from Hadāreb authority. The end came finally early in the fifteenth century. The Beshariin claim to have driven them from the northern Atbai about this time, and in 1426 Aidhab was destroyed by Bars Bey, the Mamluke Sultan of Egypt, as punishment for the plunder of a caravan on its way to Mecca. The Hadāreb fled south and, if Leo Africanus is to be believed, suffered final annihilation at the hands of their trade rivals, the Arteiga of Suakin. This may be so, but it seems nevertheless that a section of them managed to maintain themselves in the glens and hills round Sinkat and Erkowit until once more driven south beyond Khor Baraka by the Hadendowa, who refer always to their opponents in these early tribal wars as the Bellou. Beyond Khor Baraka they were able to survive and retain their feudal system intact until late in the sixteenth century when they suffered a crushing defeat at Asaramaderheib at the hands of a Fung, or more probably an Abdullāb, army. The broken remnants fled to the Samhar (the coastal plain behind Massawa) where their descendants still remain; and their position as overlords of a large serf population was usurped by a contingent of Sha'adinab/Ja'aliin who had fought in the Abdullāb army, and who remained on as masters of the country, and gave to themselves and their newly conquered dependants the generic name of Beni Amer.

The name Hadāreb still survives, firstly as applied to the Tu-Bedawie-speaking sections of the Beni Amer, possibly because they were a remnant of former Hadāreb

serfs, and secondly, in slight amended form, Hadārba, to all traders of Arabian origin, the Sheikh of the Arteiga in Suakin for long being known as the Emīr el Hadārba.

There seems little doubt that the three great tribal confederations mentioned above have for their ancestors the one-time serf peoples of the Atbai who were under Hadāreb rule. So anxious have they been, however, to claim Arab ancestry, the Beshariin and Amarar from the Aulad Kahil, and the Hadendowa from the Ashrāf, that their true tribal antecedents have been forgotten, and their knowledge of their pre-Islamic history is more than usually vague and incorrect. And yet despite the infusion from Arabia of not a little of the blood both of Joktān and of Ishmael they remain in nearly everything essentially and unmistakably a Hamitic people.

THE EUROPEAN POWERS AND THE SUDAN IN THE LATER NINETEENTH CENTURY

by

G. N. Sanderson

The theme of this paper is the attitude of the European Powers to the problem created by the disappearance of Egyptian rule from the Sudan as a result of the successful Mahdist insurrection. Some apology is perhaps necessary, at a Conference of a Sudanese society, for treating the Sudan as an object of foreign competition and aspiration, rather than as a polity to be studied for its own sake. But this treatment may, I think, plead a two-fold justification. During the period under review the fate of the Nile Valley became a question of major international importance, which could influence and be influenced by the general alignments of the Powers; the international rivalries which had the Nile Valley as their focus were often not merely of local, but of world-wide interest. Further, the settlement of this question also decided the régime under which, for good or evil, the Sudan was to live for over half a century. However the Condominium Government may finally be judged, the events which generated it are surely worthy of interest and of study in the Sudan.

From about 1850 various European Powers had shown a languid and intermittent interest in the affairs of the Sudan; after 1870 Britain was more actively involved in that British nationals were often the agents of Egyptian expansion towards regions where other British nationals—merchants and missionaries—had interests or aspirations. Again, Ismā'īl's drive to the Indian Ocean clashed awkwardly with the interests of Britain's client the Sultan of Zanzibar. But these were not problems of Great-Power diplomacy; they were minor hitches in the diplomatic management of small Powers who tended to look to Britain for advice and support. European complications did not arise until, between 1881 and 1885, the political status of the Nile Valley was transformed by the successes of the Mahdi and the British occupation of Egypt. As the Mahdist State neither sought nor obtained the recognition of other Powers, it had in European eyes no juridical existence; it was either still *de jure* Egyptian territory or else *res nullius*, legally at the mercy of the first successful invader. The latter alternative was given practical importance by the impossibility of accurately assessing the strength and probable duration of the Mahdist régime: an embarrassing vacuum of power might, it seemed, appear at any moment in the Sudan. Indeed, before the end of 1886 it was already clear from the comparatively successful resistance of Emin Pasha that the Mahdist hold upon the Southern Sudan was incomplete and probably insecure.

In 1882, when the insurrection in the Sudan was gathering momentum, came the British occupation of Egypt. This occupation was not easy to reconcile with Britain's international obligations to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and Gladstone had stumbled into Egypt without adequate diplomatic preparation. It soon became clear that the British position in the Nile Valley was hardly tenable without German support; and Bismarck did not intend to afford that support gratuitously. As Baring told Rosebery in February 1886, "Berlin, and not Cairo, is the real centre of gravity in Egyptian affairs".

Britain's precarious tenure, and the opposition of other Powers, precluded her from any attempt to make a formal change in the international status of Egypt, and forced her to present the occupation as a purely temporary and provisional expedient—

as indeed it undoubtedly was in origin. One important result of this situation was that it was for many years quite impossible to ask the House of Commons for financial assistance towards the Reconquest of the Sudan ; down to 1896, at any rate, the re-occupation of the *Northern* Sudan was regarded as a purely Egyptian interest. And the course of events between 1882 and 1885 showed that the Egyptian Army, dissolved after the suppression of 'Arabi and hastily reconstructed, was unlikely for many years to be equal to the task of reconquest.

Yet so long as the British remained in Egypt, it was impossible for them entirely to ignore the Sudan. In the 1880's the detailed hydrology of the Nile system was still ill-understood, but the dependence of Egypt upon the Nile waters was obvious. This dependence had embarrassing consequences for Britain. Her unilateral occupation of Egypt had converted France from a reasonably co-operative friend to an almost open enemy, with whom no reconciliation appeared possible so long as Britain remained on the Nile. The passage of time seemed to embitter rather than to heal the Anglo-French estrangement ; German goodwill became more necessary and British dependence upon it more obvious and more galling. In these circumstances a threatened extension of rival European influence to the Upper Basin of the Nile, with its implied threat to the Nile waters, would have seriously compromised the British position in Egypt. The actual evacuation of Egypt would have been the least of the evils which, from the British point of view, might have been engendered by such a crisis. Britain would have been fortunate to escape a disadvantageous and humiliating revision of her entire foreign policy ; and a forced evacuation would doubtless have gravely damaged British prestige throughout the Near East and possibly even in India. At best, such disasters could only have been avoided by securing active German support, for which Bismarck would have been able to name his own price. The appearance of a rival Power on the Upper Nile was not indeed an immediate danger during the 1880's ; but the potential threat could hardly be ignored, and this threat it was impossible to parry either by British or by Egyptian military action.

In 1887 Lord Salisbury attempted to escape from a situation which rendered Britain potentially so vulnerable. The Drummond Wolff Convention, negotiated with Turkey in that year, embodied an undertaking to evacuate Egypt within three years. But this undertaking was subject to the proviso that Britain should be satisfied as to the internal and external security of Egypt, and it contemplated the possibility of a postponement of the evacuation, and even of a renewed occupation. The conditions were indeed so rigorous that the Convention has sometimes been interpreted as a mere sham designed to pacify European opinion. However, Salisbury's own correspondence makes it clear that he was anxious to evacuate Egypt if he could do so without opening the way for another Power and without causing dangerous political repercussions at home. It may well be that the elaborate safeguards were introduced as much in order to placate British (and especially Conservative) opinion as for their real value in promoting Egyptian security. However this may be, these safeguards wrecked the Convention. The French were naturally suspicious ; and they were egged on by the Russians, who, as Britain's rivals in Central Asia and in the Near and Far East, had no desire to see the end of a quarrel which effectively prevented Anglo-French political co-operation. Paris and St. Petersburg brought heavy pressure to bear upon the Sultan, who at the last moment repudiated his acceptance of the Convention.

After 1887 the British had perforce to make the best of their uncomfortable situation. Sooner or later the Egyptian Army would have to undertake the reconquest of the Northern Sudan : meanwhile, it was best to refrain from "merely destructive"

attacks upon the Mahdists. The Mahdists were themselves incapable of interfering with the Nile Waters, and were, from the British and indeed from the Egyptian point of view, the best available safeguard against others who might so interfere. The one apparent exception to this policy, the Egyptian advance to Tokar in February 1891, was the fruit of the soldiers' desire to extend and round off their Suakin bridgehead and of Baring's uneasiness at possible Italian penetration into the Nile Valley from the Red Sea littoral. It was certainly never intended as the first move in a general offensive against the Mahdist State.

The Southern Sudan presented a rather different problem. Here the Mahdist power was admittedly weak and fluctuating ; yet, probably by 1887 and certainly by 1890, the British had made up their minds not to exert themselves to restore Egyptian authority in this region. It was believed, rightly or wrongly, that Egyptian rule here had done Egypt no good and the country itself considerable harm ; it was believed too, and this was doubtless decisive, that the Southern Provinces would be difficult and above all very expensive to administer. At a time when the balancing of the Egyptian Budget was Britain's first line of defence against international intervention in Egyptian affairs, rigid economy was essential, even more in British than in Egyptian interests.

Yet it was essential that no other European Power should be permitted to gain a foothold in this region and thus be in a position to interfere with the flow of the White Nile. The most obvious solution, direct British annexation, was impracticable. It would have been impossible to justify an expensive expedition to annex admittedly unprofitable territory in an age when overseas possessions were expected to be a relief and not a burden to the metropolitan taxpayer. Other solutions were therefore attempted. One was to permit the expansion of British influence from Uganda into the Southern Sudan without engaging the British Government in financial or direct administrative responsibility. By 1888 an instrument was ready to hand in the Imperial British East Africa Company, under the Presidency of Sir William Mackinnon. Another possibility was to permit the occupation of some at least of the Southern Sudan by some Power thought too weak to be dangerous. Here again there was an obvious candidate in the person of King Leopold II, Sovereign of the Independent Congo State, who had been contemplating an advance into the Bahr al-Ghazal since 1884, and whose megalomaniac ambition soon began to aspire to the extension of his influence not only throughout the Upper Basin of the Nile, but even to Ethiopia and Eritrea. Alone perhaps among the European statesmen of this period, King Leopold genuinely desired the Southern Sudan for its own sake, and not merely in order to forestall, or to influence the policy of, some other Power.

From the rather scanty evidence that has so far emerged, the Foreign Office approval of H. M. Stanley's "Emin Pasha Relief Expedition" seems to represent a decision to connive at the removal of Egyptian authority from the Upper Nile and its replacement by a combination of Congolese and British influence, while carefully evading any direct responsibility for administration and finance. But by 1889 it was clear that this project had miscarried ; Emin had indeed been "rescued", but because of his refusal to co-operate with either Leopold or Mackinnon, a vacuum of power had been left in Equatoria, where the remnants of the Egyptian garrison, almost paralysed by factional disputes, engaged in desultory combat and intrigue with the local Mahdist outposts. Worse still from the British point of view, the publicity attending Stanley's exploit had excited European interest in the Upper Nile. The German colonialist group had set on foot an Emin Pasha Relief Expedition of its own ; true, Bismarck had promised that he would give no political countenance to this

project, but Bismarck was to fall in March 1890. At about the same time a memorandum by Gabriel Hanotaux, at that time *sous-directeur des Protectorats* at the Quai d'Orsay, inaugurated serious French interest in a project for reaching the Upper Nile by way of the affluents of the Upper Ubangi.

Stanley's exploits on the Upper Nile almost coincided with events of equal importance further to the North—the signature in May 1889 of the Treaty of Uccialli between Italy and the Negus Menelik, and in August of the same year the total defeat of the Khalifa's northern expeditionary force under the Amir Wad al-Najūmi. The Italians seemed to have solved their immediate African problems by their occupation of Eritrea and the probable extension of their influence throughout Ethiopia. The annihilation of Wad al-Najūmi's force, combined with rumours of internal dissensions at Omdurman, gave rise to a belief that the collapse of the Mahdist State might be expected within a matter of months. The settlement of the Sudan Question seemed to be imminent; and in that settlement Crispi, the Italian Premier and Foreign Minister was determined to take a hand. Italy was much the weakest of the Great Powers; but Crispi was anxious to cover up this weakness by a bold and aggressive foreign policy, and to "teach Italy to walk by forcing her to run". The acquisition of African territory was admirably suited to this purpose; territorial gains which looked impressive on the map could still often be picked up without danger or even serious international friction.

Crispi's technique of intervention in the Sudan was to offer to the British, as a keen and loyal friend, military co-operation and "parallel action" against the Mahdists; in return he intended to claim a territorial reward or even a status similar to that of Britain as a self-appointed "trustee" of Egyptian rights in the Sudan. Crispi's manoeuvres, in spite of the air of great subtlety which he loved to give them, were quite transparent to Salisbury, who countered this project of an "Anglo-Italian Sudan" by evasions, by procrastination, and when absolutely necessary by blunt statements that Britain did not intend in any way to tie her hands in the Sudan, still less accept Italy as a partner there. Salisbury well knew that Italy's dependence upon Britain in the Mediterranean was so great that even the headstrong Crispi was unlikely to risk unilateral action in the Nile Valley: he refused to take alarm at Crispi's calculated approaches to Paris or at German complaints (probably inspired from Rome) that British coldness was driving Italy into the arms of France and so out of the Triple Alliance. Salisbury was content to wait until Crispi should have been succeeded by a Minister less fanatically set upon empire-building in Africa, and in 1891 he concluded with Di Rudinì two Protocols by which Italy abandoned all serious aspirations within the Nile Valley. When in 1894 Crispi attempted to re-open the question Rosebery refused to be drawn.

Not the least important result of the Italian challenge of 1889–90 was its effect upon Baring's attitude to the Sudan Question. Early in 1890 Baring persuaded himself that the military power of the Mahdists was in ruins ; and he seems to have feared that Salisbury's diplomacy was insufficiently combative to keep the Italians out of the Nile Valley when the Dervish collapse became generally apparent. He therefore advised total reconquest as the easiest and quickest solution to the whole problem of the Sudan. But he very soon revised his views about Dervish military strength ; and his experience at Tokar in February 1891, when the Mahdist resistance was very much stronger than had been expected, confirmed him in a merely "expectant" attitude to the Sudanese problem. Although Baring never abandoned the thesis that Egypt must sooner or later reconquer the Sudan, at least as far South as Khartoum, he insisted year after year that the time was not yet ripe, and tended to postpone indefinitely an

operation which threatened to interfere with the smooth operation of the Egyptian administration, and above all to compromise the soundness of Egyptian finances. Much as he disliked Italian encroachments, in 1894 he preferred to permit a temporary Italian occupation of Kassala, in accordance with the Protocol of 1891, rather than allow the Egyptian Army to become involved in joint operations and risk the re-opening of "this abominable Soudan question". From 1891, down to and even after the inauguration of the Egyptian advance of March 1896, the whole of Baring's very powerful influence was thrown against the launching of a reconquest from the North.

Meanwhile, as early as 1890, the South had been secured, on paper at least, against European encroachments. In the course of 1889 the Germans had begun to show an unusual interest in certain East African regions whose sole serious importance was that their hinterlands extended to the sources of the White Nile. By 1890 that interest had extended to Uganda itself, where Carl Peters had already forestalled the British East Africa Company. The Germans were indeed not unwilling to relinquish these regions—but at a price in African territory elsewhere which Salisbury was for reasons of domestic politics quite unable to pay. The problem was complicated by the need for Britain to retain the friendship of Germany ; the only possible alternative, a rapprochement with France, was obtainable only at the price of the evacuation of Egypt. It is doubtful whether in 1890 such a surrender would have been acceptable to British opinion ; in any case, a reversal of alliances inaugurated by so sweeping a concession to the new ally would have been, as Salisbury drily pointed out to the Queen, "very disadvantageous". The difficulty seemed insoluble—until Salisbury offered Heligoland in return for a substantial reduction of German territorial claims in Africa, and the recognition of a British "sphere" on the Upper Nile extending as far North as "the confines of Egypt", a limit which was left conveniently vague.

The Germans were more than satisfied with their bargain ; and from the conclusion of the Agreement in July 1890 Anglo-German relations remained very cordial for some two years. The Italians too, except during the periods when Crispi was in office, scarcely resented their exclusion from the Nile Valley, attaching far greater importance to close co-operation with Britain in the Mediterranean than to "unimportant and even doubtful" colonial claims in Africa. Indeed, the Germans were so cordial, and the Italians so effusive, that Salisbury had some difficulty in convincing Paris that he had not formally aligned himself with the Powers hostile to France ; and the Russian suspicion, dating from the time of the Anglo-German Agreement, that England had become an unofficial member of the Triple Alliance, became so strong that it exercised an important and perhaps a decisive influence upon the Russian decision to conclude an entente with Paris.

The Italian challenge in the Nile Valley had never caused more than a very superficial disturbance of the good relations between Rome and London ; while the potential German challenge was converted by Salisbury's diplomatic finesse into a means of positively improving Anglo-German relations. But King Leopold, supposedly a negligible quantity in international politics, was to be for a time more than a match for the Foreign Office. In May 1890, at a moment when the Anglo-German East African negotiations seemed very unpromising, Salisbury had approved an arrangement (the so-called "Mackinnon Treaty") which partitioned the basin of the Upper Nile, as far North as Lado, between the King and the British East Africa Company. This treaty looks like a rather more formal version of the working arrangement between Mackinnon and Leopold which was probably concluded at the time of the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition. But Salisbury seems to have soon lost his enthusiasm

for this settlement; indeed, its main immediate advantage to him was perhaps that Leopold offered concessions elsewhere in Africa which helped to dissuade the African lobby at Westminster from attempting to wreck the delicate negotiations with Germany.

Whatever Salisbury's motives for concluding it, the Mackinnon Treaty lost its value to Britain, and indeed became potentially embarrassing, when the British East Africa Company not only failed to advance into the Southern Sudan, but in the course of 1891–2 took the decision to retire from Uganda unless it were granted a State Subsidy. Moreover, the projected railway from Mombasa to Lake Victoria, whose early completion might have made an advance into the Sudan from the South technically practicable, was not begun until 1896. Goschen, Salisbury's Liberal Unionist Chancellor of the Exchequer, under the influence of his own Party following and perhaps of his departmental officials, refused to finance the project; and Harcourt, Goschen's successor in the Cabinet of Gladstone which followed that of Salisbury in August 1892, was the formidable and outspoken leader of those "Little England" Liberals who disapproved on principle of imperial expansion. It was hardly possible to maintain a British "Watch on the Nile" if British influence in Uganda were to be allowed to lapse; but in spite of the impending withdrawal of the East Africa Company, Harcourt and his supporters maintained a tenacious opposition to any settlement which would engage official British responsibility for finance or administration. It was not until Rosebery had replaced Gladstone as Prime Minister in March 1894 that this opposition was overridden.

The failure of the East Africa Company and the consequent prolonged delay in settling the fate of Uganda destroyed whatever chance the British may have had of keeping intruders out of the Upper Nile by occupying the region themselves. Meanwhile, other Powers had not been idle. King Leopold had gone ahead on the basis of the Mackinnon Treaty, and by 1892–3 Congolese troops had reached the Upper Nile on the Wadelai-Nimule reach. This exploit was by now most unwelcome to the Foreign Office, which in 1892 repudiated the Mackinnon Treaty on the grounds of its alleged informality and incompleteness, and threatened the King with serious consequences if his troops were not withdrawn beyond the Nile-Congo watershed. But the Foreign Office was soon silenced by Leopold's counter-threat to publish the repeated written assurances, given to him by Salisbury in 1890, that the Mackinnon Treaty enjoyed the full approval of the British Government. No other course seemed open but to come to terms with the King-Sovereign; but no approach could profitably be made until it had been decided to remain in Uganda.

King Leopold was not the only Power to take advantage of this period of British inertia: France now appears for the first time as an active competitor on the Upper Nile. Ever since 1887 French statesmen and publicists had from time to time discussed the possibility of an advance to the Upper Nile by way of the Upper Ubangi, and Hanotaux' memorandum of 1889 had given this project a certain official standing. But it was not until 1893 that any serious plan was adopted in Paris. Action had previously been frustrated by the more active enterprise of the Congolese who, taking advantage of a disputed interpretation of a Franco-Congolese boundary Protocol of April 1887, had solidly established themselves on the Upper Ubangi, and were prepared to resist French penetration even by the threat of armed force.

The French reaction to this provocative behaviour was remarkably mild; and although negotiations with the Congo State took place intermittently between 1892 and 1894, no serious diplomatic pressure was put upon King Leopold. De Brazza, the Governor of the French Congo, seems to have had little interest in the Upper

Ubangi region ; not a few permanent officials in the French Foreign and Colonial Ministries were opposed to a new expansionist adventure which might, like the enthusiastic aggression of the French military in West Africa, become dangerously unamenable to metropolitan control. The Foreign Ministers of this period, especially Ribot, were not particularly interested in African affairs; the Colonial Under-Secretaries, with the sole exception of Delcassé, were either exclusively interested in other regions of Africa, or else ephemeral figures with no policy of their own. Indeed, the most obvious feature of French colonial policy in this period is its lack of co-ordination; action or inaction was determined by the strength of French forces on the spot and of Parliamentary or official lobbies at Paris.

Weak locally, and normally enjoying little support at Paris, French action on the Upper Ubangi was further paralysed by the remarkable influence which King Leopold obtained within the French colonialist movement, and especially within the *Comité de l'Afrique Française*, with whose secretary-general the King maintained a confidential correspondence through an intermediary.

However, in February 1893, Delcassé, then colonial under-secretary, decided with the support of the President of the Republic to send an expedition to the Upper Nile. The object of this enterprise was not only to show the flag in the Franco-Congolese territorial dispute, but to compel Britain, by a threat to the Nile waters, to abandon her refusal to discuss the Egyptian Question with France. The projected expedition soon ran into serious difficulties, owing to the blunt refusal of its leader, Monteil, to leave France until a political settlement with the Congo State had been secured. The evidence suggests, although it does not indeed prove, that the influence of King Leopold played a part in determining Monteil's attitude.

But of these difficulties the British knew nothing ; and they were further alarmed by Leopold's constant threats to turn to France unless England was prepared to be accommodating. By March 1894 it seemed equally impossible for the British either to eject the Congolese from the Upper Nile or to forestall the French there ; and no sooner had Rosebery taken office as Prime Minister than he forced through a positive decision on Uganda and initiated discussions with King Leopold. The result was the Anglo-Congolese Agreement of May 1894, by which the King was granted extensive leases of territory on the west bank of the Upper Nile and in the Bahr al-Ghazal ; in this situation, it was hoped, he would be an effective buffer against French penetration.

The Anglo-Congolese Agreement was peculiarly irritating to Paris in that Leopold had engaged in sham negotiations with the French after its conclusion. Moreover, Paris now openly objected to the British claim (recognised by Leopold) to a sphere on the Upper Nile. This was in sharp contrast to the silence with which they had greeted the similar claim in July 1890 ; the Anglo-French rivalry on the Upper Nile was now openly acknowledged.

The French protests might have been over-ridden or ignored but for the fact that Germany too had taken grave offence at the Agreement, which included the lease to Britain, behind the German sphere in East Africa, of a corridor of Congolese territory. The practical injury to German interests was not great, but Berlin was incensed by the apparently underhand means by which Britain had secured territory which she was believed to have definitely renounced in 1890. Nor was the corridor of much practical use to Britain ; it seems to have been included in the Agreement at least partly as a riposte to the Franco-German Cameroon Agreement of February 1894. By this Agreement Germany had conceded to France access to the Benue, and so to the navigable system of the Lower Niger, at a time when, as a result of the missions

conducted by Lieut. Mizon, the French claim to free trade and navigation in these waters was a very sore point with London. Germany's action was hotly resented in the Foreign Office—Anderson of the African Department called it 'treachery'—and even the pacific Lord Kimberley was not disinclined to give tit for tat.

The Germans secured the withdrawal of the obnoxious clause by heavy diplomatic pressure upon both King Leopold and the Foreign Office, in the course of which they threatened actively to collaborate with France on African colonial questions and possibly even on Egypt. At the height of the crisis, when it seemed doubtful whether isolated German pressure would be successful, tentative offers of collaboration on purely African questions were in fact made to Paris by the Wilhelmstrasse, but they were withdrawn as soon as Berlin had gained its point.

Since 1 June 1894 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Paris had been in the hands of Gabriel Hanotaux, a professional diplomatist who had had many years of departmental experience. His position was not enviable. Deserted by Berlin and without any effective support from Russia, he was expected by French opinion to achieve a diplomatic success not less striking than that of the Germans. At the same time, on general diplomatic grounds he had no desire for a serious breach with England. He hinted that he might be prepared to recognise the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890, with its British sphere on the Upper Nile, if the Anglo-Congolese Agreement were abandoned and if the British would state precisely where their own sphere ended and Egypt began. But this distinction was not at all to the taste of the Foregin Office, which wished to retain a completely free hand for the final settlement in the Upper Nile by playing hide-and-seek between the claim to a British sphere and the rights of Egypt for which Britain acted as a self-appointed 'trustee'. Finding London immovable, Hanotaux turned to Brussels and soon brought Leopold to heel by a threat to call upon Belgium, as a neutral State, to forbid the employment of Belgian officers in the Congolese *Force Publique*. Leopold was compelled to relinquish the occupation of the greater part of the leased territories (August 1894); the small portion which he retained—the Lado Enclave—did not obstruct French access to the Nile. Rosebery wished to forbid the King to accept this arrangement, and was prepared to accept the serious tension with France which would have followed, but he was overborne by a majority of his Cabinet colleagues under the leadership of Harcourt. All that remained of the Anglo-Congolese Agreement was a British right of telegraphic communication through Congo territory—"a few telegraph poles", in the sardonic words of the German Foreign Secretary.

The first round of the open Anglo-French conflict on the Upper Nile had thus resulted in a severe diplomatic setback for Britain. So long as the French had merely refrained from recognising the British claim, the British had been content not to press them to do so, though they were on their guard, perhaps excessively so, against any French attempt to undermine it by an act of occupation. Hanotaux had now openly challenged the British claim and in doing so had thrown a flood of unwelcome light on the juridical weakness of London's case. The British, notwithstanding their setback, had abated no jot of their pretensions; in fact, both Powers had publicly taken up positions from which they could hardly recede without a dangerous loss of prestige. Moreover, since Paris was concerned to insist that the Sudan still formed an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, the question of the Upper Nile, hitherto a rather obscure African dispute in which King Leopold had played a leading part, was shown to be inseparable from the Egyptian question and thus to be intimately connected with the power politics of the Mediterranean and of Europe.

Hanotaux was undoubtedly aware of the potential dangers of this situation. For his own part he would still have been ready to recognise a British sphere on the Upper Nile, if London could have been brought to define its northern limits ; but his colleagues, especially the Colonial Minister Delcassé, insisted that he offer no more than a project of 'mutual self-denial'—France would agree not to encroach upon the Upper Nile if London would give a similar undertaking. Such an arrangement would indeed have given the British the practical security for the Nile waters which was their most important objective. But the public surrender of a sphere claimed since 1890 was more than a weak and divided Liberal government dared accept, especially after its recent diplomatic humiliation. In October 1894 Hanotaux' proposal was rejected ; and no further serious discussion of the problem took place until the crisis of 1898.

The permanent officials at the French Colonial Ministry had looked upon the proposed 'self-denying arrangement' with a disfavour equal to that of their counterparts in the African Department of the British Foreign Office ; and in November 1894 the Paris Cabinet, prompted by Delcassé, ordered an advance from the Upper Ubangi to the Nile. Hanotaux opposed this decision, but allowed himself to be overborne by his colleagues. However, even with the Congolese obstacle removed, the French resources on the spot were not equal to this task. Victor Liotard, the agent to whom the advance had been entrusted, made little progress, and by April 1895 his reports made it clear that he was unlikely to reach the Nile in the foreseeable future unless he were heavily reinforced. Meanwhile (January 1895) Delcassé had ceased to be Colonial Minister, and his successor Chautemps was not in favour of a forward policy.

In January 1895 the *Comité de l'Afrique Française*, abandoning its previous indifference, had begun to advocate an early advance to the Nile ; and similar views were expressed in public by leading French colonialists. Exaggerated rumours of Liotard's exploits seemed to gain verisimilitude from the perfectly genuine reports of rapid French advance into disputed regions on the Middle Niger; and British opinion began to fear a similar *fait accompli* on the Nile. The Government, under heavy Parliamentary pressure, declared through Sir Edward Grey on 28 March that a French advance into the Nile Basin would be considered "an unfriendly act"—choosing, ironically enough, the very moment when the French Colonial Ministry was about to abandon all hopes of success in this operation. It is still impossible to say with certainty whether the precise terms of the 'Grey Declaration' were prearranged, and if so who was responsible for their formulation. Hanotaux deeply resented what he was bound to regard as an arrogant attempt to obtain by a Parliamentary 'demonstration' an advantage which was unobtainable by diplomacy; but on this occasion he was more than usually reluctant to permit an open breach between London and Paris, for he was anxious to secure British co-operation in the Far East. Nevertheless, the 'Grey Declaration' had exploded with embarrassing violence at Paris. Kimberley, conciliatory but vague, watered it down by suggesting to the French Ambassador that it represented no more than England's 'claim' and was intended simply to deprecate unilateral action which would prejudice a pending controversy. The upshot was unfortunate in that British opinion came to regard the public Declaration as a valid statement of British 'rights' in the Nile Valley, while Paris, apparently in perfect good faith, interpreted Kimberley's remarks as an admission that the whole question was still open to debate.

There the matter rested until September 1895. Chautemps maintained his cautious and conservative policy on the Upper Ubangi ; and Hanotaux, perturbed by the growing cordiality between Germany and Russia, was concerned to relax rather

than increase the tension between Paris and London. But meanwhile a certain Captain Marchand, on leave from West Africa, had gained the ear of the permanent officials at the Colonial Ministry. Marchand believed that a small but well-planned expedition could reach the Upper Nile, and that its presence there would be the signal for a Conference of the Powers for the settlement of the Sudan question and possibly also the Egyptian question. In his original project Marchand was at pains to insist that the mission should perform no act of occupation and make no political treaties; it would not even hoist the French flag unless it were confronted with a rival European expedition. Chautemps listened to Marchand, but cautiously referred to Hanotaux a project which, as he pointed out, was more intimately connected with foreign policy than with purely colonial interests. Hanotaux also saw Marchand, but had taken no decision when the government of which he was a member fell towards the end of October. He can hardly have overlooked the obvious dangers inherent in Marchand's plan ; but he seems to have preferred to evade a decision rather than openly oppose it.

Guieysse and Berthelot, who held the portfolios of the Colonies and of Foreign Affairs in the Radical Bourgeois Cabinet of November 1895, were singularly ill-equipped by training and experience to fill these offices. Guieysse seems to have done no more than transmit the views of his officials, who now began to press Marchand's project as a matter of urgency. In its explanatory memorandum to Berthelot, the *Direction Politique* gave no hint of the potential hazards of the enterprise, and presented it merely as a means of obtaining a ticket of entry to a future European Conference on the fate of the Upper Nile. When Berthelot signed the draft letter of approval on 30 November he had certainly no intention of deliberately provoking a crisis by challenging British hegemony in the Nile Valley ; he was at that very time strongly encouraging his Ambassador in London to work harmoniously with Salisbury towards a solution of outstanding Anglo-French difficulties. Marchand's disclaimer of acts of occupation and political treaties had been incorporated as an instruction in the letter of approval ; presumably this seemed to Berthelot a sufficient safeguard.

Although in November the *Colonies* had been pressing for a decision as a matter of great urgency, they now took no further action until the end of February 1896, when instructions were at last issued to the impatient Marchand. This delay has never been satisfactorily explained, nor has the precise timing of the long-awaited instructions ; the speculation that the Colonial Ministry was shocked into action by foreknowledge—or intelligent anticipation— of the Dongola expedition, is demonstrably unfounded. Berthelot may have been belatedly trying to apply the brake, and it may be significant that the instructions were issued at a moment when his grip on affairs was more than usually feeble. There was also a controversy within the Colonial Ministry itself between those who believed with Liotard that it was necessary to support the Zande against Mahdist encroachments, and the supporters of Marchand's view that a *modus vivendi* with the Mahdists was essential to the expedition's success. If personalities were involved, as they doubtless were, this dispute may in itself have generated sufficient friction to account for the delay. It was not in fact settled until June 1896, after Guieysse had been replaced by André Lebon.

In April 1896 the advance party of Marchand's mission left France for Africa ; at the end of the month Hanotaux returned to the Quai d'Orsay. Two days before Marchand's own departure on 28 June, he was given further instructions by the *Colonies*. Hanotaux later claimed to have had a hand in these, and to have insisted upon a draft modifying the February instructions so as to emphasise the peaceful and non-military character of the Mission. In fact, apart from discussing the Zande-

Mahdist controversy at some length and settling it in Marchand's favour, the new instructions merely recapitulated the earlier ones. The most important feature of both sets of instructions is that they entirely omitted the political safeguards which Marchand himself had originally proposed and upon which Berthelot had attempted to insist. The political objectives of the Mission were in fact defined in terms so vague as to leave Marchand complete freedom of action.

The vagueness was later to be clarified ; but not by restoring the safeguards. Early in 1897 (the exact date cannot be ascertained owing to the disappearance of the relevant documents) and again in January 1898, the Colonial Ministry explicitly instructed Marchand to undertake a political occupation and to make treaties placing the inhabitants of the occupied territory under French protection. Early in 1898 the Ministry began to follow up Marchand's advance by a systematic occupation of the Bahr al-Ghazal, and in April 1898, by decree of the Governor of the Upper Ubangi, the 'French Bahr al-Ghazal' was divided for administrative purposes into three 'cercles' with their Headquarters at Tambura, Jur Ghattas and Ayak. The Mission which reached Fashoda on 10 July 1898 had a rôle utterly different from that which Marchand had originally planned and Berthelot approved.

The documents are completely silent about the views of Hanotaux on these developments ; there is no record either of his approval or his objection. He seems indeed to have had no official knowledge of what the Colonial Ministry was doing. This is less surpising than it seems ; the Marchand Mission is by no means the only known example of the *Pavillon de Flore* ignoring the directives of the Quai d'Orsay and in effect pursuing a private foreign policy. Hanotaux may even have preferred to remain officially ignorant, but it is inconceivable that he and his officials were really unaware of what was afoot. Indeed, in February 1897 the *Direction Politique* put forward a policy proposal pretty clearly based upon the 'New Course' of the Colonial Ministry : Egypt, defined so as to include the Northern Sudan, was to be evacuated and neutralised under international guarantees, while the Central and Southern Sudan was to be partitioned between Britain and France. This proposal Hanotaux rejected ; officially, he still clung to the thesis which he had repeatedly urged against the British pretensions in 1894 and 1895 : that the Sudan had a lawful master, the Khedive, and that no other Power had any business there.

Rather than risk a head-on collision with his colleagues, Hanotaux seems to have hoped that Marchand would not get through; or if he did, that 'something would turn up'. His attitude to the Marchand Mission was indeed always ambiguous. In the autumn of 1895 he seems to have tried to evade a decision. In May 1896, in a despatch to St. Petersburg, Hanotaux strongly deprecated unilateral French intervention in the Sudan as unlikely to lead to any result other than an unnecessary and embarrassing increase in Anglo-French tension : in the Sudan question only the Powers in concert could properly or profitably act. Yet at this very moment the Marchand Mission was on its way to Africa, and Marchand himself left six weeks later. In his book *Fachoda* Hanotaux later attempted to justify his proceedings concerning the Marchand Mission. This work contains much hair-splitting and verbalistic argumentation, and not a little *suppressio veri* and *suggestio falsi*. But one point emerges clearly enough : that in the opinion of Hanotaux any attempt to countermand the Mission at this stage would have generated a political crisis dangerous to the government of which Hanotaux was a member.

Hanotaux was doubly at a disadvantage in dealing with this situation. Convinced, perhaps not unreasonably, that Gabriel Hanotaux was 'the best Foreign Minister we have' and that any possible substitutes would be fumbling amateurs, he was deter-

mined to cling to office and become, if possible, the quasi-permanent Foreign Minister whose position was unaffected by mere Cabinet reshuffles. But Hanotaux, the technician turned Minister, had no effective party political following ; he could, if necessary, be dropped without disturbing the delicate balance of political groupings which precariously sustained a French Cabinet. It was therefore difficult for him to insist upon views repugnant to politician-colleagues, or likely to cause the government Parliamentary embarrassment. In 1897 and 1898 he did his best to oppose the attempts of the Colonial Ministry to enlist in the French interest the political and military support of the Negus Menelik in the Upper Nile. He doubtless knew, or guessed, that this would be the last straw to the British ; but, once again, he allowed his opposition to be overborne by his colleagues.

Between January 1897 and June 1898 Hanotaux' diplomatic correspondence—even with Cairo—is utterly silent about the Marchand Mission. In October 1897 and January 1898 he laid down, in a memorandum to the Russian Ambassador and in a directive to his Department, a policy which was the very antithesis of that represented by the Marchand Mission : in Egyptian affairs France was to take no drastic action, but to temporise until there was some prospect of joint action by the Powers. Only in June 1898, after news had been received which indicated Marchand's probable arrival at Fashoda, did Hanotaux adopt a policy by which 'Egypt'—now considered as extending to Khartoum—was to be evacuated and neutralised, while the southern Sudan was to be partitioned, not between Britain and France, but between France and Ethiopia. The latter provision was a line of policy which the Colonial Ministry had been pushing since early in 1897.

It is difficult to take this startling revolution seriously except perhaps as a piece of personal propaganda. When Hanotaux adopted this policy he was already a caretaker Minister ; it looks as if he was anxious to pose as the champion of French rights and so to embarrass the successor who would necessarily have to retreat from this utterly untenable position. Some Frenchmen, indeed some French diplomatists, flattered themselves that Britain would never go to war on the issue of the Nile Valley. But is unlikely that Hanotaux shared these illusions ; earlier in 1898 he had been forced to recognise that there were limits to British forbearance even on the comparatively trivial question of West African boundaries. It is incredible that in June he was seriously contemplating a war for which France had made neither military nor diplomatic preparations.

* * *

In June 1898 the Anglo-Egyptian army was preparing for its final advance beyond the sixth cataract to Khartoum. This was a situation which neither Salisbury nor Cromer had foreseen when in March 1896 the British Cabinet had authorised a limited Egyptian advance in the Northern Sudan. That move had certainly not been prompted by any fear of French penetration to the Upper Nile ; as late as May 1896 the British Intelligence Division would not credit the rumours that Marchand had been commissioned to reach Fashoda, and was convinced that France had not sent to the Upper Ubangi any force capable of this task. Indeed, in March 1896 it had never entered Salisbury's mind that an advance into the Sudan from the North could safeguard British interests on the Upper Nile. On the contrary, he feared that this move might well be the deciding factor in provoking a French expedition to the Southern Sudan which Britian would be unable to forestall. The advance of March 1896 was not at the time intended to initiate the reconquest of even the Northern Sudan. The published objective of Dongola was little more than a bluff designed to impress the

Mahdists ; all that was called for by the original plan was an advance to Akasha and a mere demonstration in the direction of Murrat Wells. It was Cromer who, deprecating the expedition as a dangerously premature re-opening of the Sudan question, nevertheless insisted to the reluctant Salisbury that, if expedition there must be, it should not stop short of Dongola. He feared that any less advance would seriously embarrass his administration of Egypt, by confirming the widespread suspicion that Egyptian interests were being systematically sacrificed to the needs of British foreign policy ; and he warned Salisbury that the Khedive 'Abbas was already convinced that the whole affair had no other object than to help Britain's Italian ally.

The Khedive was not far wrong in his belief. On 1 March the Negus Menelik had inflicted a catastrophic defeat upon the Italians at Adowa and had shattered their Ethiopian empire at a single blow. It was of course absurd to suggest that this disaster could be repaired by Egyptian military action, even had it been on a much larger scale than that actually contemplated. The advance was therefore justified as a diversion to relieve the pressure on the Italian outposts of Kassala, and as a preventive campaign designed to "repel any disposition to attack Egypt which the recent victories of Africans over Europeans may have created among the Dervishes". These motives were not much more plausible than that of "planting the foot of Egypt rather further up the Nile" which had so signally failed to convince the Khedive. Had the Adowa débâcle not taken place, the British would not indeed have intervened when they did and in the way they did. But the links between 'Adowa' and 'Dongola' must be sought in the diplomatic history of Europe rather than in the military history of Africa.

Adowa did more than merely expel the Italians from Ethiopia. It provoked in Italy demonstrations of almost revolutionary dimensions not only against Crispi's bankrupt imperialism but also against a foreign policy which had sacrificed *Italia Irredenta* and earned the unrelenting hostility of France. At the same time it shook the Triple Alliance by raising grave doubts as to Italy's qualifications as a Great Power and her value as an ally. Salisbury could not lightly permit the collapse of the Triplice ; out of its ruins might have emerged a Russo-German entente and conceivably a Continental League. Italy's value to her allies depended mainly upon her friendship with England, and on the consequent probability that in a crisis British sea-power would be found on the Triplice side of the Mediterranean balance. Military action in support of Italy was an unmistakable demonstration that this friendship still existed ; it forestalled a despairing re-alignment of Italian policy and restored confidence in Italy as an ally. It was irrelevant that the action taken was of very little practical help to the Italians ; it was the gesture that mattered.

That the gesture should have been made in the Nile Valley also mattered. Since the end of 1895 the Germans had been uneasy at the improvement in relations between France and Britain, and had begun to fear the development of an entente directed against the Triple Alliance. Unilateral action by Britain in the Nile Valley was an effective guarantee to Germany against any further progress of the Anglo-French rapprochement ; failure to take action would have been interpreted in the Wilhelmstrasse as a sign that England had abandoned her link with the Triplice in favour of France. Much as Salisbury resented the overbearing ways of recent German diplomacy, he could not safely accept a complete break with Berlin ; quite apart from the possible emergence of new alignments less favourable to Britain, German hostility could still be a direct threat to the British position in Egypt. Salisbury therefore made his gesture, and coupled it with an assurance that British policy would henceforward 'lean towards' the Triple Alliance. The price of an effective entente with France was

still the evacuation of Egypt, however courteously that condition might be phrased; Salisbury chose to strengthen the link with Germany as the lesser evil. March 1896 was no time for an experimental foreign policy, with the Eastern Question smouldering, South Africa still inflamed, and a potentially very dangerous dispute with the United States still unsettled.

All the same, Salisbury committed himself very reluctantly and with grave misgivings. His fear that action in the North would provoke a French advance on the Upper Nile was as lively as ever; and he dreaded the increased opportunities for German 'blackmail' which would be afforded if he got into military or political difficulties in the Nile Valley. When the Italians removed the official pretext for intervention by their decision to evacuate Kassala, Salisbury promptly countermanded the Egyptian operation; only to reinstate it when, a few hours later, Rome decided to hold on at Kassala after all. He also took considerable pains, which were not entirely wasted, to avoid a serious breach with France. But the die had been cast; as the French Ambassador remarked, Salisbury had 'made his choice'.

The die had been cast in the Sudan as well as in Europe, although British statesmen in both London and Cairo were for long reluctant to admit it. Comer's persistance, coupled with Kitchener's early success at Firkah (May 1896), ensured that the reconquest should be extended to Dongola—first the town, then the province. Easy victories over comparatively weak Mahdist detachments drew Kitchener and Cromer ever further into the Sudan, and Salisbury found it impossible to resist the arguments that successes must be followed up and that in the long run it would be more economical to pursue than to postpone the advance. Cromer, in spite of occasional misgivings, was confident that 'the Soudan nut was easier to crack than he had imagined'. Neither he nor Kitchener seems to have realised that the strength of the forces which the Khalifa could maintain in the desert regions of the North was strictly limited by the impossibility of victualling those forces from Omdurman. In October 1897, at Berber, Kitchener suddenly realised that he was "now for the first time face to face with the real Dervish force". To attempt any further advance without substantial reinforcement was in his opinion to court disaster; and any reinforcement would necessarily have to be British, as no more Egyptian troops were available.

The upshot of this crisis—in the course of which Kitchener proffered his resignation—was an indefinite postponement of any further advance. The Commander-in-Chief, Lord Wolseley, strongly urged the despatch of British reinforcements and an immediate advance so as to forestall a possible French occupation of the Upper Nile. But Lansdowne (the War Minister), Salisbury and Cromer all concurred in rejecting this proposal. It was still doubtful whether the French had got through, or would get through; Salisbury doubted, or affected to doubt, whether they were even trying. In any case Salisbury preferred to wait and see. If the French were not already installed, it might be advantageous to be able to choose one's own time for the crisis which was bound to occur whenever Anglo-Egyptian forces entered the southern Sudan; if they were, their priority of occupation would not be a decisive or even a very important element in the major clash which would follow. In Salisbury's ominous words, 'technical considerations would not go for very much'. Cromer, though not so sceptical as Salisbury about the intentions of the French, fully concurred in this line of reasoning. He was also anxious not to be forced, by a precipitate advance south of Khartoum, "to acquire . . . large tracts of useless territory which it would be difficult and costly to administer properly". He therefore concluded that the Government "should not allow themselves to be hurried by fear of French activity".

The decision to take no action had one proviso: if it became clear that the Egyptian position at Berber was in danger, British reinforcements must be sent whatever the consequences. The tenuous communications and unprotected flanks of that position did not commend themselves to military opinion; and when in December 1897 an advance of the main Mahdist army appeared for a moment to be imminent, Cromer began to urge Kitchener to ask for assistance "whilst there is yet time". Kitchener, who had no illusions about his own unpopularity at the War Office and feared that the despatch of British reinforcements would be used as a pretext to supersede him by a more senior officer, reluctantly telegraphed for help on the last day of the year. It soon became clear that it would be pointless and uneconomical to restrict the reinforced army to a purely defensive rôle, and early in January 1898 it was agreed that the advance to Khartoum should take place as soon as possible. Meanwhile, news was received which put it beyond any reasonable doubt that Marchand was well on his way to Fashoda and would probably get through. The expedition from the north was after all to play a decisive part in the affairs of the Upper Nile. Nevertheless, Salisbury and Cromer were careful to stipulate that "no further military operations on a large scale or involving any considerable expense will be undertaken for the recovery of the provinces to the south of [Khartoum]".

These decisions, for all their caution, meant that the future administration of the Sudan had ceased to be a matter of remote speculation. If the Sudan was still, *de jure*, simply Egyptian territory temporarily dominated by rebels, the whole Sudan would revert unconditionally to Egypt. This was a thesis quite unacceptable to London. Until 1896 Cromer had indeed expected that the Northern Sudan should revert to the Egypt whose administrative destinies he guided, and had regarded its reconquest as an Egyptian and not a British responsibility. But the British loan to Egypt in 1897, and the despatch of British troops in 1898, made a simple restoration to Egypt a political impossibility, especially in the atmosphere of popular enthusiasm engendered by the Khartoum campaign. The Southern Sudan was an even thornier problem. Cromer had never wavered in his belief that Egypt was unfitted for the responsibility of administering the South, and that this responsibility entailed an embarrassing and perhaps a hazardous financial burden. Yet the Nile waters had to be safeguarded, and the British had therefore claimed a "sphere" as a diplomatic precaution against encroachment by rival Powers; they had been profoundly reluctant to annex and administer these "large tracts of useless territory". In 1898 the claim became a positive embarrassment; to accept, as the recompense for British military exertions in the Sudan, a sphere which could not in the foreseeable future even pay its way, would have made the Government a laughing-stock. The claim was also uncomfortably indefensible in law and logic; if the juridical claims of Egypt were sound in the Northern Sudan, they were no whit less sound in the South. Even when the British had been most active in claiming their sphere, they had been constrained to admit that this claim did not totally extinguish Egyptian rights, which still remained, in some unexplained manner, "in abeyance".

Salisbury cut the knot by refusing to treat the Mahdist Sudan as Egyptian territory of any kind, and by conferring upon it, *in articulo mortis*, the prerogatives of an independent sovereign State. This thesis, which he adopted in June 1898, emancipated the future administration of the Sudan from the international controls—oversight of finance, Capitulations, Mixed Courts—which hampered Cromer's administration of Egypt. It also destroyed any juridical claim of other Powers to have a say in the administrative settlement of the Sudan, which now became a private matter between England and Egypt. Above all, it placed the two victorious Powers in a position of complete juridical equality in the Sudan; as allies who had conquered an independent

state, each had a "right" of conquest and neither had any other right. In the circumstances of 1898–99 juridical equality implied British preponderance in practice, and by the Condominium Agreement Britain secured "a predominant voice in all matters connected with the Sudan". In the North this meant effective control ; in the South, while retaining a "right" sufficient to safeguard the Nile waters, the British hoped, by cutting their administration to the bare minimum, to escape the burdens and responsibilities involved in the effective occupation of a "sphere".

The bare minimum proved to be very bare indeed. Salisbury's despatch of 2 August 1898, which embodied a general administrative directive, made no provision whatever for regular administration south of Khartoum ; occasional "inspection" of the riverain regions by gunboats was suggested as a substitute. Cromer was even willing, provided that he retained control of both banks of the White Nile, to cede the rest of the South to anyone who would take it—to King Leopold, to the Negus, even to the French if they could thus be persuaded to abandon their "constant heckling" in Egypt. At the height of the Fashoda Crisis Salisbury could hardly afford to take so cold-bloodedly administrative a view, but in 1902 his successor at the Foreign Office offered most of the western Bahr al-Ghazal to King Leopold in return for the Lado Enclave. To dispose of "large tracts of useless territory" and at the same time to remove the restless Leopold from the immediate neighbourhood of the Nile seemed an excellent stroke of business ; the bargain fell through only because of the King's exorbitant demand for even more territory than he had been offered.

Britain's great reluctance to acquire territory in the Southern Sudan shows clearly that her intransigence at Fashoda had little to do with African questions narrowly considered. London was of course as adamant as ever that no rival Power should be in a position to interfere with the Nile Waters. But Delcassé, upon whom the crisis burst during his first few weeks as Foreign Minister, had long abandoned his grandiose plans of forcing Britain's hand in Egypt by a French establishment on the Upper Nile. Unsupported by the Russians, whose fundamental interest was still to keep England in Egypt as an insurance against an Anglo-French entente, and well aware that German support was available only in return for final acquiescence in the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, Delcassé was perfectly willing to evacuate Fashoda if he could secure a token concession in the Bahr al-Ghazal as a sop to French feelings. His resistance to the British demand was prompted solely by the hope that Salisbury would shrink from a final breach and could be brought to abandon his obstinate refusal to discuss even the possibility of a bargain until Marchand was under orders to leave Fashoda.

Salisbury's intransigence, which he was prepared, however reluctantly, to carry to the point of war, arose from a situation in which the Marchand Mission, whatever its original motives, appeared as a deliberate challenge to British hegemony in the Nile Valley, a full-scale trial of strength which Britain could not evade without very grave damage to her influence in Europe and the Near East. Salisbury's personal reputation was also at stake. In preparation for this very crisis, he had for some months past been very much on his guard against complications with other Powers. The rather feeble British reaction to the Russian decision to fortify Port Arthur in March 1898 had been the result of his personal insistence that stronger action "might clash awkwardly with our French policy". Salisbury's forbearance was in many quarters bitterly resented as a humiliating climb-down and a dereliction of British interests in the Far East ; his critics insinuated that he was an old and sick man who had lost his grip on affairs and whose retirement was overdue. At Fashoda he had to redeem himself by insisting on a settlement which would not only protect British interests but also pacify an excited and resentful public.

In the not very long run Fashoda settled the question of Egypt as well as that of the Upper Nile—though not in the way that Marchand had hoped. Fashoda demonstrated *a fortiori* that Britain would fight rather than permit herself to be harried out of Egypt, and thereby destroyed an illusion which had been widespread even in the French diplomatic corps and the *bureaux* of the Foreign and Colonial Ministries—an illusion which might have survived had the Upper Nile question been settled in isolation by a compromise. No responsible French statesman had ever seriously contemplated a war with England over Egypt, except perhaps as a member of a Continental League. Experience had shown that such a combination was impossible unless France paid the prohibitive price of finally renouncing the Lost Provinces. To persevere in the Egyptian quarrel after Fashoda was a sterile and self-defeating gesture which France could ill afford as Germany grew stronger and Russia drifted towards war with Britain's new ally Japan. The time was not far distant when this obviously lost cause would be sacrificed to the need for less distant relations with England and to colonialist aspirations in Morocco.

After Mr. Sanderson had delivered his paper, the following discussion took place:—

Sayed Mohammed Khojali emphasised the religious motive in the refusal of the Mahdist State to seek the recognition of other Powers ; and asked how the speaker reconciled the European belief in the inherent weakness of the Mahdist State with the impressive early successes of the Mahdi and the Khalifa. He pointed out that even in the Southern Sudan, where the Mahdists were supposed to be weakest, Emin Pasha had been unable to escape. *The speaker* replied that he had mentioned and indeed emphasised the fact that the politico-religious outlook of the Mahdia precluded it from seeking recognition even from other Muslim States. The point he had wished to make was simply this ; that the failure of the Mahdist State to seek or obtain recognition provided a legal if not a moral justification for treating it either as *res nullius* or as Egyptian territory, according to the convenience of the Power concerned.

The belief that the Mahdist State was on the verge of collapse was widespread around 1890 ; it was particularly fashionable among British military circles in London, but it was of course a total misapprehension.

The Mahdist hold upon the Southern Sudan was on the other hand at best intermittent and always rather precarious ; and Emin's failure to escape does not necessarily prove the strength of the Mahdist hold on the Equatorial regions. In 1884–85 the Mahdist Movement had been strong in the Bahr al-Ghazal, and in 1889–90 Mahdist influence probably reached almost, if not quite, as far as the Nile-Congo divide. Thereafter effective Mahdist control south of Fashoda was more or less confined to the Bor-Rejaf reach of the Bahr el-Jebel, though in 1893–4 'Arabi Dafa'allah and his lieutenants made a temporarily successful raid into the Upper Uele and threatened the Belgian post of Niangara ; another and less successful expedition against the Bahr al-Ghazal Dinka was launched from Shakka by al-Khatim Musa in 1894. But the defeat of the Mahdists on the Upper Uele by the Belgians in December 1894, and above all the closing of the Bahr el-Jebel *sudd* in the course of the same year, reduced the Mahdist garrison in the South to a dangerously isolated outpost precariously holding the narrow riverain strip between Bor and Rejaf.

Sayed Justice M.I. El Nur asked whether the real objective of Stanley's Emin Pasha relief expedition was not to pave the way for the occupation of Uganda by the Imperial British East Africa Company.

Mr. Sanderson replied that Mackinnon, the President of the I.B.E.A. Co., had certainly hoped that Emin would retire to Uganda with his Sudanese troops, and administer that territory as an agent of the Company. He probably also hoped that when the time was ripe Emin would return to his old province, now conveniently *res nullius*, and take this over in the name of the Company. Although the British Government had no official cognizance of Mackinnon's plans, and had indeed carefully avoided any direct responsibility for Stanley's expedition, they were unlikely to discourage these arrangements so long as Mackinnon was prepared to assume the financial burdens involved. A year or two later, in May 1890, Lord Salisbury approved a formal arrangement between Mackinnon and King Leopold for the partition of the Upper Nile as far north as Lado. It is not known whther a similar, though less formal, arrangement existed between the King and the Company at the time of the Relief Expedition ; nor, if such an arrangement did exist, whether the Foreign Office knew of it or approved of it. The relations between King Leopold, the Company and the Foreign Office in the period 1887–1890 form a subject which might well repay investigation.

Sayed Taha Abbas asked for a further explanation of the motives of the Marchand Mission. Was its objective simply to reach the Upper Nile before other European Powers or Ethiopia could do so ; or was it hoped effectively to occupy the whole area ? And why did the French Government leave out of account the potential Mahdist threat to Marchand's position at Fashoda ?

Mr. Sanderson replied that the original objective of the Mission, as approved by the French Foreign Ministry, was simply to provide France with a card to play in any international discussion of the fate of the Upper Nile provinces. The original plan was so carefully hedged around with safeguards designed to minimize the political scope of the mission that, had this plan been followed, Marchand could indeed have been plausibly described as 'simply an emissary of civilisation'. However, the plan was radically changed by the French Colonial Ministry without reference to the Quai d'Orsay ; Marchand was instructed to undertake a political occupation, to fly the French flag, and to induce the local chiefs to accept the protection of France. (It may be mentioned in passing that the Marchand Mission was by no means the only occasion in the 1890's when the French Colonial Ministry pursued a private policy in Africa and disregarded, or even flatly rejected, the directives of the Quai d'Orsay. Other examples are the Mizon Missions to Adamawa in 1892 and 1893, and the mission of Cazemajou to Sokoto in 1898).

It is, however, difficult to believe that Gabriel Hanotaux was really ignorant of the far-reaching changes which the Colonial Ministry had introduced into Marchand's programme ; but his love of office, combined with the political weakness of his position as a career official turned Minister, seems to have restrained him from openly opposing his colleagues at the Colonial Ministry. In the event, he let matters drift ; he may have believed, and secretly hoped, that Marchand would not get through to Fashoda.

It was not until about the end of 1897 that Paris began to give serious thought to the danger to Marchand from the Mahdists. Indeed, the original project of the Mission had looked forward to the establishment 'if not of an alliance, at least of a friendly understanding' with the Khalifa. French politicians frequently showed a curious inability to take the Mahdist movement seriously, or to understand its militantly Islamic ideology. Some of them seem genuinely to have suspected that the Mahdia had been encouraged, if not instigated, by British intrigue ; rather illogically, they also hoped that the Khalifa would welcome a French alliance if he could be brought

to understand the difference between Englishmen and Frenchmen. Marchand himself, who had been one of the strongest supporters of the Franco-Mahdist alliance, was undeceived by the time he was about to pass the barrier of the Bahr al-Ghazal *sudd* in June 1898; he now hoped that the balance would be redressed by the arrival of French or Franco-Abyssinian reinforcements at Fashoda. The Colonial Ministry had in fact made repeated but unsuccessful attempts to enlist the political and military support of the Negus Menelik on the Upper Nile; and at Fashoda Marchand was not far from despair at his failure to make any contact with the expected reinforcements from the east.

Dr. P. Collinson asked whether it was a fact that the French had attempted to reach an agreement with the Khalifa through the intermediary of the Negus Menelik.

Mr. Sanderson replied that in January or February 1898, Lagarde, the Governor of Obock and official representative of France at the Court of the Negus, had attempted to take advantage of the rapprochement between Menelik and the Khalifa by sending a French flag to 'Abdallahi through one of Menelik's messengers. The Khalifa was told that if he flew this flag at the head of his forces, no European Power would dare to attack him. Menelik, while appearing to approve this démarche, privately instructed the messenger to impress upon the Khalifa the importance of remaining aloof from *all* European Powers. 'Abdallahi declined to use the flag, and the incident had no sequel—except at Paris, where Hanotaux protested very strongly to his Colonial colleague against the dangerously irresponsible enterprise of M. Lagarde.

Although Hanotaux was certainly horrified at Lagarde's methods, which might have led directly to an Anglo-French war, he himself—or at any rate his *sous-chef de Cabinet*, Borel—had been privy to an attempt in 1896 to make contact with the Khalifa through a Hungarian adventurer called Karl Inger, who gave himself out to be a confidential agent of the Khalifa and whose knowledge of Arabic and of Islamic affairs, meagre though it was, was nevertheless sufficient to impress the *bureaux* at Paris. Inger, who called himself 'Emir Suleyman ibn Inger Adullah', was eccentric to the point of being scarcely able to distinguish between reality and his own fantasies. He was a farcically incompetent conspirator and secret agent; but his activities go to show that the dream of a Franco-Mahdist alliance was slow to die in Paris.

Sayed Nasr el-Din El Sayed suggested that the very great delay between the taking of a decision in Paris and its execution in Africa added to the difficulty of interpreting intentions and motives. Changes in the situation, between the issue of an order and its arrival in Africa, might mean that the execution of the order would have an effect very different from that originally intended. Paris would also be months behind in its knowledge of Marchand's activities, and might be unaware of their full scope. Sayed Nasr el-Din asked the speaker to comment on these considerations. He also asked whether any agreements relating to the distribution of the Nile waters had existed in the 1890's, and if so, whether these treaties retained any validity today.

Mr. Sanderson replied that it was possible to judge the intentions of a Government only by considering the instructions which were issued in relation to the state of official knowledge when they were issued. It was perfectly true that the detailed instructions issued by Paris were usually hopelessly out of date by the time they reached the Upper Ubangi or the Upper Nile; but there seemed to be no evidence that the thinking of the Colonial Ministry on the broad objectives of the mission had become confused by the delay in communications. Nor was there any evidence that Marchand had at any time exceeded his instructions. True, the course of action he

had followed had been very different from that which he had originally proposed and the Quai d'Orsay approved; but the changes in his course of action had been in response to instructions received from the Colonial Minister, his immediate superior. Marchand had throughout obeyed the last order received, as a good soldier should. Hence the not unjustifiable violence of his reaction when in October 1898 his proceedings were in effect repudiated by Delcassé.

In a rather different way, however, the question of communications did play a major part in the development and resolution of the crisis on the Upper Nile. This was the failure of the French—and indeed of almost everyone except Lord Cromer—to appreciate the contrast between the extreme difficulty or frank impossibility of the approach to the Fashoda region from East, West or South, and the ease and speed by which this region could be reached from Khartoum by the placid, unobstructed, canal-like White Nile. The strategic implication—that whoever was master of Khartoum and had adequate river-transport at his disposal was also master of Fashoda—was strikingly illustrated in September 1898.

In answer to Sayed Nasr el-Din's second question, *Mr. Sanderson* said that he had no knowledge of any agreements concerning the distribution of Nile water during this period. But the British, in treaties with other Powers relating to the Nile basin, almost always included a proviso forbidding any significant interference with the free flow of the Nile and its affluents. The present validity of these agreements was a matter on which an international lawyer was better qualified to express an opinion than an historian.

Mr. George Lengas said that he had gained the impression that the Sudan during this period had been a passive victim of the predatory European Powers. Was this really so? How did the Sudanese themselves react to the situation?

Mr. Sanderson replied that his paper had been primarily an essay in diplomatic history, and that the European Powers were therefore necessarily in the foreground. But he regretted having given any impression of Sudanese passivity; in fact, the Mahdists had throughout made a vigorous military response to the European challenge. They had successfully parried the Belgian threat to the Nimule-Juba reach; they had driven the Belgians from the Bahr al-Ghazal and Dar Fertit; they fought, gallantly if unsuccessfully, to preserve Kassala from the Italians and to dislodge the French from Fashoda. Finally, they contested step by step Kitchener's advance from Wadi Halfa to Omdurman.

The resistance of the Mahdists was however purely military; unlike the Negus, the Khalifa did not engage in the diplomatic struggle by playing off the European Powers one against another.

Sayed Nasr El Hag Ali doubted whether the purely diplomatic considerations put forward by the speaker were really the whole of the story. Was not the Mahdia itself regarded as a threat by European Powers with interests in Muslim, and especially African Muslim, territories? The Mahdia was after all an aggressively expansionist religious movement, and the Mahdist State was to some extent at least in contact with other Muslim States and communities.

Mr. Sanderson replied that neither the British nor the French, so far as he could see, had been so alarmed by this aspect of the Mahdia as to regard it as in itself a motive for intervention in the Sudan. The British were of course at first alarmed lest the movement should spread to Egypt; but the fiasco of Wad al-Najumi's expedi-

tion in 1889, and above all the lack of support for the Mahdists among the inhabitants of Upper Egypt, laid this fear to rest pretty completely. The only other region where the British were at all sensitive to this kind of threat was Uganda. This was, as both Portal and Kitchener saw, a key area; a potentially Christian and European-influenced wedge between the Mahdists on the one hand and the East African and Congo-basin Arabs on the other. It was certainly the policy of British missionary interests to forestall and prevent any encroachment on Uganda either by the Mahdists or by their fellow-Muslims to the South ; and above all to prevent any junction between these two spearheads of Islam and 'Arabism'. This policy had the backing of the African Department of the Foreign Office and might—one cannot say more—have become the official policy of the British Government had the need arisen. As things turned out, the threatened Arab 'pincer-movement' against Uganda never became a serious reality.

In March 1896, when the British Cabinet authorised an Egyptian advance into the Northern Sudan, ostensibly to ease the Mahdist pressure on Kassala, they suggested for public consumption that, after Adowa, a further victory of Africans over Europeans might have dangerous repercussions elsewhere, and might in particular encourage the Mahdists to launch an attack upon Egypt. But these supposed apprehensions can hardly be taken seriously ; when in the course of the next few hours the Italians decided to evacuate Kassala, Salisbury at once countermanded the advance in the Northern Sudan.

Sayed Musa Mubarak asked whether the French intended to use the Marchand Mission as a means of extending their influence and perhaps their territory as far as Ethiopia and the Red Sea ; whether the French were interested in occupying the Upper Nile region for the sake of its supposed economic potentialities ; and why, if the Dongola campaign was supposed to help the Italians, the chosen field of action was in the northern and not in the eastern Sudan— surely an advance from Suakin would have been far more useful to the Italians than an advance from Wadi Halfa ?

Mr. Sanderson replied that, in the 1890's at any rate, France had no direct territorial ambitions in Ethiopia They believed, over-confidently as it turned out, that the Negus Menelik was already to a great extent under their influence. What they seem to have been aiming at in the later 1890's was much the same sort of 'informal protectorate' in Ethiopia as Britain had enjoyed in Zanzibar in the 1880's. This they hoped to obtain not by military pressure (Adowa had shown the futility of this idea), but by affording diplomatic support to the Negus against Powers which threatened or were believed to threaten his independence.

That some French circles were interested in the acquisition of the Upper Nile, as opposed to its mere occupation as a move in diplomacy, is sufficiently shown by the way in which, under the auspices of the Colonial Ministry, Marchand's original project was transformed. But it is doubtful whether greed for material gain counted for much in this development. France, in a moment of hesitation and weakness, had lost her influence in Egypt, a territory which many Frenchmen, from the time of the first Napoleon, had believed that France was destined to dominate and introduce to western culture. For those who held these views, it was simply a matter of national self-respect that the French flag should once again float somewhere on the Nile. If a French advance to the Upper Nile might also hasten the end of the hated British occupation of Egypt, so much the better. There is no evidence that any important section of French capital took any interest in the Upper Nile ; there is on the other

hand some quite reliable, if not very detailed, evidence that the Parisian world of high finance and large-scale commerce was in the later nineties beginning to regard as a pointless anachronism the feud with England over the Nile Valley.

The Dongola Campaign certainly afforded very little, if any, practical help to the Italians. But it was hardly intended to; and in any case the Italian situation in East Africa was past praying for. In March 1896 Salisbury found himself constrained, almost entirely for reasons of general diplomacy, to give to the Triplice Powers and particularly to Berlin, a guarantee that Britain was still on good terms with the Triple Alliance and that her recent rapprochement with France would not develop into an entente with its point against Rome and Berlin. For Britain to have stood idly by while Italy foundered completely in East Africa would have been interpreted in Berlin as a sign that London had deserted Rome for Paris. But a military gesture in the Northern Sudan, however restricted it might be and however little it might actually help the Italians, would certainly create enough ill-feeling at Paris to blast all prospect of an Anglo-French entente and to cause Salisbury to 'lean towards' the Powers of the Triple Alliance. Salisbury intensely disliked having to commit himself; but he felt that it was unsafe to allow the line to Berlin to break completely, and he therefore made his 'military gesture' in the Northern Sudan.

THE PERIOD OF EGYPTIAN OCCUPATION 1820–1881

by
RICHARD HILL

1. *Two Pressure groups in History Writing on the Sudan : Exeter Hall and Egyptian Nationalism*

No paper on Sudanese studies during this period can afford to ignore these two schools of emotion—we cannot accurately call them schools of thought—which have inspired so much historical writing on the Sudan.

The term Exeter Hall is a convenient abbreviation for that complex of different, and sometimes contradictory, strands of feeling which found expression at public meetings held at Exeter Hall in London. The chief components in the organization of this expression were the Anti-Slavery Society, strongly influenced by a group of physically pacifist, though verbally somewhat bellicose, Quakers, reinforced by Evangelicals and humanitarians representing a preponderant body of British people and ranging all the way from Charles Kingsley to the guardians of the Nonconformist Conscience.

To dismiss this nation-wide wave of emotion, which united so many otherwise disparate elements of British public opinion against slavery and the slave trade in Africa, as "capitalistic cunning" or "colonialist plotting", would be excessively naive. The powerful presence in the movement of three Quaker leaders, Edmund Sturge, Joseph Cooper and Francis William Fox, to whom Foreign Secretaries nervously deferred, lent to their campaign the fervour of a *jihād*. These men were (to use the current jargon) anti-colonialist. Jingoism, the ugly daughter of the eighteen-nineties, did not enter into British writing until the end of Mahdist times, and even then its entry was not undisputed.

If Exeter Hall erred, it was in the definition of slavery. The Anti-Slavery Society continually, and not always wisely, "plugged" the slavery issue in the Sudan, confounding in its headstrong singleness of purpose the kind of slavery which had just been stamped out in the United States where it had left behind it the scourge of a colour ideology, and the kind of slavery practised in Islam. The confusion led to the prevalence in Britain of a twisted view of the place of slavery in the Sudanese economy at that time. But in linking slavery with the slave trade (since the latter fed the former) they were at least in line with growing world opinion.

Exeter Hall had its most spectacular success in the enormous literature devoted to the Sudanese career of General Gordon, for Gordon's unorthodox personality appealed in a very special way to his countrymen who are accustomed to disguising behind a façade of uniformity an individualism of character and unorthodoxy in action. Of 308 traced bibliographical references to Gordon in the Sudan only 25 can be said to be untouched by the influence of Exeter Hall.

And Exeter Hall had both its sublimities and its bathos. Misled by ignorance of the country under the Egyptian régime, British writers who would have known better if they had possessed the factual knowledge, continued for a long time to represent the Governor-General Muḥammad Raʿūf Pasha as a slave trader. So little did they know of the march of events in the Sudan that they made the most quaint howlers in geography and ethnology.

Lest it should be imagined that all the blame rests with Exeter Hall, it must be stated that the second school, the school inspired by Egyptian nationalism, has shown an equal and opposite naivety in its writing on the Egyptian occupation. According to the general line of the majority of this school—the critical minority show greater objectivity—nearly every European who served in the Sudan since 1869 was the agent of some sinister interest conspiring against the fulfilment of Egypt's just ambitions in the Nile Valley. Extremists of the school portray Egyptian rule in the Sudan as absolutely enlightened and absolutely beneficent, almost a prelude to the *Wafd*. The intellectual excesses of this school, no less than those of Exeter Hall, have done the Sudan a disservice in that they have given the world the impression (utterly false in fact) that Egyptian and British historical writing on the Sudan lacks integrity.

Up to the end of the Egyptian monarchy historiography was actively fostered by Royal patronage. King Fū' ād was, after his fashion, a great patron of letters, and Egyptian writing on the Sudan has on the whole been the gainer for, among a small amount of sychophantic and tendentious rubbish published at Royal expense, there was much solid, honest writing. Since 1952 the source of patronage has been transferred elsewhere, but it would appear to be too early to analyse the consequences of the change upon historical writing on the Sudan ; the bibliographical basis is not yet there.

The ghost of Exeter Hall still survives in some British writing published since 1945. There is a lingering tendency among some former officers and officials of the Condominium to treat the sixty years of Egyptian occupation as a chapter in the history of crime. An English translation of Professor Mekki Shibeika's *al-Sūdān fī qarn* 1819–1919 (Cairo, 1947) might have softened this harsh view.

2. *The Ottoman Heritage*

By incorrectly using the word "Turk" when they should have used the word "Ottoman", both British and Sudanese have misunderstood the character of the Ottoman influence in the Sudan. True, the Sudan was occupied by the forces of the *wālī* of the Ottoman province of Egypt, but the character of the régime was Ottoman, and the Ottoman ruling body was only partly Turkish by race ; it was inter-racial. No member of the ruling body would have called himself a Turk or for that matter an Egyptian, but an '*Oṣmānlî*. "Turk" among the educated in the Empire was a pejorative used of rustics from the interior of Anatolia. Without doubt some of the Ottoman institutions implanted in the Sudan were moulded by Egyptian administrative tradition, but that does not make the character of the rule Egyptian.

Yet, from the standpoint of Istanbul and the Sublime Porte the Sudan was a region of no importance, a mere dependency (*iqlīm*) of the province of Egypt (*Miṣr ayāleti*) which was itself within the Ottoman African dominions (*Afrīqā-yi 'oṣmānî*). The *wālī* Muḥammad 'Alī annexed a considerable part of the northern and central Sudan in 1820–21 without so much as troubling to inform the *Bāb-i 'ālī* of his intentions. The indifference of the Ottoman central government is illustrated in the issue of a firman of 21 Dhū' l-qa'da 1255/13 February, 1841, wherein Muḥammad 'Alī was accorded the government of the *ayālet* of Darfur which was then, and for long afterwards, an independent state. Nobody in the Grand Vizier's office seems to have consulted a map of the Sudan to verify what was possibly Muḥammad 'Alī's baseless, if convenient, assertion of the extent of his province.[1]

We must not make the mistake of antedating the rise of Arab nationalism or of extending the area of its appeal to the Sudan during this period. The multi-racial

[1] I have not seen the map of the province of Egypt said to have been sent to Muḥammad 'Alī by the Grand Vizier and referred to in a firman of 2 Rabi' al-akhir 1257/23 May 1841.

constituency of Ottoman rule, and its religious toleration which permitted Jews and Christians an active part in the routine of administration, do not conceal the fact that the Empire was the most powerful independent Muslim state then existing. Educated Muslims of the Empire, whether Turks, Kurds, Circassians, Albanians or Arabs, felt themselves to be members of a privileged political community. The Sudanese *'ulamā'* may have doubted the authenticity of the Ottoman Caliphate, but they tacitly acknowledged the Ottoman Pādīshāh as the *de facto* leader of the Faithful, the *amīr al-mu'munīn*.

3. *The Sudanese Point of View*

The Sudanese chroniclers of the Egyptian period have made it clear that the vast majority of the people cared little for any government so long as it kept out of their way ; when government got in their way, they disliked it.

Sāfil jāb balīya shī Turk shī dalātīya,[2] ran the Baqqārī jingle, for the nomads detested all government. Only a small number in Sudanese society showed any positive appreciation of the foreign overlord : the Shā'īqīya who found employment in the irregular army and enjoyed the use of sequestrated lands ; the Egyptian-trained members of the *'ulamā'* whose link with al-Azhar University gave them a window on the greater Islamic world, and the great tribal chiefs, such as the Abū Sinn, to whom submission brought official recognition and support, though not all the chiefs willingly surrendered the freedom which their fathers had won from the Funj and the Hamaj. Nevertheless the conforming sections of the Sudanese people were of increasing political importance as the Egyptian régime grew to maturity, and the events of the last twelve years of Egyptian rule seriously undermined their loyalty to the government. But as this transitionary period has been the subject of much comment over the years, including a recent study by P. M. Holt in his *Mahdist State in the Sudan* (Oxford, 1958), and is further discussed in my *Egypt in the Sudan* (Oxford, early 1959), it would seem inappropriate to labour the issues here.

It is, however, permissible to remind ourselves of the apparent slowness of the growth of a consciousness of political unity among the Muslims of the north and centre. One thing is certain: that, when the Sudanese Muslims finally rose in rebellion against the Government, they had at their backs the experience of sixty years of compulsory schooling in supra-tribal unity under the Ottoman flag. Was the 'Oṣmānlī, after all, the mother of Sudanese nationalism ?

4. *Re-Assessments*

In historical writing in Egypt and the West, Muḥammad 'Alī has enjoyed a high reputation ; but it was a reputation founded on events outside the Sudan. The full story of his Sudanese economic policy, his experiments in agriculture, fruit-farming and stock-raising, have not yet been told in spite of the relatively ample documentation.

Adulators writing in French, Italian and English have made Muḥammad 'Alī a paragon of the Liberal virtues, determined (as he told John Bowring) to abolish the slave trade. The old man's protestations of his excellent intentions must have made his Armenian interpreters sore with suppressed mirth. Other adulators, writing in Arabic, have made him a latent Arab nationalist, and his son Ibrāhīm an actual champion of Arab nationalism. The documentary basis for all this is indeed slender, and since 1952 voices in Egypt have been heard saying that Muḥammad 'Alī and his son, far from working for Arab nationalism, were lining their pockets with profits wrung from the peasants of Egypt and the Sudan. Which should serve to remind us that

[2] From *delī*, a trooper of irregular cavalry.

we are likely to be entering a period of reaction against the gods of Wafdist historiography, and we must not be surprised if the blows fall heavily on Muḥammad ʿAlī and his House. Régimes have a habit of denigrating their immediate predecessors. But will any re-assessment of Muḥammad ʿAlī be based on the evidence or on emotion? Sudanese historians of Muḥammad ʿAlī's influence on the Sudan have at any rate one part of the answer in their own hands.

Another figure whose influence on the Sudan was all-important was the Khedive Ismā ʿīl on whom a superabundant amount of nonsense has been written in Arabic, French and English. He was not merely the fat, selfish voluptuary which Exeter Hall depicted. On the other hand he was not an Arab nationalist in disguise, or, most ridiculous of all, a sort of super-Solon. He was, in fact, a rather spoilt, rich man with a despot's upbringing and no sense of the value of money. His character was tempered by a flair for formulating policies and explaining them in terms of Western euphemism. Historians have attacked and defended him with heat and have edited documents which illustrate his work for the Sudan. What we now want is a historian who will follow up the effects of his policies from the Sudanese end. Editing of documents without critical comment is not enough. We know far too little of what the Sudanese people were doing and saying during Ismāʿīl's term of office.

The Egyptian period has a subsidiary interest for us as marking a stage in the development of the public relations technique. The new Liberalism in the West demanded that every official explanation of state policy must be couched in terms acceptable to the new ideology. Muḥammad ʿAlī was the first ruler of the Sudan to borrow the Western politicians' professional patter. In explaining his acts and intentions to the consuls of the Powers he showed great dexterity in handling the new public relations technique. Ismā ʿīl carried this dubious art a step further, but overdid it.

Finally, the Marxist re-assessment. Those linguistically qualified (I am not) will watch the writings of S. R. Smirnov, one of the Soviet specialists on Sudanese history, in which he endeavours to fit the story into the dialectical pattern. We should bear in mind that Marxism is not the only dogmatic historiography on the market, and, if its findings are intellectually unacceptable to the uncommitted, this must not obscure the real merit of much Russian historical work in other spheres in which writers, after paying lip-service to the official doctrine (without which gesture they would never get their work published), go on to make serious contributions to knowledge.

5. *Opportunities*

The need for studies in the internal administration of the Sudan during the Egyptian occupation is urgent, and the urgency applies to all the main departments of official activity—the evolution of the central government, the provincial government, the legal system both *sharīʿa* and "niẓāmīya", the fighting forces, tribal policy, state economic policy. One of the most alluring fields of investigation, until now almost entirely neglected, is that of public finance, especially in the years before the impingement of Western financial procedures. The fulfilment of most of these tasks will involve the student in the reading of that most difficult of scripts, *qīrma*, affected by the inward-looking clerks of the Treasury.

There is a great opportunity awaiting the qualified student of public accountancy in the Sudan. Up till now no historian has done justice to this theme because none has equipped himself with the technical knowledge required for it. Oriental accountancy is a study of its own; the gradual transition from Oriental to Western methods highly deserves examination, and the Sudan provides the field.

It is regrettable that historical writing on the Egyptian Sudan has concentrated almost exclusively on the external aspects, the foreign policies of the Powers and their struggles for the possession of the politically empty African lands. While there is, of course, much room still for elucidation of this grand subject, there is a strong case for extending the inquiry into the inner aspect of Ottoman colonial rule, internal, that is, to the Ottoman Empire, of which the Sudan was an integral, if a distant and an unimportant part.

Work on the inside history of the Egyptian occupation is hampered by a number of disabilities. The official archives are outside the Sudan, in the former Qaṣr ʿĀbidīn and in the Dār al-Maḥfūẓāt, both in Cairo. The former archive was closed to research in June 1955, but may well have been reopened since that date. The language for the bulk of the material for the terms of office of Muḥammad Saʿīd, Ismāʿīl and Muḥammad Tawfīq is Arabic. But all the higher correspondence and much of the routine paper work passing between Cairo and Khartoum under Muḥammad ʿAlī, and to a lesser extent under ʿAbbās I, is in Turkish, that is, in administrative Turkish, an admixture of Arabic and Persian within a Turkish frame. The Turkish documents have been in part translated into Arabic, and certain of these into French, but the student dares not rely on translation; he must read the documents in the original or not only will he be constantly misled by the translators' ignorance of the Sudan, but the whole *esprit d'administration* of the ruling body will escape him.

The student will be much assisted by Jean Deny's *Sommaire des archives turques du Caire* (Cairo, 1930). But he is warned that there are yawning gaps in the documents which survive, and that the Sudanese material is by no means confined to bundles of papers and letter books listed under the headings of the Sudan. No guide, comparable to Deny exists for the Arabic documents in the Dār al-Maḥfūẓāt.

As the gigantic archives of the Sublime Porte are being steadily classified and catalogued, the worker in Sudanese history might do worse than visit Istanbul, if only for the satisfaction of ascertaining beyond all doubt that there is nothing of Sudanese importance there. On the positive side he may be able to solve two puzzles: was the Ottoman Government involved in the rumoured attempt of the governor-general, Aḥmad Pasha Abū Adhān (1838–43), to detach the Sudan from the province of Egypt? And to what extent, in spite of appearances, was Istanbul interested in the internal administration of the Sudan?

Other archives in Egypt, such as that of al-Azhar, might be examined for material of Sudanese concern. Descendants of high officials and officers who served in the Sudan might permit their family papers to be examined and perhaps microfilmed. Possibly the Institute of Sudanese Studies at Giza might be disposed to facilitate research in Egypt. The all-important part played by the Coptic officials of the Egyptian Government in the Sudan has never been investigated as a general study. This has bearing upon the financial history of the time.

Professor Shibeika's edition of the *Tārīkh mulūk al-Sūdān* (Khartoum, 1947) prompts the question whether there are still unpublished Arabic chronicles, or other historical documents of value, now in private hands in the Sudan, whose owners might grant access to them to accredited research workers. Names of probable holders of such material come readily to mind, and it will be unnecessary to list them here. A systematic survey of unpublished Arabic manuscripts in private hands might yield much of historical interest. The survey should cover not only the Sudan but the great libraries of the world in possession of Sudanese Arabic documents. Modern photographic processes would help in this wider field.

Finally the writer of this paper asks forgiveness for his repeated advocacy of another project which needs undertaking: the preparation of a great dictionary of Sudanese national biography. When the writer published a one-volume pioneer biographical collection of Sudanese and foreigners connected with the Sudan (Oxford, 1951), he did so with the hope that his Sudanese colleagues would undertake a large-scale national biography in Arabic. From such a work students of Sudanese history could gain a big advantage, not only in having the completed work for reference and correction, but, perhaps more important to the brotherhood of the writers of history, of undergoing the disciplined apprenticeship involved in its compilation.

THE PLACE IN HISTORY OF THE SUDANESE MAHDIA

by
P. M. Holt

Described in secular terms, the Mahdia was a revolt which occurred in the Sudanese dependencies of the Khedive of Egypt, which overthrew the existing administration, and which established an indigenous territorial state, mainly in the northern part of those dependencies. The coincidence of this revolt with the establishment of British control over Egypt itself resulted in the confrontation of the Mahdist state with British military power and ultimately in its destruction, incidentally to the development of British foreign and imperial policy at the end of the nineteenth century. From these circumstances, it has resulted that current views of the Mahdia see it primarily as an episode in Egyptian or British imperial history. Writings on the movement have, with a few notable exceptions, abounded in political and propagandist overtones, and there has been little attempt to consider the Mahdia as an autonomous historical process, or to set it in the wider context of Islamic history. A further consequence of this external view of the Mahdia is that disproportionate attention has been paid to its opening and closing phases, the years 1881–85 and 1896–98, when the movement was engaged in a mortal struggle with Egyptian and British power, whereas the intervening decade, the heyday of the Mahdist state, has been almost totally neglected.

The present essay outlines some considerations germane to a reassessment of the place of the Mahdia in history. It defines first, the pattern of events and suggests some comparisons with other Islamic movements ; secondly, it suggests that the nature of the Mahdia was essentially revolutionary, and analyses the chief groups of its supporters. Thirdly, by sketching the main periods of Mahdist history, it seeks to indicate the significance of the neglected decade and to link it with the more dramatic phases which preceded and followed it.

1. *The Pattern of Events and their Historical Setting.*

The Sudanese Mahdia was by no means a unique development in Muslim history. It passed through three main phases, being, first, a religious movement for the revival of Islam ; secondly, a militant theocratic organisation seeking to realize the restoration of the primitive Islamic *Umma* ; thirdly, a territorial state in which the theocratic aspects gradually became obsolescent. There are several earlier movements which underwent a similar course of development. Superficially, one of the closest parallels is the Almohad movement in the Maghrib, the leader of which also claimed the Mahdiship, which originated also on the African fringe of Islam, and which established a dynastic territorial dominion. Certain developmental resemblances can also be traced between the Mahdia and the Ṣafawīya movement in north-west Persia. The Ṣafawīya, a Ṣūfī *ṭarīqa*, controlled by hereditary shaykhs, originated in the thirteenth century. In the fifteenth century it changed from a devotional and mystical brotherhood into a militant organisation, and, at the opening of the sixteenth century its third militant leader, Ismāʿīl, carved out for himself a kingdom in Iran and Iraq from which the modern Persian state has evolved. A shift from Sunnism to Shiʿism in the fifteenth century precluded the possibility of a Ṣafawī Mahdi, but the rulers of this dynasty stressed their reputed ʿAlid descent and represented themselves as vicegerents of the Concealed Imam, the Shīʿī Mahdi.

The Sudanese Mahdia, insofar as it was a religious movement, was directly linked with much more recent developments in the Muslim world. From about the middle of the eighteenth century an ideological ferment had begun, which continued throughout the nineteenth century and is by no means finished today. In its later stages, this development has appeared as a Muslim reaction against the growing pressure of Christendom on the Islamic world, a pressure which has been a solvent of the traditional political, social and cultural framework in the Middle East as elsewhere. Originally the reaction was not against Christendom, or Europe, or the West, but against the religious establishment in the eighteenth century Ottoman Empire, in which the '*ulamā*' formed a privileged and largely hereditary class; and Ṣūfī ideas and practices, often of a primitive and un-Islamic type, deeply influenced the '*ulamā*' themselves, as they did all classes of Muslims. Beginning with the Wahhābīs in eighteenth century Najd, a series of reforming, revivalist movements occurred in the Muslim world. Current practices were confronted with the *Sunna* of the Prophet; popular beliefs such, notably, as the veneration of saints, were denounced as innovations (*bida*'); the restoration of the *Sharī'a* as the actual and all-sufficient law of the Muslim community was the primary political aim. Of this general type were the Sanūsīya in Cyrenaica, the movement of Shaykh 'Uthmān dan Fodio among the Fulani, the early phase of Khatmīya activity in the Egyptian Sudan and, in a later generation, the Mahdia itself.

2. *The Mahdia as a Revolutionary Movement and its Supporters.*

Islamic reform movements are potentially revolutionary, since the confrontation of any existing political and social system with the image of an ideal Muslim society, governed by the *Sharī'a* and reproducing the traditional features of the *Umma* in its earliest phase, challenges the compromises with expediency inherent in all administration. Thus in the eighteenth century the Wahhābī movement by the nature of its tenets was fundamentally incompatible with the Ottoman state, which drew its moral sanction from a very different view of the nature of the Islamic community. Similarly in the Egyptian Sudan, Muḥammad Aḥmad's claim that he was the Expected Mahdi was revolutionary, not only because he thereby asserted a higher sanction for his acts than was possessed by the Khedivial administration, but also because he declared that he was sent to establish the *Sunna*, that is to establish a purely Muslim community on the primitive model. His movement was therefore directed against two groups; first, the ruling institution of the Egyptian Sudan—the Khedive's officials and troops, who were engaged in administering a system of government that in essentials was late Ottoman in its purposes and methods, and at the same time was permeated with European influences; secondly, the Muslim institution—the cadre of '*ulamā*' associated with the administration, who gave the Khedivial system their moral support. These two groups are denoted respectively in Mahdist phraseology as *al-Turuk*, "the Turks," and '*Ulamā' al-sū'*, "the evil '*ulamā*' ".

Muḥammad Aḥmad's mission as a religious teacher had begun many years before he publicly announced himself to be the Expected Mahdi. After the Manifestation in Abā, his religious disciples continued to form the core of the movement and were known as *Abkār al-Mahdī*, "the firstborn of the Mahdi". Their political role was, however, insignificant; with the exception of 'Abdallāhi al-Ta'īshī none of them played a prominant part in later events. The nomination of 'Abdallāhi, at an early period in the militant phase, as *Khalīfat al-Ṣiddīq*, the successor of the first patriarchal caliph, Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq, indicated his status in relation to the Mahdi, who was *Khalīfat Rasūl Allāh*, the successor of the Prophet. Another of the *Abkār al-Mahdī*,

'Alī b. Muḥammad Ḥilū, was at the same time nominated *Khalīfat al-Fārūq*, the successor of the second patriarchal caliph, 'Umar al-Fārūq. Subsequently he exercised a moderating influence in the intestine struggles for power, but he neither sought nor achieved the political pre-eminence of 'Abdallāhi.

In the militant phase, ensuing immediately upon the Manifestation, two new classes of active supporters of the Mahdi appear. The first of these consisted of men of northern, riverain origin, particularly Danāqla and Ja'liyīn, who were dispersed among the non-Arab tribes of the upper White Nile, the Baḥr al-Ghazāl river-system and Darfur. These men formed a typical frontier society, engaged as sailors, merchants and soldiers of fortune in opening-up and exploiting these peripheral areas. Like frontiersmen elsewhere, they were impatient of government and resented the extension of Egyptian rule under Khedive Ismā'īl, although some of them ensured the continuance of their privileged position by taking administrative posts. Their loyalty was strained to breaking point by the policy, first adopted by Khedive Ismā'īl, of suppressing the slave trade—a policy which was itself a motive for the extension of Egyptian rule in the south and west. Since this policy was inspired by the European Powers, especially Britain, and since it was implemented by an influx of European Christian officials, such as Baker, Gordon and Gessi, the disaffection of the frontier-society was further inflamed by sentiments of religious hatred and xenophobia. When the Mahdia entered its militant phase, the dispersed northerners of the west and south (in marked contrast to those who remained in their original homelands in Berber and Dongola provinces) were a powerful factor in its success.

The second group which supported militant Mahdism consisted of the Baqqāra. Their support of the movement may have been due partly to the faults and venality of the Khedivial officials, partly to the personality and ability of Muḥammad Aḥmad's Ta'īshī disciple, 'Abdallāhi b. Muḥammad. Yet much must be ascribed to the inherently anarchical temperament of nomad tribes and the pitifully low standard of their existence, factors which throughout history have inclined them to warfare and the seizure of booty, and all the more easily when the raid can be viewed as a holy war. Parallels can be found in the history of the other militant movements—the Berber tribes on whom Almohad power was based, the Turcomans to whom Shah Ismā'īl owed his throne, the Arab tribesmen who, both in the early period and under 'Abd al-'Azīz in the present century, formed the physical support of the Wahhābī-Sa'ūdī polity. The Baqqāra displayed another characteristic of nomads—their adherence to the Mahdia was governed by short-term considerations; a campaign against a town or a rival tribe resulting in a rapid victory and seizure of booty was the limit of their willingness to participate in the *Jihād*.

3. *The Periods of Mahdist History*

Within the general scheme of events, the evolution from a reforming movement, through a theocracy, to a territorial kingdom, which the Mahdia shares with other movements in Islamic history, a more precise periodization is possible, in which the Mahdia discloses its individual characteristics.

A. *The creation of the Mahdist theocracy:* 1881–1885

The manifestation of Muḥammad Aḥmad b. 'Abdallāh as Mahdi (29th June 1881) marked the point at which a reforming and revivalist movement assumed a political and revolutionary significance. The inevitable reaction of the Khedivial administration initiated, almost simultaneously, the militant phase which opened with the *Hijra* to Qadīr. The *Anṣār*, as the active supporters of the Mahdi were collectively

known, defeated Egyptian forces in a series of skirmishes and battles, while the Mahdi's agents harrassed the administration in various parts of the Sudan. The capture of El Obeid (19th January 1883) gave the Mahdi the chief town in the western Egyptian Sudan. Egyptian hopes of overthrowing the Mahdi died when an expeditionary force under the British general, Hicks, was annihilated at Shaykān (5th November 1883). The establishment of Mahdist rule in Darfur and the Baḥr al-Ghazāl followed. The Egyptian garrison in Khartoum was isolated and the city fell to the Mahdi (26th January 1885), the British governor-general, Gordon, being among the slain. Meanwhile a simple administrative system had been organized. The Mahdi was the sole source of authority, his rulings on religious, administrative and legal matters being promulgated in personal or general letters (*manshūrāt*). His principal lieutenant was 'Abdallāhi b. Muḥammad, *Khalīfat al-Ṣiddīq*. He was represented in the provinces by agents known originally as *amīrs*, subsequently (after May 1884) as *āmils*. A central treasury (*Bayt al Māl*) received the Koranic taxes (*zakāh* and *fiṭr*) and booty (*ghanīma*). The armed forces were formed into three divisions, the Black Flag under the *Khalīfat al-Ṣiddīq* consisting of the Baqqāra tribal levies; the Green Flag under the *Khalīfat al-Fārūq*, consisting of the tribal levies of Kināna and Dighaym; and the Red Flag, consisting of the riverain Arabs and northerners of the dispersion, known collectively as *Awlād al-balad* (i.e. sedentaries, in contrast to nomads) under the Mahdi's relative, Muḥammad Sharīf b. Ḥāmid, *Khalīfat al-Karrār*. When the Mahdi died (22nd June 1885) he controlled most of the north of the former Egyptian Sudan. British and Egyptian forces held Dongola province; Emin Pasha maintained a tenuous Egyptian authority in Equatoria; the port and garrison town of Suakin never fell into Mahdist hands.

B. *The Accession-Struggle of the Khalifa 'Abdallahi :* 1885–86

The Mahdi's sovereign powers passed on his death to 'Abdallāhi b. Muḥammad, *Khalīfat al-Ṣiddīq*, who assumed the new and additional title of *Khalīfat al-Mahdī*, "the Successor of the Mahdi". His accession was unpopular with the relatives of the Mahdi (*Ashrāf*) and *Awlād al-balad*, whose nominal head was Muḥammad Sharīf b. Ḥāmid, *Khalīfat al-Karrār*. They were in touch with the powerful governor of Darfur, Muḥammad Khālid, one of their own number. He began to march on Omdurman, the Mahdist capital, with his provincial forces. A conspiracy of the *Ashrāf* in Omdurman was forestalled by the Khalifa, while the army of Darfur was intercepted and taken over in Kordofan by the loyal general, Ḥamdān Abū 'Anja. Meanwhile the Khalifa had begun to remove the Mahdi's nominees, mostly *Awlād al-balad*, from the chief offices and to substitute his own tribesmen and clients.

C. *The Militant Mahdist State :* 1886–89

The Mahdist state was committed by its ideology to the *Jihād* against other polities, whether Muslim or Christian. This policy was foreshadowed during the Mahdi's lifetime and was strenuously pursued by the Khalifa after he had established his authority. Warfare took place in three principal areas ; on the Abyssinian frontier, in Darfur and the far West, and on the Egyptian frontier. Warfare with Abyssinia was conducted by Ḥamdān Abū 'Anja, who raided the country in 1888. After his death, a battle took place on 9th March 1889, during which the Abyssinian ruler, John IV, was killed. The subsequent internal troubles of Abyssinia until the rise of Menelik ended large-scale hostilities. In the west the young general, 'Uthmān Ādam, suppressed tribal revolts against Mahdist rule and withstood a dangerous rising headed by a messianic figure known as Abū Jummayza (1887–89). Operations against Egypt were entrusted to 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Nujūmī, who had played a prominent part in

the siege of Khartoum. Al-Nujūmī, who was not a Ta'īshī, was regarded with some suspicion by the Khalifa, and Sudanese tradition suggests that he and his mainly riverain forces were deliberately sent to their deaths. They were crushingly defeated and al-Nujūmī himself killed at the battle of Ṭūshkī (Toski) by Egyptian troops under Grenfell (3rd August 1889). The Sudanese tradition is not fully warranted.

D. *The Period of Stabilization :* 1889–91

The years 1889–90 were highly critical for the Khalifa. The deaths of Abū 'Anja, al-Nujūmī and 'Uthmān Ādam deprived him of his three ablest generals. Widespread famine was followed by epidemic. The famine was made worse by the enforced migration of the Ta'āīsha and neighbouring Baqqāra tribes to Omdurman where they formed a military support for the Khalifa, but one of dubious reliability. The policy of the *Jihād* was tacitly abandoned. Trade was allowed to proceed across the Egyptian frontier and with Suakin. An elaborate fiscal system was developed, worked by a bureaucracy employing Egyptian methods and largely staffed by former employees of the Egyptian administration in the Sudan. Some tentatives were made at reconciliation with the riverain tribes but the period closed with another conspiracy of the *Ashrāf* and their clients in Omdurman (November 1891). They were again outmanoeuvred by the Khalifa and reduced piecemeal. Many of their notables were exiled to the Upper Nile, while the Khalifa Muḥammad Sharīf was sentenced to an ignominious imprisonment in March 1892.

E. *The Ta'īshī Autocracy :* 1892–96

The next five years are characterised by the growing acceptance of the Khalifa's rule throughout a diminished Mahdist state ; by the tacit conversion of the Mahdist theocracy into a personal monarchy, and by the growing threat from outside, as European imperialism began to press on the Khalifa's frontiers. The failure of the revolt of the *Ashrāf* marked the end of large-scale resistance to the Mahdist state as such, or to the Khalifa personally. In effect he was a Muslim sultan with his brother, Ya'qūb, as his *wazīr* and his son, 'Uthmān Shaykh al-Dīn, as his intended successor. A large standing army, the Bodyguard (*al-Mulāzimīya*), was built up, on which, and on his less reliable Baqqāra, the Khalifa's authority ultimately rested. Imperialist pressure appeared in several directions. Anglo-Egyptian forces at Suakin, which in earlier years had failed to make headway against local *Anṣār* under 'Uthmān Diqna (Osman Digna), captured the Mahdist base of Tūkar in February 1891. The Italians captured Kassala in July 1894. Belgian expeditions began to penetrate into the Upper Nile and the Baḥr al-Ghazāl (in both of which regions Mahdist authority was exceedingly tenuous). From 1894 an advance through the Baḥr al-Ghazāl to the Nile became an objective of French policy.

F. *The Reconquest :* 1896–98

The final phase of the history of the Mahdist state was brought about, not by internal collapse, but by external pressure caused by the clash of imperialisms. The Khalifa, unlike Menelik of Abyssinia, failed to appreciate justly the European threat ; the policy of the *Jihād* had been superseded by a policy of isolation. The British realization of French aspirations to control the Upper Nile seems to have motivated the Reconquest, although the pretext for its first stages was an Italian appeal for help after Adowa. The Reconquest was carried out by Kitchener using Egyptian troops only in the early phase ; subsequently British forces also. He owed his victories to superior

transport (railway construction) and armament (machine-guns). The first campaign (1896) destroyed Mahdist rule in Dongola. The advance continued towards the heart of the Mahdist state. A large army under the command of Maḥmūd Aḥmad was overwhelmed at the battle of the Atbara (8th April 1898) while the last reserves were defeated in a hard-fought battle at Karārī near Omdurman (2nd September 1898). The Khalifa escaped to maintain resistance with a shadow of his former authority until his death in the battle of Umm Diwaykarāt (24th November 1899).

DĀRFŪR AND ITS NEIGHBOURS UNDER SULTĀN 'ALĪ DINĀR, 1898–1916

by
A. B. Theobald

From the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, the Sultānate of Dārfūr formed one of a string of independent kingdoms, such as Sennār, Wadai, Bagirmi, Bornu, the Hausa States, Melle and others, which stretched right across north-central Africa from the Red Sea to the Atlantic. Very little is certainly known of the history of Dārfūr until the accession of the first of the historic Fūr Sultāns of the Kayra dynasty, Sulaimān Solong, the date of whose accession is variously estimated between 1596 and 1640. There followed ten other Sultāns, before Dārfūr was conquered by al-Zubair Rahma in 1874, on behalf of the Turko-Egyptian government, and the last of these, Sultān Ibrāhīm Muhammad al-Husain, was killed.

During this long period, the frontiers of Dārfūr did not vary greatly. Kordofān to the east was debatable ground between Dārfūr and Sennār, and for a brief period at the end of the eighteenth century, it was ruled by the Sultān of Dārfūr. Similarly, to the west, the Sultāns of Dārfūr fought intermittent wars with varying success against the Sultāns of Wadai. On the long border between the two kingdoms, lay a number of petty Sultānates, whose "Dārs" sometimes maintained a precarious independence, but were more often tributary to either Dārfūr or Wadai. Such were Dārs Gimr and Tāma in the north, Dār Masālīt in the centre, and Dār Sīla (or Sūla) further south. Generally Dārs Tāma and Sīla fell within the sphere of influence of Wadai, and Dārs Gimr and Masālīt in that of Dārfūr. Thus the frontier between Dārfūr and Wadai was undefined and fluid. In the south-east of Dārfūr proper, the Rizayqāt, the most powerful of the Baqqāra group of tribes, nominally admitted the suzerainty of the Sultāns of Dārfūr, but defied them when they dared.

The Turko-Egyptian administration of Dārfūr after 1874 was not accepted submissively by all the people. The legitimate heir to the Sultānate, Hārūn, held out in the great central massif of Jebel Marra until he was killed in 1880. The young Austrian, Rudolf von Slatin, who became Governor of the district of Dāra in 1879, and Governor-General of all Dārfūr in 1881, was soon engaged in attempting unsuccessfully to stamp out the local repercussions of the Mahdist rebellion, and at the end of 1883 he was compelled to surrender to the Madhists.

Rebellions continued against the Mahdists, for the Fūr supported their legitimate Sultāns—first 'Abd Allāh Dūd Banja, then Yūsuf Ibrāhīm, then Abū Khairat. All were hunted down and killed. The head Shaikhs of the Rizayqāt and of the Ma'āliyyia were beheaded; and a serious insurrection headed by a faki, known locally as Abū Jummayza, was suppressed. On the western marches of Dārfūr, Dar Tāma was overrun; but Dār Masālīt successfully resisted the Mahdist armies.

After the final defeat of the Mahdists by Kitchener in September 1898, 'Ali Dīnār, grandson of a former Sultān of Dārfūr, Muhammad Fadl, who had been kept as a prisoner in Omdurman for some years by the Khalīfa, returned to Dārfūr, gathering followers as he went. He out-marched Kitchener's candidate for the vacant Sultānate, seized al-Fāsher from the Mahdist Amīr Umm Badda, and defeated the puppet Mahdist "Sultān", Abū Kauda. He had succeeded to the Sultānate of a land which had been devastated and drenched in blood during the preceding years; its

manhood depopulated by the Khalīfa's demands for his armies; its western frontiers undefined; and its great tribes, particularly those of the Baqqāra in the south, unwilling to accept his authority.

The Sudan Government, itself faced by the formidable problem of administering a vast country which had been devastated by almost continual fighting for seventeen years, and which was certain to be a financial liability for many years to come, was unwilling to undertake the additional burden of governing distant and bankrupt Dārfūr. 'Alī Dīnār was therefore recognized as the ruler of Dārfūr so long as he "was obedient to the Government's authority and complied with its orders", and paid a nominal tribute of £500 annually. Slatin was appointed Inspector-General of the Sudan in 1900, with special responsibility for Dārfūr affairs.

'Alī Dīnār's first task was to impose order and obedience on his people. After chastising the recalcitrant Banī Halba in the south-west; the Ma'āliyya, allies of the Rizayqāt in the south-east; and the people of Dār Gimr in the north-west, by the end of 1902, this had been achieved.

There remained the problem of the frontiers. In a Declaration on 21st March, 1899, Britain and France described their respective spheres of influence between the watersheds of the Congo and the Nile, and in doing so, were compelled to attempt to define the frontier between Dārfūr and Wadai. The operative section of the second paragraph read that the frontier "shall be drawn as far as the 15th parallel in such manner as to separate in principle the Kingdom of Wadai from what constituted in 1882 the Province of Darfur; but it shall in no case be so drawn as to pass to the west beyond the 21°st of longitude east of Greenwich (20° 40′ east of Paris) or to the east beyond the 23°rd of longitude east of Greenwich (22° 40′ east of Paris)." The fourth paragraph of the Declaration provided for the appointment of Commissioners "to delimit on the spot a frontier line in accordance with the indications given in paragraph 2 of this Declaration." Thus was created, in effect, a zone of contested, or at the best neutral, interests between the 21st and 23rd parallels, which should one day, it was intended, be delimited in such a way that the frontier should mark "*what constituted in* 1882 the Province of Darfur." But did anyone know exactly what constituted the western limits of Dārfūr in 1882?

'Alī Dīnār was himself anxious to know what were the boundaries of his kingdom, and in reply to a query, General Wingate, the Governor-General, on 1st May 1901, gave him a general description; but in referring to the western frontier, merely said that it was "the former boundary with Borgo" (i.e. Wadai). After some minor frontier troubles between the Sudan and Dārfūr, Slatin, on 22nd December 1903, described the Kordofān-Dārfūr boundary in detail, but was again vague concerning the western limits of Dārfūr. "From El Mulam," he wrote, "the line will continue to the border of western Taaisha, Masalit, and stretch to the border of Dar Tama, and the old frontier between Darfur and Wadai," Clearly both Wingate and Slatin assumed that at least the three Dārs of Gimr, Tāma and Masālīt belonged to Dārfūr. Indeed, the first official map of the Sudan, published in 1904, clearly marks these three Dārs as being part of Dārfūr, while Dār Sīla is shown as part of Wadai.

The years 1903–09 were the most peaceful that Dārfūr had enjoyed since the Turko-Egyptian conquest. 'Alī Dīnār's relations with Mūsā Madibbū, head Shaikh of the Rizayqāt, were strained; but he was only obliged to fight one major campaign, against the Masālīt, who were compelled to recognize him as the suzerain power early in 1907. Although there were minor raids back and forth along the Dārfūr-Kordofān

THE BOUNDARIES OF DARFUR
According to Sudan Govt. in 1904
Scale 1:4,000,000

FIG. 2

frontier, relations with the Sudan Government were on the whole good. 'Alī Dīnār paid his tribute regularly, and a constant flow of courteous letters and presents passed between him and Slatin.

Meanwhile, however, the French had been pushing steadily forward from the west until they impinged on the western districts of Wadai. They took advantage of internal rivalries for the throne of Wadai by supporting a certain Asīl, against the reigning Sultān, Muhammad Salih Dūd Marra. By 1908, many Wadaians had deserted to the support of Asīl, whose authority extended to within two days' march of Abeshr, the capital of Wadai. In the following year, the final advance was made, and on 2nd June, 1909, the French occupied Abeshr. Sultān Dūd Marra was deposed and fled to the east, and Asīl was installed in his place. The French assumed that all the petty Sultānates in the disputed frontier zone between Wadai and Dārfūr belonged as of right to the former, and they acted accordingly. By the end of 1909, they had installed their own nominee, Hasan Kolongawi, as Sultān of Tāma, and the Sultāns of both Dār Gimr and Dār Sīla had submitted to the French.

The French then proceeded to reconnoitre towards the borders of Dār Masālīt; but in January, 1910, they were ambushed at Bīr Tawīl, near the frontier, their commander killed, and their column annihilated. A combined Masālīt and Fūr force then marched into Dār Tāma, and ejected the Sultān who had been appointed by the French. Having received reinforcements, in April the French defeated a large Fūr force at Guerada in the north of Dār Tāma, and their protégé, Hasan, was again restored as Sultān. In May 1910, Dūd Marra, the fugitive ex-Sultān of Wadai, took refuge with Sultān Tāj al-Dīn of Dār Masālīt, thus creating a new source of friction with the French. Thus ended the first phase of the campaign.

When the rains were over, the French command at Abeshr received authority from the Government to punish the "rebellious" Masālīt, and to attempt to capture Dūd Marra. The column marched into the heart of Dār Masālīt. On 9th November 1910, the French were attacked with bewildering speed at Dorata, their square was broken, and the commander, Colonel Moll, was killed. The Masālīt, believing the battle to be won, began to loot the French camp, thereby giving the remnants of the French force an opportunity to re-form, and to turn defeat into victory. In January 1911, yet another French column marched again into Dār Masālīt, won a second battle at Dorata, recovered the remains of their dead from the first encounter, and burnt the Sultān's village. This completed the chastisement of the Masālīt.

In October 1911, Dūd Marra surrendered to the French, and shortly afterwards, the Sultān of Dār Masālīt made his peace with the French, by which he ceded to them the western third of his Dār. Meanwhile, in May, the French had driven Fūr raiders out of Dār Tāma, and re-established their authority there. Thus by the end of 1911, fighting ceased on the western marches of Dārfūr, where the French exercised control, if not an effective administration.

'Alī Dīnār's reaction to the French incursions had been violent. In October 1909, he reported to Slatin that the French had occupied Dār Tāma, "although it is a stronghold of our frontiers." He asked the Sudan Government "to issue orders to the French to withdraw in accordance with the terms of international law." But, he added, "If your Government is not able to stop their advance into our frontiers, please let us know immediately. We will then rely on God, and protect our lives and our country until the will of God is clearly established." Slatin replied soothingly, "The boundary of Darfur under your rule is well known to the French Government, and you must not be afraid that France will encroach on it, so long as you are loyal

to the Anglo-Egyptian Government." A little later (19.1.1910), Slatin was more positive. "The Government will preserve the integrity of your country," he wrote, "and resist any foreign power having malicious intentions towards you, as long as you are loyal to the Government."

In March 1910, the Sudan Government was informed by the British Foreign Office that the French authorities had agreed to instruct their troops "to avoid any collision with Ali Dinar, and not to cross the Darfur frontier." This assurance was in fact valueless, because the French conception of what constituted "the Darfur frontier" was entirely different from that of the Sudan Government or of 'Alī Dīnār. When the French aggressions continued, and 'Alī Dīnār continued to complain, Slatin's explanation (23.4.1910), was that there must have been "some false information on the part of the natives of Wadai, who told the French officials that the district in question belonged to them."

Two months later, in June 1910, writing from Vienna, where he was spending his leave, Slatin was still confident that the French troops would obey orders not to cross Dārfūr's frontiers, but said that nothing further could be done until he returned from leave. On October 15th, he had an interview with M. Roux, the French Acting Consul-General in Cairo, after which he declared that he had received explicit verbal assurances from M. Roux that the French would not enter Dārs Tāma and Masālīt. In fact, all M. Roux had said was that orders had been given to the French officers, "N'entreprendre aucune installation sur des territoires n'étant pas reconnus d'une manière incontestée comme des dépendances du Sultan Acyl." At the same time, the French reserved the right of self-defence against bands which attacked them, and of pursuit of the aggressors back to their homes.

Nevertheless, Slatin was satisfied, and he fired off renewed assurances (20.10.1910), to 'Alī Dīnār that the French had again promised "not to interfere or intrude on the frontier of Darfur, which is Dar Tama and Dar Masalit." 'Alī Dīnār was duly grateful; but when he heard of Colonel Moll's march into Dār Masālīt in November, he was correspondingly more bitter and enraged at what he regarded as the bad faith of both the French and of the Sudan Governments. The French, he wrote (24.11.1910), were clearly "ambitious of taking possession of Darfur," and "we shall, by the help of God, take our chance fighting them, till God shall decide between use." Slatin was equally indignant, and wired to the British Agent and Consul-General in Cairo (30.12.1910), "Neither I nor the Sudan Government can be held responsible for Ali Dinar's actions in future, if French troops remain in the disputed districts." But they did remain; and throughout 1911 and 1912, 'Alī Dīnār continued to protest in vain, and to call in vain for the assistance of the Sudan Government in ejecting the intruders. As late as 24th August 1913, we find him writing to Slatin, "I have only a deadly hatred for the French. All my letters to you carried complaints against them, and you have told me not to fight with them on the frontier, and repeatedly sent the good news that you will settle the question of our frontier, the frontier of my fathers and forefathers, and I have always been waiting for the accomplishment of your promise, but until now nothing has been settled."

'Alī Dīnār could not of course know that the question of the frontier between Dārfūr and Wadai had caused considerable diplomatic activity in Khartoum, Cairo, London and Paris; and that the Sudan Government had in fact been giving him its full support. The obvious solution to the problem was the delimitation of the frontier, which had been envisaged in paragraph 4 of the Anglo-French Declaration of 21st March 1899. At the end of 1909, this course was suggested to the Sudan Government

by the British Government. But General Wingate did not think it was practicable, "because any mission for this purpose would be exposed to attack by the lawless bands along the frontier, which the disturbed state of that part of the country called into existence." Wingate and Slatin appear to have been so convinced of the obvious rightness of 'Alī Dīnār's claim to the disputed territory, that they pressed at first merely for a declaration by the French that they would respect Dārfūr's frontiers. This, as we have seen, was provided in March 1910, and again by Roux, with reservations, in October.

When these promises did not produce satisfactory results, the Sudan Government was slow in taking further action, and it was not until January 1911 that Slatin wrote a memorandum, in which he presented the case for 'Alī Dīnār and the Sudan Government in full. There was no documentary evidence; but Slatin lodged a deposition by himself, supported by evidence from his book, "Fire and Sword in the Sudan", that Dārs Tāma, Gimr and Masālīt were actually administered by him when he was a Governor, and later a Governor-General, in Dārfūr from 1879 to 1883; and a further deposition to the same effect by al-Nūr Bey 'Anqara, who was Governor of the western districts of Darfur from 1879 to 1882. There were other depositions by more minor officials. No attempt was made to claim Dār Sīla.

The French case was never formally stated; but it seems to have rested on such flimsy evidence as that the Sultān of Masālīt had sent presents to Asīl, when the latter became Sultān of Wadai, and that the French military commander had been welcomed when he visited Dār Tāma. Reference was also made to the writings of Dr. Nachtigal, the German explorer, who had travelled from Wadai to Dārfūr in 1874. The year 1874 was not of course the operative date in question; and in any case, in the map illustrating his journey, Nachtigal had shown Dār Gimr as lying within Dārfūr; Dār Masālīt as partly within Dārfūr, and partly in a neutral zone between the two countries; and Dārs Tāma and Sīla as wholly within the neutral zone. The French, however, promised to produce all their evidence when delimitation was undertaken.

The proposal for delimitation did not in fact prosper. In March 1911, Slatin wrote to Wingate that he considered it necessary for the French to recognize Dārfūr's right to Dārs Tāma and Masālīt *before* a delimatition commission visited the area, because 'Alī Dīnār could not be expected to resign his right to two provinces; and because the Sudan Government was bound in honour to 'Alī Dīnār to uphold the 1899 Declaration as they interpreted it. When this point of view was put to the French Government, a long silence ensued; but in March 1912, the French Foreign Minister made the counter-proposal that before delimitation took place, "La Grande-Bretagne soit, de son côté, à même d'imposer son autorité, d'une manière efficace, sur le Sultan du Darfour."

Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, realizing that the negotiations were making no progress, then changed his tactics, and in May 1912, suggested an Anglo-French conference to consider the dispute. The French agreed in principle, but procrastinated. They first suggested that the conference should be held in December; then at some date during the first three months of 1913.

Grey considered, "It would be useless further to press the French Government to meet our wishes concerning the date and place of a conference which it is manifestly their policy to postpone for as long as possible." He therefore proposed arbitration. Negotiations continued at a very leisurely pace throughout 1913; but by January 1914, it had at length been agreed that an arbitration tribunal should be set

up, according to the procedure of chapter 4 of the Hague Convention of 1907. There was still, however, plenty of room for manoeuvre, and thus of cause for delay, in considering the composition and terms of reference of such a tribunal, and of this the French took full advantage. But the interminable correspondence was rudely interrupted by the outbreak of the first World War in August 1914.

In August 1916, the British Foreign Office asked the Sudan Government what concessions it was prepared to make to settle "the long-pending dispute". The Sudan Government replied that it was prepared to concede Dārs Tāma and Sīla, for it was generally agreed in Dārfūr that in the past they had been more frequently under Wadai than Dārfūr; but that it was essential for the Sudan to keep Dārs Gimr and Masālīt. At the Peace Conference in 1919, this compromise was adopted. But even then, it was not until 1922–23 that a Boundary Commission delimited the frontier. The agreement between Britain and France, fixing the frontier as it is today, was finally signed in January 1924.

Let us return briefly to 'Alī Dīnār. At the end of 1913, he fought an unsuccessful campaign against his old enemies, the Rizayqāt. The Sudan Government maintained an attitude of strict neutrality towards this struggle; but 'Alī Dīnār accused the Government of encouraging the Rizayqāt in their opposition to him. At the end of 1913 too, a considerable number of the Zayādiyya tribe, who could bear the exactions of 'Alī Dīnār no longer, fled from Dārfūr, and took refuge in Kordofān.

Thus when the first World War began, 'Alī Dīnār was already deeply disgruntled with the Sudan Government. When Turkey entered the war in November 1914, and the Khedive 'Abbās II of Egypt was deposed by the British in December, the tone of 'Alī Dīnār's letters to the Sduan Government and to Sudanese notables, sharply changed. In a long letter to Sayed 'Alī al-Mirghanī on March 20th, 1951, he poured out his grievances against the Sudan Government. France had taken parts of his country which had always belonged to Dārfūr, and the Government had done nothing to help him; the Rizayqāt had rebelled, and the Government had supported them; the Zayādiyya had deserted, taking some of his property with them, and the Government had not sent them back; the Kabābīsh had raided into Dārfūr and looted camels and cattle, but he had received no justice from the Government; the Government had refused to allow his representatives to buy mules in the Sudan, or ammunition in the Hijāz; and finally, the Government owed him £2800[1]. With all these accumulated grievances, however unjustified many of them might be, fanned by the blaze of a world war, with all its accompanying unrest and rumours, it is not surprising that on April 22nd, 1915, 'Alī Dīnār declared his complete independence of the Sudan Government, and refused to pay any further tribute; or that, in May, he wrote to the Shaikhs of Kordofān tribes, urging them to rebel against the Sudan Government.

Clearly, the Sudan Government could not allow such a damaging blow to its prestige to pass unnoticed, or to permit 'Alī Dīnār's inflammatory propaganda among the Sudan tribes to continue unchecked. Moreover, the Sudan Government believed that 'Alī Dīnār was in close touch with the Sanūsī to the north, and that he was being influenced by Turkish or German agents. Actually, after the occupation of Dārfūr, it was found that these fears had been much exaggerated. It is true that 'Alī Dīnār received a trickle of arms from the Sanūsī; and that in February 1915, Enver Pasha, the Turkish Minister for War, wrote to him, urging him to join the Jihād against the Christians. But another letter from Nūrī Bey, Enver's half brother, who was attached to the Sanūsī as a military adviser, which was despatched to 'Alī Dīnār in August 1915,

[1] I have been unable to find any justification for this charge.

did not in fact reach him till March 1916; and 'Alī Dīnār's own letters to the head of the Sanūsī, to Enver Pasha, and to the Sultān of Turkey, were not written until the early months of 1916.

After 'Alī Dīnār had renounced his allegiance in April 1915, there were many voices urging Wingate to launch an immediate attack on him. But the Governor-General was determined to bide his time. The military and financial resources of the Sudan Government were very small, and a campaign fought in distant Darfur would strain them to the utmost. Moreover, during the second half of 1915, Britain was engaged in the desperate Dardanelles campaign, and the opening of a new theatre of operations, which might require reinforcements of British troops, was not favoured by the military authorities. But by December, the evacuation of the Dardanelles had eased the manpower situation. At about the same time too, 'Alī Dīnār's attitude had become more threatening. On 25th November, 1915, he wrote to the Inspector, Nahūd, complaining that travellers from Dārfūr were closely examined and delayed at Nahūd, and ending fiercely, "If you do not cease this conduct, By God and His power, you will be turned out of Nahud." The Sudan Government therefore moved a small force of the Camel Corps to protect this important trade centre, and the surrounding tribes. When the Governor of Kordofān informed 'Alī Dīnār of this action, his reply was to send two fishing spears and two throwing sticks, inscribed with his name and defiant verses from the Qur'ān, to the Inspector at Nahūd, and to reinforce his own frontier post at Jebel al-Hilla. On February 6th, 1916, he wrote a final wild letter of defiance and threats, addressed to "The Governor of Hell in Kordofan and the Inspector of Flames at Nahud."

The time for action had come. A mixed force of all arms, numbering about 2,000 men, marched from Nahūd on March 16th, 1916, and crossed the frontier into Dārfūr. 'Alī Dīnār's army was defeated at Beringia, about twelve miles north of al-Fāsher, on May 22nd; al-Fāsher was captured, and the Sultān fled. Further movement had to be postponed until after the rains; but on November 6th, his camp was surprised by a flying column under the command of Major H. J. Huddleston, and 'Alī Dīnār, last Sultān of Dārfūr, was killed.

NOTE ON SOURCES

The chief sources for the study of the reign of Sultan 'Alī Dīnār are to be found in the archives of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of the Sudan, particularly:—

(a) The series '*Alī Dīnār: Historical* (Intell. 2/2–2/5) contains a rich, but somewhat bewildering mixture of Intelligence reports and correspondence concerning 'Alī Dīnār.

(b) The series '*Alī Dīnār: Correspondence* (Intell. 7/1–7/5) consists mainly of the hundreds of letters that passed to and fro between 'Alī Dīnār and the Sudan Government.

(c) The *Monthly Intelligence Reports* (Nos. 60–268) provide a valuable digest of fact and rumour on the affairs of Dārfūr under 'Alī Dīnār.

The *Wingate Papers*, now in the custody of the University of Durham, will undoubtedly provide much additional information, when they have been organized and opened to students. Thanks to the courtesy of Mr. Richard Hill, I have been able to examine the documents for the years 1915–16, and these have been fruitful.

Sudan Notes and Records, and other periodicals, contain a number of very useful articles. The French point of view in the Wadai-Dārfūr frontier dispute is well presented in a series of articles in the monthly periodical, *Bulletin Mensuel du Comité de l'Afrique Française*.

ENGLISH LAW IN THE SUDAN, 1899–1958

by

A. W. M. Disney

Whenever an advanced people, with a deep-rooted and established civilization, takes control of a backward one, its impact and influence are bound to be momentous. The advanced culture may completely overgrow and obliterate the backward one, if its representatives fail to find points of contact and compatibility; but, if such points are found, then the effect may be that of a successful graft on to a rough but sturdy stock.

No one can yet tell what general view history will eventually take of the Condominium period in the Sudan, but it seems at least probable that, whatever is thought of political and economic events, the introduction of British ideas of law and legal procedure will be regarded as a good example of successful cultural grafting.

It is, of course, quite wrong to suppose that there was a complete legal vacuum in the Sudan in 1899, for two legal systems existed then, as they have existed ever since and as they exist today—the Shari'a and "native custom" (which latter can, perhaps, be compared with the old "common law" of England). Both had naturally suffered in the general chaos, but both were very much alive.

The Shari'a was at once recognised as the law of the land, for al Muslims, in the personal spheres of marriage and inheritance and the Government's policy was to improve and organize the Shari'a courts and bring them into the new Legal Department, but otherwise to interfere with them as little as possible.

With "native custom" it was different. There was no formal code, or system, but a vast corpus of unwritten law, carried in the minds of the tribal and village elders, varying from place to place in accordance with local requirements, changing to meet new needs and acceptable to the people. Much of it is based on the Shari'a law, but much of it has obviously come down from a remote African and Arabian past, evolving with the people and forming an important part of their culture. Here and there it may contain barbarous or primitive elements, repugnant to civilized ways of thinking: one cannot, in the twentieth century, accept a practice of burying old people alive, or killing chiefs when their powers begin to fail. But by and large—and within the limits set by the needs of the simple peasant or nomad—it works and is indeed often able to deal with the new problems of a more complicated and diversified existence.

It was clearly impossible, however, for the Condominium Government to administer the Sudan with no laws other than the Shari'a and native custom and, although he was careful to add that "it is not mainly to the framing and publishing of laws that we must look for the improvement and good government of the country", Lord Kitchener did, in his annual report for 1899, say that "the necessary laws and regulations will be carefully considered and issued as required."

Two of the first requirements were a penal code and a code of criminal procedure and these were drafted and applied in the Northern Sudan in 1899. They were revised a quarter of a century later, but have been very little altered in the last 35 years and the revised edition has been well described by a later Chief Justice as "a masterpiece of draughtsmanship."

Their great qualities are clarity and simplicity. They were modelled on the Indian codes, which were themselves the result of an attempt to take English law and adapt it to an oriental setting. The drafter of the Sudan codes thus had ready to hand the achievements of his predecessors in the same field and he took full advantage of their work and of the experience of those who had been applying it in the Indian courts over a considerable period. So were born the Sudan Penal Code and the Sudan Code of Criminal Procedure, which, with the Civil Justice Ordinance (produced a year later on similar lines), have been the legal backbone of the Sudan ever since. And as the English law, on which they are based, is itself derived, to some extent, from Roman law, it may truly be said that this part of the culture of ancient Rome has thus been enabled to have an indirect influence on the Sudan, fourteen centuries after the last Roman garrison disappeared from its Northern frontier at Kasr Ibrim.

These laws had to be administered, from the first, largely by amateurs—by British, Egyptian and Sudanese officials, most of whom had had the bare minimum of legal training, and by Sudanese magistrates sitting as members of Major and Minor Courts, who had had none. And by virtue of their straightforward clarity the codes worked and themselves trained those who administered them in legal ways of thinking.

And it was in this way that these more advanced laws began to be grafted on to the sturdy stock of "native custom", for when the very first steps in legal devolution were taken by the enacting of the "Powers of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance" in 1922, it was only natural that the Sheikh and his elders, who exercised these powers, were often the selfsame persons as were chosen to be "Magistrates of the third class for the purpose of sitting on Major and Minor Courts" and they inevitably took back to their councils the experience of their magisterial work performed in association with British magistrates holding courts to administer the Penal Code, within the framework of the Code of Criminal Procedure. And thus began the process of cross-fertilization whereby the tribal elder not only provided the essential "background" that enabled the State court to interpret happenings aright and so dispense real—and acceptable—justice, but also carried away with him new ideas on such things as the nature of evidence and the definitions of the basic crimes, which profoundly influenced his work in his own tribal court.

This process, once started, has gone on to an ever increasing degree and has mingled not only the Penal Code but even some statute law with the unwritten traditional codes and thus facilitated the grant of ever widening powers to the network of local courts which has been developed by the series of enabling ordinances that have followed one another in the years since 1922.

"Civil cases", writes the author of "The Sudan—A Record of Progress" in 1947, "are decided in accordance with local custom, which in many parts of the country is in process of codification but is seldom rigid. One court, for instance, when taken to task for punishing an infringement of local sanitary regulations, which were then outside its powers, commented that these regulations had now become part of local custom. The definitions in the Penal Code of theft, hurt, insult, affray and such other simple criminal offences as come before the local courts are now so well understood that there is in fact one criminal law over the whole country."

Another point worth noting is that the local courts, thus stimulated and vitalized, often show a readiness and ability to cope with cases arising out of modern conditions wholly alien to their traditional range of experience. In Darfur, in 1941, an aircraft of Pan American Airways accidentally caused the death of a man. A magisterial inquiry proved that no one was guilty of negligence and that it was a pure accident,

but Pan American Airways agreed to pay damages and these had to be assessed. The advice of the local court was sought and, after earnest consideration, they came to the conclusion that the case was analogous to that of a man accidentally killed by another man's animal, for which they had a clear idea of the fair compensation. Their advice was acceptable to both parties and the money was duly paid and handed over to the dead man's next-of-kin.

The local courts are also ready to create precedents and so develop local custom by "case law" in connexion with the "simple" criminal offences. Two instances from Darfur in the early 1940's illustrate this. In one, a man from a certain village disappeared in a remote area, whither he had gone to tap gum. The only people anywhere near were an encampment of nomad Arabs. The missing man's fellow villagers accused the nomad tribe of making away with him; and the son of its Sheikh—perhaps rashly—said that if the missing man had not been found in a year's time, his tribe would accept responsibility. The man was never heard of again and a very big tribunal of neutral sheikhs and elders decided that full compensation must be paid. In the other case, a man had been very badly injured in a tribal fight and had had to have a large piece removed from his fractured skull. He lived, but was completely paralysed—unable to move, speak, or feed himself. A similar tribunal ruled that, although alive, he had virtually ceased to be a man and was as if dead—and again awarded full compensation as if for a death.

Here was "native custom" in the making, creating precedents that would pass into the main stream of tradition and be used in the future. In one case there was no corpse and in the other the "dead" man was alive; but both decisions were eminently reasonable and acceptable to all concerned. All the members of the tribunals had considerable experience of sitting on Major and Minor Courts under the Code of Criminal Procedure and there is no doubt that this contact with another and greater legal system had helped them to take a detached view and to arrive at a carefully reasoned decision.

The interaction between the Sudan Codes—drafted and introduced by British lawyers and for many years administered in part by British judges and magistrates—and Sudanese "common law"—itself owing much to the Shari'a, as well as to non-Islamic African tradition—has now been going on for half a century. What of the future? Will the two streams eventually join, to produce a distinctively Sudanese legal system, based on the best of both? This would perhaps be the most fitting outcome of the experiment of grafting an adapted version of English law—itself a product of such a rich and diversified tradition— on to the sturdy stock which the Condominium Government found alive in the Sudan.

Meanwhile, among the things that have made it possible for the independent Sudan to take its place easily and naturally among the free nations of the modern world, its possession of a good and adaptable legal system has been by no means the least important.

[*This paper by Mr. Disney concludes the Proceedings of the Philosophical Society Conference.*]

THE DOWNFALL OF THE CHRISTIAN NUBIAN KINGDOMS

by

Mustafa M. Musad.

INTRODUCTION :

The territory extending from Aswan, the ancient Syene, southwards to the confluence of the White and Blue Niles, was known to the Arabs as Nubia. When the first Christian missionaries arrived in Nubia in the middle of the sixth century, they found three independent kingdoms that had arisen on the ruins of the Meroitic power, Nobatia in the North, Alwa in the South, and Maqurra situated between Nobatia and Alwa.[1] By A.D. 580 Christianity had become the official religion of the three Nubian Kingdoms. The unification of the two northern kingdoms took place between A.D. 580, when the two kingdoms were independent, and A.D. 652 when they had a joint capital at Dongola.[2] The united kingdom also was known to the Arab historians as Maqurra.[3] The Southern limit of Maqurra was the principality of El Abwab[4] (Kabbushia).

Although the two kingdoms of Nobatia and Maqurra had united in the face of the common danger of an Arab invasion, yet there were still two independent kingdoms which failed to form any kind of union ; and disputes arose between their rulers which resulted in the decline of these two powers. The decline of the Nubian Kingdoms was due mainly to the breaking up of the culture and religious life on which the state institutions has been grafted. The infiltration of Arab blood and culture deeply influenced the social, political and intellectual life of the Nubians.

I. The Downfall of Maqurra.

With the rise of the Mamluke Sultanate in Egypt in A.D. 1250, a new phase in the history of Nubia began. It happened that Dawud, the Christian king of Maqurra, who should by ancient custom have paid an annual tribute or *baqt* of slaves to the Sultan, had sent various expeditions into Egyptian territory and taken Muslims as captives at Aswan and Aydhab. In revenge the governor of Kus had raided Nubia as far as Dongola in A.D. 1273, but Dawud escaped to El Abwab.[5]

Sultan Baibars, in order to guarantee the safety of Egypt, determined to interfere in the affairs of the kingdom of Maqurra. His opportunity came when Shekenda, a nephew of Dawud, arrived in Egypt. Baibars espoused his cause, and set him up in opposition of Dawud, basing his claim to the throne on the traditional succession through sister's sons. A fresh army was sent into Nubia ; the forts of Daw and Dongola were taken ; Dawud was defeated and Shekenda set upon the throne, after taking the most solemn oath by all he held sacred to be a true and loyal vassal to the Sultan of Egypt, to render the customary *baqt* of slaves, and to pay half the revenue of the kingdom, together with various presents, as tribute, as well as a gold dinar for each adult male of the population as long as they remained Christians. Churches were demolished, and chiefs taken as hostages. Maqurra was considered an Egyptian protectorate and the district of Maris "Al Ola and El Gabal" was recognized as the Sultan's own fief.[6]

Sometime before A.D. 1288, a king called Sammamun came to the throne of Maqurra, and for the next six years he alternated with an Egyptian nominee. Sultan Qala'un sent two expeditions (1287 and 1289 A.D.) to establish a pretender, but as soon as the Mamluke troops retired Sammamun seized the throne, and when they

advanced he fled.[7] Though these two expeditions had not succeeded in suppressing the contumacious king, Sammamun had at least been so far impressed by the repeated and temporarily successful invasions of the Mamlukes, that he renewed the annual tribute, which he had rashly repudiated.[8]

It is noteworthy that numerous Arab tribes took part in all these expeditions to Nubia. These were mainly Beni Abu Bakr, Beni Omar, Beni Sherif, Beni Shayban, Beni Kanz and Beni Hilal.[9] Most of these tribes did not return to Egypt but settled in Maqurra where they mingled with the Nubians and took their daughters in marriage.

Thousands of Nubians were taken captive and many princes were taken as hostages to Cairo.[10] The Mamluke expeditions to Maqurra aroused such terror in Alwa that its kings recognized the Mamluke supremacy. They occasionally sent their ambassadors to the Egyptian court to complain against the kings of Maqurra and appeal for Egyptian help.[11]

After the death of Sultan Qala'un, fighting went on between the Mamlukes and Nubians, either about the payment of tribute or the appointment of rival candidates to the throne of Nubia (Maqurra). In A.D. 1311 the tribute was paid by Kerenbes, the last Christian king of Dongola, but he was evidently less docile than his predecessors, for both in 1315 and 1316 troops had to be sent to Dongola. The second of these two expeditions was accompanied by 'Abdallah Birshambu, who was a Muslim, and was to be set upon the throne of Dongola. Kerenbes and his brother Abraam fled, but were captured and imprisoned in Cairo. However, a certain Kanz-al-Dawla, son of Shoga'-al-Din, who had been sent from Dongola by his uncle Kerenbes to intercede with Sultan al Nasir, but had been cast into prison by the latter, obtained his liberty, attacked 'Abdallah Birshambu, and seized the throne. Thereupon the Sultan released Abraam and promised to liberate Kerenbes also in return for the delivery to him Kanz-el Dawla in fetters. The latter gave himself up to his uncle Abraam, but Abraam died three days later and Kanz-el-Dawla was re-elected king by the Nubians and Arabs.[12] Under him and his successors, though the Sultan tried to turn them out a number of times, Nubia (Maqurra) was really an independent Muslim state.

The kingdom of Maqurra had now (1323 A.D.) to all intents and purposes ceased to exist and such "kings" as reigned in name were puppets of the Arab tribes. The tribute had been abolished when the paramount king was no longer a Christian[13] and great hordes of Arabs, mainly Guhayna, were pouring into Nubia and rapidly overrunning it as far as Abyssinia and Darfur. And with the conversion of the Nubians to Islam, the payment of the tributed ceased.[14]

In A.D. 1317 a mosque was dedicated at Dongola, and subsequently the upper part of a church there was turned into a mosque.[15]

Thus the downfall of the kingdom of Maqurra at the beginning of the fourteenth century was due to several reasons. Internal dissensions became acute during the Mamluke period and gave the Sultan of Egypt opportunity for interference. Public security was weak, since the collection of slaves for tribute meant constant raiding and led to internal anarchy. The infiltration and settlement of Arab tribes, who intermarried with the Nubians, secured the succession of their sons through the matrilinear system,[16] and undermined what central authority still existed by the rise of the arabicized Nubian tribe of the Beni Kanz.

From the time of the Patriarch Cyril (A.D. 1335) the Nubian church was left to manage its own affairs with the result that serious dissensions between the clergy and the civil powers arose, and the Muslims promptly took advantage of this situation.[17]

The persecution of the Christians in Egypt by the Muslims was extended into Nubia; many of the Arabs followed the example of their co-religionists in Egypt ; the churches were burnt and mosques erected in their places, and the Nubian church had ceased to exist before the end of the fourteenth century.[18]

In 1378, 1385, 1395 and 1397 outrages of all sorts were committed both by the Arab troops in Nubia and by the Mamlukes. In 1405 A.D. Upper Egypt was in a state of desolation, whilst Aswan had ceased to belong to the Sultan of Egypt.[19] This disorder continued until later in the 16th century when Nubia was conquered by the Bosnians sent into the country by Selim I after his conquest of Egypt in 1517 A.D.

II. THE DOWNFALL OF ALWA.

The Christian Kingdom of Alwa began to totter to its fall owing to a combination of various causes. Constant dissensions arose from the disputes between the chiefs of Maqurra and Alwa. It was the slave trade which sapped the strength and morality of the Christian Kingdom of Alwa and eventually made it an easy prey to Islam. The collection of slaves for tribute led to perpetual fighting and anarchy, and the Nubian Kingdoms were set one against the other.

The Kingdom of Dongola had fallen at the beginning of the 14th century and the downfall of Soba became merely a question of time. Alwa was practically cut off from the mother church in Egypt and the church of Alwa was left to native control ; a fact which in itself might not tend to further its well-being. A vivid picture is given in Francisco Alvarez, who wrote in A.D. 1520–1527 of Alwa's last despairing attempt to obtain priests from Abyssinia and Prester John's refusal to send them. The spiritual condition of the people of Alwa, Alvarez describes as most wretched and miserable, ". . . and the people of this country (Alwa) are neither Christians, Moors, nor Jews, and they live in the desire to become Christians."[20]

The actual fall of Alwa in A.D. 1504 is generally supposed to have been caused by the alliance of Quasma Arabs with the Fung.[21] This meant that Arab tribes had been powerful enough to acieve victory over the Christians of Alwa.

Since Maqurra had been opened up, Arab immigration had become a flood and the tribes poured southwards to the richer lands. The middle Nile region was admirably suited for the pastoral life, and since it had no rigidly organized government such as that of Egypt, the immigrants were free to live in it as they liked.[22] Among the most powerful tribes which found their way southwards were the Guhayna, a Kahtanite tribe ; and various branches of the Isma'ilitic Quraish accompanied by many other tribes, particularly by branches of Qais Ailan (e.g. Fezara). The Guhayna tended to remain nomadic and many offshoots of them found their way in the 14th century and the following centuries into the Gezira and Abyssinia in the east and Kordofan and Darfur in the west. It is clear that the Quraish settled among the Nubians and so became largely responsible for the Danagla and *soi-disant* Ja'lin stocks.[23]

The Arabs, having no racial prejudices, intermarried freely with the indigenous inhabitants. Further, the succession of the Arab tribal leader's son by a Nubian woman may have been secured by their making use of the matrilinear system prevailing amongst the Nubians. The power of the Nubian princes was thus gradually weakened or rather absorbed. As the royal houses were dethroned, Christianity began to disappear rapidly through the absorption of the inhabitants into the Arab tribal system and the cultural ascendancy of Islam.

Of the events in the middle Nile region during the 14th and 15th centuries, practically no record has survived. It was a period of anarchy when the only government that existed was the local jurisdiction of petty sheikhs. It is difficult to believe that the government at Soba can have survived the storm. It has been stated by al-Dimashqi (14th C.) that the king of Alwa resided at a place called Kusha (near Zankar).[24] It appears that the royal house of Alwa was driven there by the pressure from the invading Arabs.[25]

This anarchy led to a decline in trade. Thus the Fung under Omara Dunqas allied themselves with the Quasma Arabs of the Gezira under Abdalla Gama'a against the encroaching Arabs and Nubians (of Alwa) to gain ascendency over them and to maintain order and open the country for trade.

The Fung chronicle is our only source for the end of the kingdom of Alwa and the establishment of the Fung Monarchy on its ruins. The account runs : " . . . The Fung decided to make war on the kings of Soba and Qerri. Therefore Umara and Abdalla Gama'a set off with their army, fought the kings of Soba and Qerri and defeated them and slew them."[26]

Little is known of the early reigns of the Fung kings who ruled at Sennar with their Abdallab viceroys at Qerri. In the Fung chronicle, it is stated that after the establishment of the Fung kingdom, the immigration of the Arabs increased considerably.

The Fung kingdom extended from the head of the 3rd Cataract in the north to Fazogli in the south and from the Red Sea in the east to the Nile in the west.[27]

Though the Christian kingdom of Alwa fell rapidly, it seems clear from the contemporary Alvarez that Christianity still survived. It may be doubted whether the conquerors, Fung or Arab, took much interest in any religion, but the conquest created a medium more favourable to the growth of Islamic than of Christian characteristics. The first generation of scholars who came from Egypt, Baghdad and Morocco, at just about the time to which Alvarez refers, and the schools of learning which they founded, were the centres from which Islam and the Arabic language were diffused over the country. The majority of these scholars settled along the Blue Nile in the direction of Sennar and in the Dongola and Berber districts, where the Fung kings assured them a welcome.

The first reformer was Mahmoud Al Araki who came from Egypt and settled on the White Nile. Students from the kingdom of Sennar attended Al Azhar University, others went to the holy cities in the Hijaz, and these on their return set up as reformers. All these reformers and holy men laid the foundations of the Islamic studies that flourished in the kingdom of Sennar, from the beginning of the seventeenth century.

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[3] Mas'ūdi : *Les Prairies d'Or*, ed. C. B. de Meynard and P. de Courteille, Paris 1861, III, pp. 32–33.

[4] Maqrizi : *El Khetat . . .*, Boulak, 1270 A.H., I, p. 192.

[5] Quatremère, E. : *Mémoires Géographiques et Historiques sur l'Egypte et sur Quelques Contrées Voisines*, Paris 1811, II, p. 96.

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[7] Maqrizi : *Kitab al Suluk*, I, part III, pp. 736–753.
Quatremère ; *op. cit.*, pp. 101–110.
[8] Maqrizi : *op. cit.*, p. 753.
[9] *Ibid.* : op. cit., pp. 736–37
Ibn Khaldun : *Al Ebar* . . . , arab text, Cairo, V, p. 400.
[10] Maqrizi : *op. cit.*, Part II, p. 623.
[11] *Histoire de Qalaun*, fonds arabes, No. 1704, Paris, quoted by Quartemère, *op. cit.*, pp. 100–101.
[12] Nowairy : *op. cit.*, XXX, p. 96.
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[13] Qalaqashandi : *Kitab Sobh el Asha*, Cairo 1913–19, V, p. 277.
[14] Ibn Khaldun : *op. cit.*, V, p. 429.
[15] Budge, E. A. W. : *The Egyptian Sudan*, II, p. 130.
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[16] Ibn Khaldun : *op. cit.*, V, p. 429.
[17] Budge, E. A. W. : *op. cit.*, II, p. 130.
[18] Ibid. : *op. cit.*
[19] Quatremère : *op. cit.*, II, pp. 116–125.
[20] Alvarez, F. : *Narrative of the Portuguese Embassy to Abyssinia*, 1520–27 (Hakluyt Soc.) LXIV, London 1881, p. 65.
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[24] Crawford, O. G. S. : *op. cit.*, p. 27.
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THE BANDIYA AT DEIM ZUBEIR[1]

by

Fr. S. Santandrea, V.F.M.

1. *DEIM ZUBEIR : A ZANDE COLONY*

Perhaps only a very few people in the Sudan, and not many in the Bahr el Ghazal itself, know that Deim Zubeir town and neighbourhood, for 13 Kms to the north-east and 7 to the west, is actually a Zande colony. Lists of taxpayers for 1952 show a total of 94, the population amounting to less than 400 souls. To these a few survivals of the former Jahadiya should be added, with a small number of "strangers", thus making a grand total of some 500, or rather less.

2. *ZANDE OR BANDIYA?*

Like a great number of other Zande settlements, this one, small as it is, contains a number of odd races who have become more or less Zande-ised ; besides some real Zande (mostly Abandogo), there are Kare, Birri (5 taxpayers), Bodo (9), Tagbu (just a few individuals), Golo, etc. ; but the main group is formed by the Bandiya (51 taxpayers in 1946, but only 41 in 1952). It is with them that I am concerned here ; for I am quite aware of the fact that, though they are frequently mentioned, few people know anything about them besides their name. The following notes represent the combined result of information gathered from various books and from elders of the tribe living at Deim Zubeir.

The main works consulted were :
(1) *Azande* by A. de Calonne-Beaufaict (2) *La Grande Chronique de l'Uele* by Père Lotar (3) *Les Abandiya*, a pamphlet by the Brothers of the Normal School of Bondo (Belgian Congo). My main informant at Deim Zubeir was Jean Gingiye s/o Gendu, former clerk of Chief Jabr.

3. *BANDIYA ORIGINS*

It is a difficult problem to solve, at the present stage of racial development. The Bandiya are considered to form the westernmost branch of the great Zande nation ; they speak Zande and nothing but Zande, have Zande customs, organisation, etc. They occupy a vast territory in the Upper Welle, with Bondo as their capital (lying roughly at 4° lat. north, 24° long. east). They call themselves simply *Zande*, leaving the term *Bandiya* only for the ruling family. As far as the name Bandiya itself is concerned, my informants are ignorant of its meaning or origin ; one author says that it was the name of their first known ancestor. What is beyond doubt is the fact that they were formerly known as *Baza* and that their ancestors spoke the Baza language, which they dropped altogether two or three generations ago. The Baza language, possibly dead now, is said to be (or have been) related to Ngbandi, Yakoma, Sangu, etc.—thus differing widely from Zande.

Incidentally we may point out here an interesting detail : the Avungura seem not loth to admit a common origin—in very old times—with the Bandiya. If that is true, does that apply to the whole population or to the ruling caste only ? The former opinion—I feel sure—cannot be entertained, for it would imply that the Avungura were originally Baza, i.e. a branch of the Ngbandi nation. For the latter version,

[1] The name Bandiya can be found spelt Bandia, Bandya, or even Bandjia, etc. As no final agreement was reached on the subject, liberty should be left to writers to use or not the prefix "a" in front of Bandiya, as well as Zande, etc. for the plural. Thus the *Bandiya*, the *Zande* are equally correct forms as the Abandiya, the Azande.

I doubt very much whether there is any plausible or probable foundation in historical traditions ; besides other difficulties, it would imply that the rulers of the Bandiya belonged to a different race from that of their subjects—a circumstance which I do not find recorded by any author or mentioned by any informant. Personally I have the impression that these chiefs, proud of their ancient family lines which have held such a tremendous power through long ages, find it natural to boast of a common origin, all the more so since their peoples have been welded together into the same great Zande nation.

Now, to go back to the history of the Bandiya. At some period which cannot be precisely fixed, they left their ancestral home, somewhere near Yakoma where the two great rivers, the Mbomu and the Welle, meet to form the Ubangi. First they advanced eastward, occupying the area around Bondo (on the Welle) ; then, through an almost unbroken series of victories over neighbours and enemies, they gradually extended farther and farther : to the east, as far as Ango ; to the south, they reached Buta ; to the north, they crossed the Mbomu, occupying what are now Bangasu's and Rafai's territories. The families of both these chiefs were originally Bandiya, though the former were so thoroughly interbred, from early times, with their Nzakara subjects, that they commonly pass now for Nzakara.

4. *ZANDE-ISATION*

But a rather strange fact took place during this period of glorious conquest. The Azande, led by Ngura, were crossing the Mbomu and trying to force their way south and southeast, when they met the Abandiya, under their first great leader Luzia. After a short period of peaceful neighbourhood, war broke out between the two rival tribes, the Bandiya succeeding in defeating their enemies : they even boast of having killed Ngura himself. But, as already hinted above, a strange phenomenon took place as a consequence of that war : the winners, partly on account of the great numbers of women captured and consequently married, partly owing to their sincere admiration for the much superior Zande social and military organisation—became gradually Zande-ised in custom, law and language : in everything. The ruling caste, accordingly, took up the prerogatives of the Avungura, e.g. that of marrying within the clan and the family itself. At present, as stated at the outset, the Bandiya form the westernmost section of the Zande people. To get an idea of where they live, take a map, find Yubu, and then take the road going to the former French Equatorial Africa. Pass through Obo ; carry on to Zemoi, Rafai and Bangasu, always in a westerly direction. At Bangasu you stop and cross south of the Mbomu River ; then you turn southeast, and, through Monga, you reach Bondo, the centre of the old Bandiya empire. From Yubu to Bondo, by such a route, is about 880 Kms.

5. *THE BANDIYA AT DEIM ZUBEIR*

So far the history of the Bandiya is connected mainly with Belgian Congo and partly with French Equatorial Africa ; had not the following event taken place, these notes would not have been written. One day, towards the end of 1906, a band of refugees took sanctuary in the far-famed land of the Hakuma, in the far-famed town of Deim Zubeir. Their request being granted, they were allowed to settle on the right bank of the Sopo river, along the old road to Boro and Kafiakingi, via Mangaya. Who were those people ? Bandiya, led by a chief whose name enjoyed, beyond the Nile-Congo Divide, a fame almost equal to that of the land where he took refuge : Jabir[1]. And now Jabir's story begins.

[1] This name may appear under different spellings, such as: Jaber, Jabir, etc. In French documents the spelling Djabir is perhaps the commonest.

6. *JABIR : A SLAVE-TRADER'S WAKIL*

His Bandiya name was Papuyo, the son of Nduaro, son of Hirõ. The latter had raised the power of the Bandiya to a very high pitch, but his death marked the beginning of a period of decline : his numerous sons started to fight among themselves, and soon their enemies, the Avungura—always on the alert—availed themselves of the opportunity for redressing old wrongs. Moreover just at that time the Arab traders, in quest of white and black ivory, were trying to force their way south of the Mbomu ; local disorder and tribal rivalries helped them to succeed. Thus we find Ali Kobbo (otherwise spelt : Kabu) firmly established, some time before 1880, in the heart of Bandiya country, a few miles west of Bondo. Papuyo seems to have been prevented from pursuing a brilliant career : a younger son of a chief's younger son, one day he had to flee for dear life, having been "found" with one of his father's wives (c.1875). Expelled from his tribe, he threw in his lot with the enemy, and became a great aide-de-camp of Ali Kobbo, in collecting ivory and slaves, and in supervising their delivery to Deim Zubeir. His case was not unique by any means : Rafa'i, likewise a younger son of a Bandiya chief, was doing the same. Luck favoured both of them, for the events that brought about, unexpectedly, the ruin of their common foreign lords, caused them, natives of the land, to rise higher and higher in power.

7. *JABIR AND RAFA'I*

(The following account, very long if told in detail, has been summarized in the briefest possible way.) At the time of Suleiman's[1] revolt, Ali Kobbo—though by no means innocent of complicity—followed the example of his former master, Genawi Abu-Amoori, and sided with the government ; thus, almost automatically, he became its representative in that distant region, which the central authority was unable to reach. When Lupton succeeded Gessi and, threatened by Karamallah's invasion, ordered all outposts to be evacuated and all troops available to rally to the defence of Deim Zubeir, Ali Kobbo obeyed loyally. As can be easily understood, confusion reigned all over the country, enhanced by rumours about the Mahdist victories in the north ; movement was dangerous, for the subjects of yesterday were turning into enemies overnight. The shrewd Jabir, fully realising the conditions of the moment, followed his master, but determined to abandon him if he could do so with advantage ; in fact, choosing the right time and place, he escaped with the maximum number of followers and the greatest quantity of arms and ammunition. Eventually he settled at the present Bondo.

Rafa'i, superior to Jabir in seniority, service and influence, had likewise changed with the times, but in a more ambitious way; accepting the new order of things, he was actively co-operating with Lupton against the Mahdists. But when Deim Zubeir fell, he retired to his home at the Mbomu-Shinko confluence ; at the head of an orderly army, mostly composed of loyal Zande, and with a considerable amount of ammunition, he was soon to become a powerful independent chief.

Yet he did not feel safe, so near to the Bahr el Ghazal which had been overrun by the Dervishes. Therefore he moved southwestward with all his followers, and settled on the Mago stream, a few miles west of Jabir. But here again the vicinity of his cunning and powerful former partner gave Rafa'i a feeling of insecurity ; and Rafa'i decided to rid himself of Jabir. How did he manage to get hold of Jabir ? Some writers say "by force" ; my informants unanimously say, "by deceit". Jabir accepted an invitation from Rafa'i, relying on his word of honour ; but when he

[1] Suleiman wad Zubair, son of the famous Zubair Rahma Mansur ('Zubair Pasha'). Suleiman came out against the Government in July 1878, and was shot by Gessi in July 1879.

arrived at the latter's residence, he was imprisoned and put in chains (1886). Rafa'i, it seems, proposed a ransom for his prisoner : if Jabir's people would hand over all their guns, he would deliver to them their chief alive. But Mbali, Jabir's cousin and in charge of his household, flatly refused the bargain, probably because he did not trust Rafa'i's word ; he answered that he would bring up Jabir's eldest son, Rifaki ; and that with all his guns they would avenge their cousin and father. But the prisoner eventually succeeded in escaping. How did that happen ? My informants say that a blood-friend of Jabir's, a Banda, supplied him with a saw, by means of which he sawed through his chains. Early one morning the trumpets of Rafa'i's station sounded a sudden alarm, but in vain : Jabir had fled in the night, and through darkness and forest made good his flight. As a living witness of the fact there survives, to the present day, Jabir's (sixth ?) son, born during this captivity. The child had been called, at the sultan's wish, Rafa'i-Mbomu, but his father rechristened him Akabäti, i.e. *fell-into-a-trap* (—aka) and *was saved* (=bäti), from the Zande. Of him we shall have to speak later on.

8. *JABIR—A GREAT CHIEF*

Jabir's later life was full of events connected with the history of the Belgian colonisation of the Welle region. Suffice it to say, that from that day he and Rafa'i did their utmost to overthrow one another ; but as their strength was nearly equal, both had recourse to foreign powers, in the persons of two old Arab slave-traders. Fierce fighting took place ; and Rafa'i, who had already retreated northward, was obliged to cross the Mbomu and settle at his old home, on the Shinko. But still fiercer encounters were to be expected, had not a new foreign Power, the Belgians, appeared on the scene. Unlike their predecessors, the Belgians did not intend to take sides in the struggle between Jabir and Rafa'i, but to suppress it.

9. *JABIR AND THE BELGIANS*

Both Bandiya chiefs were ready to throw in their lot with the dominant newcomers. The first to do so was Jabir, who met them on his river, the Welle (1890). Rafa'i had to wait for the Belgians to reach him from the east, via Zemoi (1892). For years Jabir worked hard and loyally for the Congo State, both in fighting the remaining Arab hordes and in establishing its sovereignty over the various native tribes. But he himself ultimately failed to maintain his original good relations with the Congo Government. How did the breach between them occur ? Historians do not agree. Some speak of an attempt to get rid of the Belgians, in order to become the independent lord of the land; some speak of foreign suggestions, from old Arab friends; some add the detail of an inspector, Christian Holm, killed by the Bandiya in an ambush—all agree in saying that a movement of revolt was going on, like a smouldering fire under the ashes, which had to be, and ultimately was, checked by force (1905). My Deim Zubeir informants concur in denying the above charges, only admitting that their chief was finding the foreign yoke too heavy, and was guilty of "khalaf 'amr", especially in connection with the requisitioning of porters. Anyhow Jabir, intelligent as he was, soon realised that he had only two alternatives : either to surrender, accepting whatever punishment might be inflicted on him ; or to flee. Too proud even to think of the former, he took to the latter course, and fled.

10. *IN QUEST OF A NEW HOME*

(*Henceforth the narrative depends exclusively on information gathered at Deim Zubeir*).

Knowing every inch of his native land, it was not difficult for the fugitive to find a safe shelter, for the time being, in some secluded spot in the forest ; he chose for the purpose a place some 20 miles from Baundai's, the residence of one of his cousins.

But now where was he to go? News of his rebellion and consequent flight had reached beyond the Mbomu, where the French had long since replaced the Belgians, and a friendly European merchant (called Abu-Ras by the Arabs) sent him a letter on his own behalf and on that of Sultan Bangasu, with an invitation to go there and settle north of Bangasu's residence, between the Shinko and the Mbali. To allure him, prospects of trade and gain were skilfully brought to his consideration; but Jabir politely declined their kind offer: could two great chiefs co-exist peacefully in the same territory?

As a former resident of Deim Zubeir, Jabir was well acquainted with the new conditions of the Bahr al-Ghazal, and was naturally led to seek there a new home, under the already far-famed wings of the Sudan Government. Moreover he still entertained a hopeless dream of transferring to the 'Hakuma' his whole territory and people.

11. *TOWARDS DEIM ZUBEIR*

It is not easy to follow the steps that gradually led Jabir to Deim Zubeir, owing to conflicting accounts given by the various informants, who are probably biased by the desire to boast of their importance in leading their people to their new home. I have tried, with the help of Jean Gingiye, to sort the various threads of the story out of this confusion.

(a) Jabir decided to send a message to Deim Zubeir and chose for the purpose a certain Haj Mohammed (Gal al-Din?) a Bornu merchant with whom he was well acquainted. This merchant bore a letter written for Jabir by his young clerk, Jean Gingiye. Fearing the hostility of Osman s/o Rafa'i, the messenger took the road along the course of the Shinko River, then turned to the east up the Gboko Kresh, whence he proceeded safely to his goal. As the then D.C., Bimb. C. V. N. Percival, was on leave, the letter was handed to Sagh Ali Wabeh who, being unable to read French, forwarded it to Wau.

(b) Shortly afterwards a native messenger followed, by the same route: this was Njikavuru, one of Jabir's nephews. They were both so eager to bring news to their master that they left before receiving any official answer to the letter which Haj Mohammed had taken. They had, however, an oral message from the Sagh, inviting Jabir to leave at once lest, if he were discovered, his life should be in danger. He could take refuge in the Bahr al-Ghazal, leaving the question of his people and territory to the Governments concerned.

(c) But when the two messengers arrived home, they realised that they had been preceded by others. Two Bandiya men residing at Deim Zubeir, Gberewo Ndimo (commonly called Talag-en-Nar)[1] and Said Mangapa, as soon as they heard of the plight of their great tribal chief, had eagerly sought an opportunity to go to his help. And the opportunity was not long in coming. The Sagh entrusted the official reply to Jabir's letter to these two Bandiyas, recommending them to a merchant called Raki, a Syrian from Nahud, for protection on the road. Travelling via Zemoi, they arrived before the others, but bringing the very same news; for their letter, written in Arabic, could not be read by Jean Gingiye.

[1] Talag-en-Nar deserves a special note. Formerly a slave, he was taken to the north from the Bandiya country and ultimately entered the Mahdist army. He used to boast of great feats of bravery, etc. but was probably telling lies. He was a well known figure at Deim Zubeir for years up to his death (1951) at about 80 years of age.

(d) Before setting off for his journey towards the land of the 'Hakuma' Njikavuru had ordered his nephew Gingiye, Baundai's son, to collect elephant tusks, to be offered to the authorities of Deim Zubeir as the first tribute of their new Bandiya subjects. But unfortunately this party fell into an ambush of Osman, who captured not only their ivory but their rifles.

(e) It appears that strong competition was arising among the Bandiya fugitives to be first to offer their homage to the 'Hakuma'. Mbali and Akabäti, cousin and son respectively of Jabir, felt ashamed at being preceded by Gingiye, a more distant relative, and hastily set off towards the same goal. Skirting Rafa'i's territory, but keeping within Bangasu's, they arrived at Deim Zubeir before Gingiye, who had been deprived of his precious loads. They parleyed with the Sagh and proceeded to Wau, where they paid homage to the governor on behalf of their father and cousin. But while still on the road from the capital to Deim Zubeir, news reached them that Jabir was already in the Bahr el Ghazal, with the Mangaya tribe.

(f) In fact, reassured by the repeated messages of the Sagh and by the precious, though incomprehensible letter, Jabir had decided to start. He rewarded *en grand seigneur* the two Bandiya messengers, giving them a wife apiece and a tusk between them, to be sold for cash ; and gave them for companion a certain Karafallah, to act as his representative. But while they took the shorter route via Rafa'i, he himself travelled through the forest, along the boundaries of Bangasu's territory. (With this great chief he was on friendly terms, and he is reported to have had a private meeting with him in the bush while crossing his country.) Following the course of the Vovodo, he took the old path to the Mangaya hills and villages, whence he proceeded to the Sopo River. There he stopped, to send advance news of his arrival to Deim Zubeir; on being notified that Percival had at last returned, he hastened to pay him a visit.

The D.C. gave him a warm welcome and advised him to go and pay homage personally to the Governor. Thus Jabir and his retinue arrived at Wau : it was the last day of 1906. Back at Deim Zubeir, the Bandiya were instructed to settle at Nembe Hill, near Khor Ndaanda, on the Sopo River, along the old road Deim Zubeir–Mangaya-Boro-Kafiakingi, several miles upstream of the present Sopo bridge.

During the *kharif* of 1907 Mbali came from the Congo with a load of tusks, which Jabir wished to present to the Sirdar as a gift ; in fact, according to my informants, he went to Wau and in company with other paramount chiefs, among whom was the well-known Chakchak, he proceeded as far as Khartoum.

12. *THE BANDIYA IN EXILE*

A flight easily turns into an epic : there is poetry about it, we might say. But exile is prose. Moreover it is a noticeable fact that small tribal groups, detached from the main stocks, seem (generally speaking) doomed to decline and gradual extinction. The western Bahr al-Ghazal offers a collection of units that have undergone such a fate, forming a page of history and commentary together, readable by all, even by the illiterate. Our Bandiya may have counted some 200 people, when the colony was complete, to whom some late arrivals were gradually added. But death soon started to thin their ranks: hardships, change of environment and, above all, scarcity of food weakened their physique, so that disease played considerable havoc among them. Many of them were driven by fear to retrace the long road back home ; some just felt home-sick, and also returned to their native country. Mention will be made here of some of the outstanding members of their community.

First to move was Njikavuru. Having fallen ill, he went to Wau hosptial, but refused to undergo an operation; afterwards he managed to trudge back home, but died at Bangasu. One year since their arrival had barely elapsed, when Bangazegino, Jabir's 12th (?) son, left to go and take care of his father's household in the Belgian Congo. Yukutara-Ukuo, Jabir's 8th (?) son, followed suit, followed in his turn by Isa, the 14th (?) son. The last of the chief's sons to leave was Akabäti. It is true that, in the meantime, some more people had come; but the outflow went on for long, whereas the inflow soon stopped.

The first notable to die in exile was Mbali, Jabir's staunch supporter. The chief himself died in 1920, followed by Mbukä-Mozagba, his brother, two years later. Zakira, Jabir's 13th (?) son, who had succeeded him, renounced his post to go back to the home of his ancestors. It is said that such was his father's last will: he said that, after his death, "*i zundi beyo, i ki niga ka karaga tiyo ku Bondo yo*". Explaining his words, he added, he let the people free to remain, but expressed his will that Zakira should go. (NB. Zakira was wrongly interpreted as an Arabic name, *Zakaria*, and as such he was called by most.)

13. *JABIR'S SUCCESSORS*

Jabir	from	1907	to	1920
Mbukä-Mozagba	„	1920	„	1922
Zakira Jabir	„	1922	„	1924
Ali-Bare s/o Mbuka	„	1924–5	„	1931
Ibrahim (Jabir) a Kare	„	1931	„	1949
Tarcizio Jabir s/o Mbuka	„	1949		

(NB. Ibrahim had come to Deim Zubeir as Karafallah's boy; had then entered the Jahadiya, and was eventually made a subchief of the Deim Zubeir Zande settlement.)

14. *AKABÄTI* deserves a few more words, though belonging now to another land, the Belgian Congo. In 1915 Rifaki, Jabir's first-born son, who had recently returned to his native land, was appointed to his father's throne, which had meanwhile been occupied by a government nominee, the former sergeant Guga, whose rule had given no satisfaction. Rifaki died in 1930, and was succeeded by Akabäti, who received in 1935 "la grande médaille" which carries with it the title of "great chief". He still resides in Bondo, and is reputed the wisest and most honoured chief of the Bandiya. Nobody would have thought, in old times, that he would have had such a brilliant career. As already mentioned, he was one of the first to emigrate to the Bahr el Ghazal. After a time he went back home on an errand. While at Bangasu, the Chief's brother, Vando, gave him a Langba girl as a wife, who bore him his eldest living male child, Kerekuru. But when back at the Sopo, he found her one day in adultery and beat her so severely that after a few days she died; and people surmised that she had died in consequence of her husband's thrashing. Fear overtook Akabäti, who retraced his steps back to French Congo. This time he went to Rafa'i, where his brother Bangazegino resided, and stayed there up to the time of his father's death, when his elder brother, Chief Rifaki, called him to his side, in Bondo. And in Bondo he is still living—the much revered Chief Leopold Akabäti.

ON THE FECUNDITY OF THE NILE CYPRINID LABEO COUBIE (RÜPPELL 1832)

by

G. Nawar

The cyprinid *Labeo coubie* Rüppell is one of the economically important fishes of the Nile. Stubbs (1948) states that it reaches two feet in length in the Northern Bahr el Ghazal region and during the course of the present investigation, specimens 85 cms. in length were frequently found. It has good edible flesh (Pekkola, 1918) that is sometimes mistaken for the highly rated flesh of the Nile perch *Lates niloticus* (Linnaeus).

Recently attention has been directed to the study of some aspects of the biology of the economically important species of the Nile fishes (Nawar, 1957, 1958, 1960a, 1960b). Such studies are useful for the experimental work on the breeding of some species of the Nile fishes in artificial and natural inland fresh water bodies.

During the course of the above mentioned studies, it was observed that *Labeo coubie* Rüppell breeds during July and August. Large numbers of specimens are caught during July before the maximum rise of the flood is reached early in August. An account is now given of its fecundity.

The material of this paper is based on the study of 57 specimens of *Labeo coubie* Rüppell obtained from Khartoum market during the second half of July 1958. Khartoum market is mainly supplied by fish that are caught from the White Nile region, Khartoum to Jabel Aulia. The length of each specimen was measured from the tip of the snout to the tip of the lower lobe of the caudal fin and ranged between 65–85 cms. in length. The ovaries were dissected out and taken to the laboratory for investigation. The fecundity of each specimen was calculated after Stone's method (1937) which is quoted by Nawar (1960b).

The ovaries were green to bluish green in colour. Each ovary is usually partially sub-divided into an anterior small lobe and a posterior large one. The ova are small, more or less spherical in shape and vary in diameter between 0.5—1 mm. The number of ova per cubic centimeter ranged between 568 to 1737. This variation is due to differences in the diameters of the ova and to the different proportions of small to large ova in different ovaries.

Table I summarises the results of examination of all the sample. It indicates the following :

1. The volume of a pair of ovaries varies in the ranges between 310 cc. (specimen L38 ; 75 cms. in length) to 1820 cc. (specimen L36 ; 80 cms. in length).

2. The minimum fecundity was 262,880 ova (specimen L38; 75 cms. in length) and the maximum was 2,640,240 ova (specimen L9 ; 85 cms. in length).

3. Fecundity varies in a wide range in each length group. The maximum fecundity increases in the successive length groups.

4. In general the average fecundity increases according to increase in length. The comparatively high value of the average fecundity for the length group 65–70 may be due to low number of specimens examined in this group. The conclusion that fecundity is in general correlated with length of the specimen is justified.

Summary

1. The fecundity of the cyprinid *Labeo coubie* Rüppell was studied through the investigation of 58 ripe females.
2. The fecundity of the majority of the examined specimens falls within the range 5,000,000–2,000,000 with an overall average of about 900,000–1,000,000.
3. Fecundity is generally correlated to the length of the specimen.

Acknowledgement

The author wishes to express his gratitude to Professor H. Sandon for his critical reading of the manuscript and to Mr. Abd el-Salam Mahmoud for his help in counting the ova and recording the lengths of the specimens.

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Table I

Summary of the results of examination of the fecundity of the sample of *Labeo coubie* Rüppell

No. of specimens	Length in cms.			Vol. of a pair of ovaries in cc.			No. of ova per cc.			Fecundity		
	Min.	Max.	Aver.	Min.	Max.	Aver.	Min.	Max.	Aver.	Min.	Max.	Aver.
5	65	70	67·6	720	1330	1038·2	781	1438	1078·4	764400	1514870	1110796
21	70	75	73·3	530	1320	818·5	568	1398	1171·9	533920	1545720	959547
18	75	80	78·1	310	1590	1022·2	890	1462	1154·5	262880	2028840	1196465
13	80	85	82·2	650	1820	1236·4	859	1737	1156·5	676000	2640240	1430967·6

ON THE FECUNDITY OF THE NILE CATFISH SYNODONTIS SCHALL (BLOCH-SCHNEIDER 1801)

by

G. Nawar

The Nile catfish *Synodontis schall* is one of the very common fishes of the Nile. It is always available and in large numbers. Recently some observations on the biology of the Nile fishes has been made (Nawar, 1957, 1958, 1960a), during the course of which it was found that *Synodontis schall* breeds during July and August.

A study on the fecundity of two economically important species of the Nile fishes, viz. the mormyrid *Hyperopisus bebe* Lacépède and the cyprinid *Labeo coubie* Rüppell has been carried out (Nawar, 1960b, 1962). An account is now given of the fecundity of the Nile catfish *Synodontis schall.*

The material of this paper is based on the study of 53 specimens of *Synodontis schall.* They were collected from Khartoum market which is mainly supplied by fish that are caught from the White Nile region, Khartoum—Jabel Aulia. The collection was made during the first half of August 1958. The length of each specimen was measured from the tip of the snout to the tip of the lower lobe of the caudal fin. The ovaries were then dissected out and the fecundity of each specimen was estimated according to Stone's method (1937).

The ovaries were brownish green in colour and more or less oval in shape. The volume of a pair of ovaries varied in the range 8 cc. (specimen S10 ; 34 cms. in length) to 120 cc. (specimen S50 ; 45 cms. in length). The ova were small, oval or spherical in shape and varied from 0.33–1 mm. in diameter.

Table I summarises the results of examination of all the sample. It indicates the following :

1. The specimens examined ranged between 30 to 48 cms. in length.
2. The minimum fecundity was that of specimen S23 (37 cms. in length) 7,340 ova, and the maximum was that of specimen S50 (45 cms. in length) 138,360 ova.
3. Fecundity is generally correlated with the length of the specimen.

Summary

1. The fecundity of *Synodontis schall* was determined through the examination of 53 ripe female specimens.
2. The fecundity of the majority of the specimens examined falls within the range of 7,000 to 130,000 with an overall average of about 30,000 to 40,000.
3. Fecundity is generally correlated with the length of the specimen.

Acknowledgement

The author wishes to express his gratitude to Professor H. Sandon for his critical reading of the manuscript and to Mr. M. Kheir Idris for helping in counting the ova and recording the fish lengths.

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Table I

Summary of the results of examination of the fecundity of 53 specimens of *Synodontis schall*

No. of specimens	Length in cms.			Vol. of a pair of ovaries in cc.			No. of ova per cc.			Fecundity		
	Min.	Max.	Aver.	Min.	Max.	Aver.	Min.	Max.	Aver.	Min.	Max.	Aver.
3	30	33	30·6	19	22	20·3	850	1044	964·6	18700	20000	19512
7	34	36	35·3	8	48	17·8	910	1870	1419·4	11284	60960	26318·5
14	37	39	38·2	10	52·5	26·3	734	1589	1221·5	7340	58720	31784·7
21	40	42	41	15	110	35·7	712	1658	1231·9	10680	134140	43815
4	43	45	43·7	20	120	60	950	1209	1101	19000	138360	68102·5
4	46	48	47	30	80	50	1100	1220	1146	34590	88000	56462·5

PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY OF THE SUDAN

HON. SECRETARIES' ANNUAL REPORT

1st October, 1958 to 30th September, 1959

1. *Membership*

Eighteen ordinary members were elected during the season and forty-one left the Society, mostly as a result of their having left Khartoum and, as a rule the Sudan. The total number of members is thus 141 as opposed to 164 last season.

The present membership is made up as follows:—

Honorary Members	3
Ordinary Members	136
Family Members	2

2. *The Fourteenth Annual General Meeting*

The fourteenth Annual General Meeting was held in the large Geography lecture room of the University of Khartoum at 6 p.m. on Thursday, 6th January, 1959.

The following officers and members of the Council were elected for the season 1958/1959:—

President	Sayed Justice M. I. El Nur
Vice-President	Professor J. H. G. Lebon
Hon. Treasurer	Mr. M. Jolliffe
Joint Hon. Secretaries	Sayed Hassan Bashir Ahmed Mr. G. N. Sanderson.
Members of Council	Kaimakam Abdel Rahman El Faki Professor H. Butler Dr. S. O. S. Dark Mr. W. J. Hill, O.B.E. Dr. Ihsan Rashid Abbas Sayed Mahmoud Ahmed Abdulla Sayed Mohammed el Makkawi Mustafa Mr. Sabit Girgis Assabgy

Ex-Presidents, *ex-officio* members of the Council, were:

Professor S. Fawzi
Capt. G. W. Ogden
Professor H. Sandon
Professor M. Shibeika

3. *Council*

Two meetings of the Council (the eleventh and twelfth) were held on 15th November 1958 and 13th March 1959, respectively. The first was mainly concerned with the arrangements for the seventh Annual Conference, and the choice of a theme for the eighth Annual Conference. The second was mainly concerned with the planning of the eighth Annual Conference.

4. *Executive Committee*

In addition to the five officers of the Society, the following were elected to the Executive Committee:—

S. G. Assabgy
H. Butler
S. O. S. Dark
A. R. el Faki

The Executive Committee met twice during the session, the twelfth and thirteenth meetings being held on 11th November, 1958 and 20th December, 1958. These meetings were mainly concerned with sales of publications and detailed arrangements for the seventh Annual Conference.

5. *Publications Sub-Committee*

The following were elected to the Publications Sub-Committee:—

S. Fawzi
J. H. G. Lebon
G. N. Sanderson

The work of this Sub-Committee was transacted by informal consultation between the members. Sayed Nasr el Hag Ali's paper on Educational Problems in the Sudan, and Mr. Davies' paper on the tribes of the Ethiopian border, were recommended for publication. The latter has been prepared for the press under the direction of the Editor of *Sudan Notes and Records*.

6. *The* 1959 (*Eighth*) *Annual Conference*

The topic chosen is "The Health of the Sudan: A study in Social Development", and Professor H. Butler has been appointed Convenor.

7. *The* 1958 (*Seventh*) *Annual Conference*

The Conference had as its theme "The Sudan in History", and Mr. G. N. Sanderson was Convenor. It was held on 15th and 16th January, 1959, under the high Patronage of the President of the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces, and was opened by His Excellency the Minister of Education. Spoken Communications were delivered by Dr. J. Vercoutter, Mr. L. P. Kirwan, Dr. 'Abd al-Magid 'Abdin and Mr. G. N. Sanderson. Written communications were presented by:—

A. J. Arkell, A. W. M. Disney, F. F. Gadallah, R. L. Hill, P. M. Holt, A. Paul, T. H. Thabit and A. B. Theobald.

The administrative arrangements and the publicity for the Conference were handled by Mr. M. Jolliffe and Ustaz Ezzel Din Mamoun of the University Library.

The Conference aroused a keen interest among the public, and the popularity of the theme was reflected in the very satisfactory attendances which were (in order of the four sessions) approximately 350, 200, 100 and 250.

The proceedings of the Conference are being published in *Sudan Notes and Records*.

8. *Ordinary Meetings*

Five meetings were held in the course of the session.

91st Meeting: 28th October, 1958—62 members and guests present.

Chairman Professor S. Fawzi

Speaker Professor H. Tornebohm
"The Concepts of Space, Time and Causality in the Theory of Relativity."

92nd Meeting: 25th November, 1958—25 members and guests present.

Chairman Professor S. Fawzi

Speaker Mr. H. R. J. Davies
"The Tribes of the Ethiopian Border between the Blue Nile and the Sobat."

93rd Meeting: 27th January, 1959—42 members and guests present.

Chairman Sayed Justice M. I. El Nur

Speaker Sayed Nasr El Hag Ali
"Educational Problems in the Sudan."

94th Meeting: Tuesday, 10th February, 1959—45 members and guests present.

Chairman Dr. M. A. Nour

Speaker Sayed Wadie Habbashi
"Agriculture Development in the Sudan."

95th Meeting: Tuesday, 24th February, 1959—19 members and guests present.

Chairman Professor H. Butler

Speaker Dr. Mansour Ali Haseeb
"Virus Diseases in the Sudan."

9. *Special Meetings*

One special meeting was held, on 11th November, 1958: 55 members and guests were present.

Chairman Sayed Mohammed Ahmed Abdulla

Speaker Mr. V. C. Robertson
"The Jebel Marra: its geology, water-supplies, vegetation and land-use."

10. *Field Days and Special Communications*

No Field Days took place and no special communications were received.

11. *General*

On the whole, the Council believes that the Society has had a successful year. The Society has, however, suffered a heavy loss by the untimely death of its distinguished Past President and Council Member, Professor Saad ed Din Fawzi; it had looked forward to benefiting for many years to come by the energy and wisdom of the late Professor Fawzi.

The decline in membership during the session was due to inevitable losses which were not offset by sufficiently vigorous recruitment. In the 1959/60 session Council Members have made themselves personally responsible for recruitment, and those efforts are beginning to bear fruit. At the time of writing 13 new members have been elected since the beginning of the current session, and 11 are in the process of being elected.

The tradition of successful Philosophical Society Conferences has been well maintained; and the Conference is now well established as a most important part of the Society's activities. It may be added that the Proceedings of all the Conferences except the First have now been published or are in the process of publication.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Labour Movement in the Sudan, 1946–1955 (Middle Eastern Monographs, No. 1). By Saad ed Din Fawzi. O.U.P. for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1957. 25s.

Dr. Fawzi's book on the Labour Movement in the Sudan is a straightforward presentation of the facts relating to the Trade Union movement in the Sudan.

It starts with a survey of labour in the Sudan economy and then proceeds to give a background to the emergence of the early forms of workers' organisations.

It then tells the story of how these organisations struggled for recognition, gained it and developed into fully-fledged trade unions. From this stage, it devotes more space to the study of Labour-Management relations against a background of political unrest, unrealistic wage policies and rather advanced Labour Legislation.

Altogether it is an outstanding work. In it Dr. Fawzi has collected, analysed and recorded for us material which would have been beyond our reach a few years from now. He has given us a study which—to say the least—is so objective and fundamental that future writers on the same subject will find it indispensable.

The background to the emergence of trade unions in the Sudan is, however, incomplete. Dr. Fawzi starts his story with a bold statement that the Labour Movement in the Sudan was the result of two simultaneous lines of development dating back to 1946.

But this statement, though made with some reservation, gives the impression that trade unions in the Sudan were first thought of in the summer of 1946, while in fact the records available show that trade unions had been the subject of discussion, both in labour and Government circles, for some time before 1946.

At their meeting held on 29.10.44, for example, the Labour Board considered a suggestion from the Security Conference that the employees of the Sudan Light & Power (Power House) should be encouraged to form a trade union, and decided that no steps should be taken to organise labour on trade union lines before a proper office had been set up for that purpose.

In labour circles, as Dr. Fawzi himself admits (p. 38), "as early as 1944 there had been some talk among the skilled workers in Atbara about the *virtues of unity* and the need for trade unions in response, among other things, to a British Ministry of Information pamphlet on trade unionism."

To be fair to Dr. Fawzi however, his book contains all the material necessary to show that trade unions were the result of an even longer chain of development than that mentioned above. He says (at the beginning of Chapter IV, p. 34 for example) that the W.A.A. formed in 1946 was "preceded a decade earlier by successful attempts to group workers for cultural and social purposes by means of workers' clubs, the first of which emerged as early as 1934 in Atbara and the second in 1935 in Khartoum, two of the main centres of industrial labour. The importance of these clubs in relation to the Labour movement is that they gave impetus to the emergence of industrial labour as a self-conscious class and provided much-needed centres for workers' activities of a recreational and cultural character. They also provided a meeting place and a platform for the more articulate artisans to express their hopes for workers' organisations which would not be limited to social and cultural activities. Indeed, it was in the Technical School Old Boys' Club in Atbara that the Workers' Affairs Association was born."

But instead of telling the story chronologically, Dr. Fawzi chose the other way. He started at the point where the workers' consciousness crystallised in a clear-cut attempt to form trade unions, and from there went on to tell the story in detail.

It is true that the book is about the Labour Movement in the Sudan during the period 1946–1955. But this hardly justifies the relegation of the events leading to those of 1946 to such a minor place. Indeed, a Chapter on organisational consciousness and collective action among workers before 1946 might have been a very welcome introduction to the events of 1946. It would have covered such events as :—

(i) The Sudan Light & Power workers' strike in 1936 on gratuities.

(ii) The carpenters' strike at Atbara in 1940, on discharges.

(iii) The Technical School Graduates' strike in 1942, on wages.

(iv) The Mogran and Gordon's Tree workers' strike towards the end of 1942, demanding wage increases.

(v) The P.W.D. workers' strike at Juba in 1945, on wages.

(vi) The Ginneries workers' strike at Barakat and Hassa-Heisa in 1946, on cost of living.

Further, a reference to the Gordon Memorial College students' strike in 1931 and the Gezira tenants' strike in 1946 would have been well in place to show that workers had some examples of collective action around them to copy.

With regard to organisational consciousness, one might mention that as early as 1934–5 there were social clubs at Atbara and Khartoum which provided a meeting place and a platform for the more articulate artizans to express their hopes for *workers' organisations which would not be limited to social and cultural activities.*

Indeed it was at these clubs and other centres that articulate workers joined literary societies and trained themselves in orderly discussion and patient listening to all points of view. They also had a chance of meeting and participating with educated members of these clubs in organisational activities and discussions which must have surely touched on trade unionism.

Then there was the Graduates' Congress which, started in 1938, quickly sparked off nationalist thinking and popular politics, and by 1942 there were quite a number of political parties. One of these parties, the Ashigga, worked with, and depended very much on workers' support. They even went a step further and amended the Graduates' Congress constitution in such a way as to allow the majority of the literate workers to join it.

The consequences of that step were obvious : the Ashigga party and perhaps many others, had to add to their political demands other ones such as freedom of association (trade unions), improvement of the workers' lot, etc., and from then on workers were given more and more chance to work within the Congress or with political parties. In 1946 for example, when a Sudanese delegation was sent to Cairo, an all-party organisation—the National Front—was set up to give it support. Of the twenty members entrusted with the organisation of the Front nine were workers, and the secretary was Mohamed Sayed Sallam, later President of the S.W.T.U.F.

Clearly then, the workers were on the track, long before 1946. Their organisational consciousness and the collective action they took here and there provide the natural background to the events of 1946.

It is unfair therefore to ignore that part of the story and begin where there were two lines of development, one initiated by Government and the other by the workers themselves, and to claim that trade unions were simultaneously thought of by Government and workers.

Indeed, this approach to the story has rendered it rather unnatural. It has prompted Professor Phelps Brown's statement that :

"In this work by Dr. Fawzi there lies before us a story which in a sense begins with the endeavour of an administration to develop joint consultation in workshops where there had hitherto been no workers' organisations : was that mistaken simply because it inverted the general order of development in the West ?"

In fact, this question is irrelevant ; the workers were always ahead of the Government in the attempts to set up workers' organisations.

The first suggestion—from the Security Conference—to encourage the Sudan Light & Power workers to form a trade union was made in 1944, in response to a strike in the Power House. The Labour Board's frequent meetings in 1945 and 1946 were a response to the mounting problems of demobilisation and the post-war strikes. "Works Committees" were thought of when workers began to voice their dissatisfaction with the role of the "Welfare Committees", and trade unions were allowed when the workers flatly rejected the "Works Committee" as falling far below their hopes for fully representative workers' organisations.

This is the natural sequence of events however. Workers' demands are seldom anticipated and granted before they are submitted ; and whatever we find on record about the Government's initiation of Works Committees even as "training grounds in Labour-Management relations before fully-fledged trade unionism was allowed" (p. 33) must be taken as a concession made to a workers' demand and an inadequate concession at that. Indeed, Dr. Fawzi himself admits this fact when he says (p. 50) "The subsequent extension (in April 1947) by the Central Government of the terms of reference of the Committees to include wage questions *came too late* because the workers wanted trade unions . . . . .".

Further, there is also reason to believe that the "administration" in the Sudan was against freedom of association and had it not been for the coming to office of a Labour Government in Britain trade unions would not have been allowed in the Sudan. The British Labour Attaché in Cairo was in close contact with the Sudan Government on this matter, and when the Sudanese Delegation (1946) was in Cairo, he managed to have an interview with three of its members to whom he expressed the view that their country was not ready for self-government seeing that trade unions, which were an indication of nationalist consciousness, had not yet been formed in the Sudan.

Even stronger evidence in support of this belief is provided by Dr. Fawzi himself where he says (p.74) "Legally, all the strikers were liable to prosecution under sections 143 or 228 of the Sudan Penal Code and a number of the organisers [of a railway workers strike], including the President and the Secretary of the W.A.A., could have been called upon to forfeit the recognizances they had entered into after the July demonstration. It was decided, however, not to prosecute, partly to avoid enhancing the leaders' popularity, partly it is understood, on the advice of the British Government."

Another feature of the book is the amount of "economics" and statistical material in it. Dr. Fawzi has not always resisted the temptation to bring in material which, though of very good value for a purely economic study, is hardly relevant to a study of the Labour Movement.

Take for example his chapter on labour in the Sudan economy. Instead of using the material he had collected about the various types of labour in the Gezira to explain why trade unionism could not take root among them, he digressed into a socio-economic discussion of the information before him. He has, however, rounded off his chapter with a very good paragraph in which he points out that the picture that emerges from his account of the position of labour in the economy of the Sudan is one of a predominantly agricultural and pastoral economy in which wage-earning affects a relatively small section of the gainfully-employed population; and concludes that it is "not surprising that trade unionism has left agricultural labour almost totally untouched".

It has been said at the beginning of this review that Dr. Fawzi has studied industrial relations against a background of political unrest, unrealistic wage policies and rather advanced labour legislation. This statement is amply verified by the contents of Chapter X; but instead of leaving the matter at that, Dr. Fawzi has squeezed in a further chapter on wages in which he was obviously more concerned with the academic aspects of wage determination than with the relation between wage policies and industrial relations.

Finally Dr. Fawzi has been accused of being too objective in this study. But if there is any ground for this it may be because Dr. Fawzi was so fair to the two sides, that the story has lost some of the colour usually given to it by writers on the workers' side.

ABDEL WAHAB MUSA

An Atlas of African History. By J. D. FAGE. Edward Arnold. 1958. (62 Maps.) 30s.

In newly-developed branches of historical study scholars are often prone to discuss the production of teaching instruments rather than actually to produce them. Dr. Fage's motto is evidently 'Do it Yourself'; and he has been prepared to sacrifice complete scholarly perfection for the sake of immediate availability and practical teaching value. Most of us would agree, perhaps with certain reservations, that this is a sound principle; how many of us would be ready to face the hazards involved in acting upon it? Dr. Fage is to be congratulated both for his courage and for the degree of success he has achieved in an enterprise which might seem more suited to an international team of experts than to the powers of any single scholar. He has not of course produced a perfect atlas; but he has produced a very useful atlas. Above all, he has produced it *now*, when it is so urgently needed. When, some day, a definitive Atlas of African History does appear, it will be very heavily indebted to Dr. Fage's pioneer clearing of the bush.

If some of the detailed criticisms which will follow seem ungenerously minute, it should be borne in mind that their sole object is to indicate improvements which might fairly easily be incorporated when the Atlas is reprinted, as it surely will be. Now that Dr. Fage has achieved his break-through to a reasonably comprehensive and eminently useful atlas, the time has come for consolidation in detailed accuracy, to which persons with special knowledge of particular regions may usefully contribute.

Nobody ever finds in any atlas everything that he is looking for. In this one, West Africa—Guinea and the Western Sudan—seems throughout to receive favoured treatment in comparison with the Nilotic Sudan, Ethiopia and the Eastern Horn; but we could ill spare any of the excellent West African maps, which doubtless reflect Dr. Fage's special interests. There are, however, a few fairly definite omissions which Dr. Fage might consider repairing in a new edition.

(1) Meroë. Dr. Fage gives reasons for omitting the Meroitic kingdom and beginning with Roman Africa. This seems a questionable decision in view of the known and suspected influence of Meroë upon later African development; and the rather extravagant double-page spread devoted to Roman Africa could easily have been compressed to provide the necessary space.

(2) Islam in Africa South of the Sahara in recent times. Relevant information appears in Maps No. 4, 12, 23 and 27; but a fairly detailed map giving a synoptic picture would have been valuable.

(3) Turco-Egyptian Expansion in the Nile Valley and North-East Africa. The bare information appears on Map 31 and (less accurately) on Maps 45 and 46. Maps 34, 41, and 42 by interpreting 'European' in a rather narrow sense, ignore or under-emphasise the Egyptian contribution to the exploration and administrative penetration of the Upper Nile. None of these maps really brings out the fact that in the third quarter of the nineteenth century Egypt was the greatest imperial Power in Africa, and that the upper basin of the Nile was (outside Southern Africa) the best-explored region of the African interior. Perhaps Map 31 might be re-drawn on a larger scale, to include Egypt itself and with the emphasis on Egyptian expansion; and the category 'European' in Maps 34, 41 and 42 should certainly be reconsidered.

(4) The Congo State. A map showing synoptically the development and fluctuation of the State's frontiers (including leases) between 1885 and 1914 would have been valuable, if only because the delimitation of these frontiers was so often a focus of 'partition-of-Africa' diplomacy.

On the whole, however, Dr. Fage has succeeded in combining a very comprehensive coverage with an impressive amount of detailed information. Most of the maps are clearly and attractively drawn, and great ingenuity has been shown in devising symbols to overcome the limitations of black-and-white. But some of the maps (e.g., Nos. 7 to 12) are smaller than they need have been, in that much of the page has been left blank. Perhaps expense forbade larger plates; but No. 12, which is badly overcrowded with detail, should certainly be enlarged in a new edition. In some maps over-heavy shading has been used to show relief of land; in Maps 19 and 31, both of which as it happens deal with the Nile Valley and Ethiopia, the relief-shading tends to obliterate the historical information. Heavy relief-shading gives an ugly appearance to Map 35 (on the Greak Trek), but does not so seriously impair its clarity. The North point of this map is at an angle of some 35° to the vertical edge of the sheet. As Map 36 shows, the same region can be quite adequately represented on the same scale 'right way up'; are there any advantages which compensate for the discomfort caused by the eccentric orientation of Map 35?

In Maps 54, 55 and 56—European settlement in South and South-Central Africa—the symbols employed to indicate rainfall, native reserves and tse-tse infestation should be reconsidered; the pattern which they produce, particularly in Map 55, is very confusing to the eye. A literal reading of the symbols and legend of Map 54 gives the impression that Bantu may not occupy any land at all in Basutoland and Swaziland. In some of the tribal maps relating to Southern Africa (e.g., No. 22), old acquaintances such as the Barotse, the Basuto and the Bechuana are scarcely recognisable disguised as the Lozi, the Sotho and the Tswana; but the experts have evidently decided to insist on this terminology, and the layman can but bow to their decision. (However, Dr. Fage himself is not entirely consistent, and in other maps the traditional nomenclature survives.)

The regional maps illustrating recent economic development (Nos. 58 to 62) are admirable in conception and excellently drawn. In North-West Africa very recent development has already outstripped the cartographer ; an early opportunity should be taken of adding the 'oil' symbol to Map 58 ! The following comments are offered on Map 60 (Modern Economic Development, North East Africa):-

(1) Alexandria has lost its 'modern Harbour' symbol in the inset.

(2) By 1958 the Sudan railway system had been extended from Sennar to Roseires.

(3) Massawa and Djibuti might be considered as candidates for 'harbour' symbols; and Asmara and Addis Ababa for 'airport' symbols. Even though these places may not fully satisfy Dr. Fage's criterion of 'importance', their omission creates the false impression that the Sudan enjoys, in this region of Africa, something like a monopoly of long-distance sea and air transport facilities.

(4) The selection and distribution of 'product symbols' for the Sudan might be revised with advantage.
   (i) *Tobacco* might be shown near the Congo border and in Darfur.
   (ii) The 'gum' symbol might be better in *Northern* Kordofan.
   (iii) *Cotton* should certainly be shown South of El Obeid (Nuba Mountains), and on the coast South of Suakin (Tokar).
   (iv) *Dates* might be shown on the Nile loop South of Dongola.
   (v) The restriction of *Millet* to a single southern area is seriously misleading. It should also be shown in Kordofan, Darfur and the Kassala-Gedaref area.
   (vi) *Camels* (for which no symbol has been provided) should certainly be shown as a 'principal product' of Northern Kordofan and perhaps of the extreme North-East of the Sudan.

(5) Juba has been shown on the East, instead of on the West, bank of the Bahr El Jebel.

The following detailed slips and omissions have been noted in the atlas:-

Maps 4, 9 and 11 ; 'Bini' is hardly an acceptable variant for 'Banū' or 'Banī' in Arabic tribal names.

Map 7 : *For* Shi'ism *read* Shi'ism.

Map 11 : *For* Abd al Wahid *read* 'Abd al Wādid.
For peninsular *read* peninsula.

Map 15 : Might have shown the Kingdom of Alwah with its capital at Soba.

Map 31 : *For* (Jebel) Gehdi *read* Gedir (Sudan Surveys spelling) *or* Qadīr (scientific transliteration).

Map 34 : Might have shown : J. L. Burckhardt's journeys in Nubia : W. G. Browne's journeys in Kordofan and Darfur ; and P. L. Monteil's politically important journey (1890–92) from Senegal to Tripoli via Lake Chad.

This map gives a misleading impression of Marchand's route to Fashoda.

Map 38 : 'Approximate limits of El Mahdi's conquests 1881–9'—the terminal date seems to have been quite arbitrarily chosen ; and the line in any case errs by omitting the Bahr al-Ghazal and Equatorial provinces.

Map 41 : The Sudan-Uganda boundary was not as shown at any time between 1884 and 1900.

The Lado Enclave is incorrectly indicated.

The expeditions northwards from Uganda of Macdonald and Martyr (1898–99), and Carl Peters' journey to Uganda (1889–90), might have been shown.

Map 42 : The Macdonald and Martyr expeditions, and the de Bonchamps expedition from Abyssinia to the White Nile (1897–98) might have been shown.

Marchand's route to Fashoda is misrepresented both in this map and in Map 41. (Admittedly, these 'lines of penetration' are merely diagrammatic, but they need not be gratuitously misleading.)

The dates given for the Darfur frontier and the Sudan-Libya frontier as shown are erroneous. No dates are given for the Sudanese frontiers with Uganda and with Egypt.

Maps 45 and 46 : The extent of Turco-Egyptian penetration into the Sudan and East-Central Africa is seriously under-represented in both maps.

Map 48 : The representation of the Lado Enclave is again incorrect, and does not even agree with that in Map 41.

Map 53 : The 'area of Mahdist domination' should have included the *Southern* Sudan. It was here if anywhere that the impact of the Mahdia upon missionary activity was critical.

After recording these minor blemishes it is only fair to repeat, with emphasis, that this atlas is a *tour de force*. Dr Fage has marshalled his encyclopaedic knowledge with enviable clarity, and has placed all teachers and students of African history very greatly in his debt. His publishers have co-operated by marketing the atlas at a price which, as prices go these days, is far from unreasonable.

G. N. SANDERSON

Scheik Ibrahim (*Johann Ludwig Burckhardt*), *Briefe an Eltern und Geschwister ;* edited by C. BURCKHARDT-SARASIN and H. SCHWABE-BURCKHARDT, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Basel. 1956.

The student of African and Near Eastern history or geography must not expect any revelations from this book. J. L. Burckhardt set out his observations in extensive reports to the "Association for Promoting the Discovery of the Interior Parts of Africa", and these observations were published by this Association in the years subsequent to the traveller's death (1819–29). Burckhardt's letters to his parents and a few other members of his family, which are now printed, were composed to satisfy the interests of a Swiss bourgeois circle thoroughly ignorant of African lore, and did not aspire to remove this ignorance. The two descendants of the same family who edit the present volume still preserve this happy ignorance to a degree sufficient to resettle the Hadendoa (see their sketch-map opp. p. 214) in the Nile circuit of the Nubian desert west of the old caravan track and the present Wadi Halfa railway. Moreover, they add in their notes the highly illuminating comment : "Hadendoa, otherwise called Beja or Bisharin, a Nubian tribe . . ." (p.199). As a matter of fact, only the last third of the letters here collected originated from Burckhardt's Oriental travels ; the largest and most significant group was written during the years spent in England, and these cast some sidelights upon English economic conditions in the period of the Continental System. Particularly interesting is the light thrown upon the facilities for, and limitations upon, the transmission of mail and money orders between London and the Helvetic Republic.

Although relatively irrelevant to Oriental problems, the collection is very valuable indeed for its intimate presentation of one of the most puzzling and enigmatic travellers of the 19th century. The family letters make it quite clear that there is no question of Burckhardt's having been a born adventurer who, in his pioneer journeys through the deserts of Nubia and Arabia, simply followed his natural inclination. The contract with the Association for the Discovery of Africa comes as a sudden decision taken by a desperate young man of sound bourgeois outlook after years of hopeless attempts to fight his way into the English Civil Service : and it is the merit of the present edition to reveal Burckhardt's experiences and feelings during this period of his life. From such beginnings, the young Swiss would seem to have travelled, mentally no less than physically, a long distance in order to become so great a practitioner and admirer of Beduin life and, ultimately, to prefer a Muslim funeral and tomb to Christian burial. One would like to see this long journey further illustrated, and one wonders whether, besides the learned reports to the "Association" and the intimate family letters, further sources of perhaps an equally private but more problematic and less conciliatory character could be traced. But the editors of the *Briefe* do not indicate whether or not they have gone into this question.

P. G. BIETENHOLZ

CORRESPONDENCE

School of Oriental Studies,
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10th February, 1959.

The Editor,
Sudan Notes and Records.

Sir,

The place name Caturea whose location puzzled Mr. K. J. Krotki in *Sudan Notes and Records*, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 161, is probably a mistake for al-Khatmīya.

RICHARD HILL.